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Yugoslavia

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Pedro Ramet

Stalin and Trotsky

George R. Urban Boris Bazhanov
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From Cheka to KGB

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Nationality in the Fabric of Yugoslav Politics

George Schöpflin

YUGOSLAVIA is a kind of successor to Austria-Hungary. Like Francis Joseph's empire, the Yugoslavia that Tito built is an amalgam of a number of nations, each with its own autonomous political culture and loyalties on which is superimposed the Yugoslav state framework and Marxist ideology. What follows is an attempt to explore the weaknesses and strengths of this framework in the aftermath of Tito's departure from the political scene and the inevitable weakening of the structure resulting from the disappearance of the authority that he wielded. At the same time, some thoughts will be offered on the problem of two coexisting tiers of political identity, both with some claim to being " national " and with potential or actual friction arising from these claims; further, the article will also explore the tensions that have arisen in a multi-national state in which some of the constituent nations perceive their national aspirations as not satisfied and those of others as having been excessively satisfied.

A " Yugoslav " identity?

The census figures for the post-war period tell a curious story, which the uninitiated might be tempted to misinterpret. In the 1953 census, 998,698 persons placed themselves in the category of " Yugoslavs, undetermined," a figure that dropped to 317,125 in 1961. *Prima facie,* that would suggest a crisis of major proportions, of an enormous resurgence of local national identification against a central Yugoslav one. In fact, the category " Yugoslav, undetermined " had an entirely different meaning in 1953, in that for that census there was no other category in which ethnic Moslems (of Serbo-Croat mother tongue) could place themselves, whilst in 1961 there was. The lesson to be drawn from this is that the concept of a Yugoslav identity has been very far from straightforward and, indeed, has unexpected connotations.

Central to this is the unique national composition of Yugoslavia. Unlike other multi-national states, no nation or national group enjoys a majority position; the Serbs have a plurality, with about two-fifths of the population. But from the point of view of the other constituent nations, the Serbs are under constant suspicion of abusing their strength in the federation and exploiting the other nations to Serbian advantage. These suspicions can be traced back to the foundation of Yugoslavia in 1918 and the rapid disappearance of the Illyrian ideal of South Slav unity under the impact of Serbian centralism. In the

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inter-war period, the Serbian elite controlled the court, the bureaucracy and the army and ruled Yugoslavia as if it were Serbia writ large.

Paradoxically this situation was partly replicated in the post-1945 period in a different form. The Yugoslav communists emerged as victors from the war-time civil war not least because they stood for a united Yugoslavia and national equality. The Party's thinking on the national question, however, was close to orthodox Marxism-Leninism and it was assumed that once economic inequalities were ironed out, nationalism would disappear. In this context, the interests of a Serbian worker were by definition identical with those of a Croatian worker and the Party's policy was to promote cultural autonomy, under strict central control, with the aim of developing a socialist content.

However, already by the early 1950s the top Party leadership grew increasingly concerned at the persistence of nationalism and began to evolve a policy which would replace local nationalism with loyalty to Yugoslavia.[1] This actually came to be called " Yugoslavism " (*jugoslovenstvo*) in 1958 by Edvard Kardelj in his lengthy discussion entitled *The Development of the Slovene National Question*. The problem was that Yugoslavism, however much the Party may have insisted on its socialist content, was perceived as a new form of Serbian hegemonism and was in any case identified with centralist rule from Belgrade. In this way, an ostensibly non-nationalist ideology, which had the aim of resocializing popular consciousness by the promotion of a higher set of loyalties, was actually interpreted at the popular level as the revival of Serbian nationalism, something incidentally which many Serbs found irksome. There is an interesting parallel here with *Kaisertreue* (loyalty to the Emperor) in Austria-Hungary, which many non-Germans saw as favouring the German national interest.

YUGOSLAVISM was propagated from about 1953 to 1963, i.e. the lifetime of the 1953 constitution. It was essentially an attempt by the party to create a new ideological basis for the national question, to elevate the " Yugoslav " ideal to a level where it would become a new focus of loyalties that would transcend existing local national loyalties. Whilst Yugoslavism contained within it some aspects of Illyrianism, it was widely perceived as a cover for Serbian hegemony, which was not unexpected in the context of the then prevailing centralism. It had certain similarities to the Soviet concept of national development, in which nations would draw together (*sblizhenie*) eventually to merge into a single Soviet nation (*sliyanie*).

There were four main areas where Yugoslavism was propagated. In the first place, it turned on the role of the republics in the federation. From the republican standpoint, republican institutions were a central achievement of the Titoist revolution and a major gain when

[1] This discussion of Yugoslavism is largely based on Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (1968), p. 190 ff.

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compared with the pre-communist system in which local national cultures were largely without institutional protection. Hence arguments by the centralists in the 1950s, which came close to denying the federal nature of the Yugoslav system, ran into stiff opposition. Secondly, in the field of culture the Party made considerable efforts to promote an interpenetration of the different national cultures in the veiled hope that eventually a single Yugoslav culture would emerge. The Novi Sad agreement of 1954, which declared Serbian and Croatian to be a single language written in a Serbian and a Croatian variant (and which was renounced by the Croats in the 1960s), was a high water mark. Equally the campaign to forge a single Yugoslav culture was a failure. Even in the 1950s there were constant complaints that the different republican educational systems were unable to agree on identical school textbooks. In 1961, a leading Serbian intellectual, Dobrica Cosic, claimed that inter-republican cooperation was too passive and would remain so as long as republican institutions existed. Cosic's call for greater unification was automatically interpreted as an attempt to dissolve the republics and to revive Serbian hegemony. Thirdly, the Party encouraged the writing of "Yugoslav" history, based fundamentally on the concept that the creation of a Yugoslav state was an inevitable product of history and the fulfilment of the ago old aspirations of the South Slav peoples. This too was rejected by republican historians, who each tended to give primacy to their own culture in South Slav aspirations and this reinforced local national ideologies. Finally, in his essay on the national question, Kardelj came close to arguing, implicitly at least, that Yugoslavism had a socialist content, whereas the local national ideologies were backward and reactionary. The only true nation, he contended, the sole legitimate focus of loyalties could be Yugoslavia, whilst the republics were hardly more than organs of local self-government. Thanks partly to the obscurity of Kardelj's political language—he was always the most opaque of writers—his arguments were interpreted by republican ideologists to favour the republican argument. In any event, the Party itself abandoned Yugoslavism by the early 1960s and it disappeared completely after the reforms of 1964 and the purge of Alexander Rankovic in 1966.

IF Yugoslavism as an officially sponsored ideology was abandoned, what has remained, one might well ask. The answer appears to lie in a tacit acceptance of the long-term survival of local national cultures, with all that that implies politically, in domestic affairs, but this is coupled with the propagation of a form of state patriotism externally. The watershed may very well have been the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, an event which forced Yugoslavia to take stock for the second time in 20 years of the possibility of hostile Soviet action. The response of the Yugoslav population was to rally round and to sink internal national differences in the face of a perceived foreign

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threat. A small anecdote might serve as an illustration. I visited Novi Sad, the capital of the Vojvodina with a large Hungarian population, in March 1969 and, *inter alia,* enquired about the attitude of the Hungarian minority towards the Yugoslav state. The response (from a Serb) was that all the nationalities of Yugoslavia, Hungarians included, were completely united in their support for the Yugoslav state and that although there were Hungarians in the units sent to the frontier with Hungary, the potential front line, there was not one instance of desertion, which had not been the case in 1948. In other words, in the face of a serious threat of invasion, a Yugoslav loyalty had prevailed over internal disagreements among the local national groups.

Since the post-1972 recentralization, the Yugoslav authorities have made use of this feeling through periodic campaigns on nationally flavoured issues. Here they have applied a principle that the national problems of one nation are the concern of all. Thus when the national issue which is made the subject of a campaign is a Slovene one—the problem of the Slovenes of Carinthia—the entire Yugoslav press, from Macedonia to Croatia, would take part in an orchestrated campaign of ritualistic abuse. Other similar campaigns had Italy as their target over Trieste, and Bulgaria over Sofia's refusal to accept Macedonian nationhood. All these campaigns have involved the whole of Yugoslavia, albeit the local nation concerned would tend to devote greater attention to it, and it had the aim of rallying opinion throughout the country to what would otherwise have been regarded as a local issue and thereby to establish a kind of overall Yugoslav loyalty.

Whilst relations with the Soviet Union are not the subject of such campaigns, it is worth adding that this is an area where a shared loyalty to the Yugoslav state is the strongest. Whatever the country's leaders may say about non-alignment and the dangers facing Yugoslavia from the West, there is no doubt that for the majority of the country's population, the Soviet Union is the greatest threat to independence. This was what gave national, i.e. Yugoslav, unity a boost in 1948, in 1968 and is what gives the anti-Bulgarian campaigns a much greater intensity than the anti-Austrian or anti-Italian campaigns. The Bulgarian media have hardly to breathe the words "San Stefano" before the Yugoslavs have rounded on them in the most outspoken terms. The fear which lies close to the surface (and this does less than justice to Bulgaria's own national aspirations) is that the Bulgarians are so far in the Soviet pocket that they would not be brave enough to articulate demands concerning Macedonia without Soviet backing and without in some way carrying out a Soviet design.

A Yugoslav identity is also fostered through the reiteration of the partisan myth, the events of the second world war. This process is complicated by the Party's claim to legitimacy through victory in the civil war, but the national unity of the partisan forces and the principle

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of brotherhood and unity (*bratstvo i jedinstvo*) are specifically derived from the wartime struggle. The effectiveness of this myth, however, does seem to be diminishing with time and for the youngest generation, the tales of heroism constantly projected by the Yugoslav media have begun to be a little repetitive, not to say irrelevant.

Yugoslavism and the category "Yugoslav" do, nevertheless, continue to have some function. Occasionally voices are heard arguing in favour of developing an internal, as opposed to an external, Yugoslav consciousness, essentially stating the case that there can be no real Yugoslav community without an identity that would place Yugoslav interests above all local national ones.[2] But the strength of resistance from the republics remains strong and matters have remained at the level of debate rather than the implementation of policy.

The category "Yugoslav, nationally undeclared" appears to play a more central role. In the first place, it has become the national identity of a section of the Party cadre, which presumably does not wish to be drawn into local national conflicts. It has also been suggested that the category is used by children of mixed marriages, especially Serbs and Croats, and by members of the armed forces, probably serving officers. Tables 5 and 6 show disproportionately high numbers of "Yugoslavs" within the Croatian Party membership, in the main garrison towns and in the 1979 intake of the League of Communists' Political School. Finally, the approximately 100,000 Moslems of the Sanjak of Novipazar, a part of Serbia, declared themselves "Yugoslav" at the 1971 census. It will be interesting to see whether this pattern is maintained in 1981.

The Serb-Croat conflict

There is general agreement that the Serb-Croat relationship is the weakest link in the Yugoslav multi-national state.[3] Indeed, the entire history of Yugoslavia has turned on the inability of Serbs and Croats to find a common formula for the constitution of the state. The roots of this can be traced back to the nineteenth century, when modern nationalism first arose as the dominant political ideology. The Serbian national ideology was essentially an integrative and centralizing doctrine, derived from the Serbian experience of struggle against outside powers and adding new territories to the state through military victory. The Croats on the other hand drew their political experience from

[2] Predrag Matvejevic, "Svijest o zajednistvu" [The communal consciousness], *Vjesnik u srijedu*, 12 Nov. 1977; Momcilo Stojanovic, "Postoji li jugoslovenska kultura?" [Is there a Yugoslav culture?], ibid.

[3] My own views on Croatian nationalism are set out in George Schöpflin, "The Ideology of Croatian Nationalism," *Survey*, Winter 1973 (No. 86), and more recent developments in "The National Question in Yugoslavia," *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 7, No. 6. See also Gerald Gilbert Govorchin, "Pravastvo and the Croatian National Issue," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 1; Paul Hehn, "The Origins of Modern Pan-Serbism," ibid., Vol. 9, No. 2; and Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia* (1971), p. 53 ff.

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lengthy legalistic arguments with Vienna and Budapest with the aim of separating Croatia from Hungarian overlordship and, therefore, the Croatian national ideology was coloured by centrifugal aims. Thus when the Croats found that they were not being treated as equal partners by the Serbs after 1918, Illyrian idealism faded and the Serbs came to be viewed as the new oppressor. The disintegration of the state in 1941 was followed by intercommunal massacres and eventually by its reconstitution under Tito. The recentralization after 1945, notably the Yugoslavism of the 1950s, came increasingly to be resented by the Croats as yet a new variant of Serbian supremacy. The revival of Croat claims to autonomy in the 1960s was, equally, perceived by the Serbs not as the legitimate aspirations of the Croat nation, but it was automatically associated with the wartime fascist anti-Serbian regime of Ante Pavelic, the NDH (the Independent State of Croatia). For most Croats this association was an intolerable affront, even while many Serbs felt that the Croats had not only not atoned for their wartime crimes, but remained irremediably *ustasa* in nature. Thus the equation may be reduced to the following: in Croatian eyes, Yugoslavia came to be seen as an instrument of Serbian domination, reinforced by the ready confusion of Belgrade as federal capital with Belgrade as the capital of Serbia, and also by the apparent preponderance of Serbs in the federal institutions. Contrariwise, the Serbian attitude was that the Croats were seeking only to disrupt the federation in an unbridled pursuit of their national interests.

As if this complex of misunderstandings and misperceptions was not sufficient, Serb-Croat relations have been further envenomed by the problem of the Serbian minority in Croatia, the *precani*. This minority has in many ways been the pivot of the entire relationship and to that extent of Yugoslav politics since 1918. About 15 per cent of the population of the Croatian republic are Serbs and they form much higher local concentrations in some areas (Slavonia, parts of the Croatian littoral and parts of Dalmatia). Thus the *precani* are too numerous to be ignored by the Croats (as the small Italian and Hungarian minorities are) and, what is more significant, they have come to play a key role in Croatian affairs. As a minority-within-a-minority, the *precani* have long experience of articulating their interests and undoubtedly contributed to the creation of mutually negative national stereotypes between Serbs and Croats in the inter-war period. In 1941 they were the victims of the massacres perpetrated by the NDH and not unnaturally joined the only political force that seemed to offer them any protection, the Partisans. The result was that after the war, the *precani* came to play a central role in Croatian institutions. Their strength in four party organizations in nationally mixed communes is shown in Table 5; from the figures it might even be inferred that for many Croats, the Party is perceived as a Serbian institution. In the same way, the *precani* play a preponderant role in the coercive insti-

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tutions of the state—the army, the police, the secret police and the veterans organizations.

THUS from the Croatian standpoint, Serbian hegemonism did not merely mean domination by Belgrade (an abstract form of Serbian domination), but, more seriously, by the concrete form of the local Serbian policeman or Party secretary. The tensions that this perception has created continue to be expressed in various surrogate forms, for example through literary and linguistic debates. The intensity of the sensitivities involved were shown by the polemics of the Zagreb publication *Oko*, in which a literary reader put out by Prosvjeta, the publishing house of the Serbs of Croatia, was savagely attacked by its critics, who *inter alia* ridiculed references to the "tragedy of the Serbian people" and the suggestion that the Serbs were somehow "threatened." The Serbian response was equally bitter and rested, essentially, on a reiteration of *precani* fears based on the very real experiences of this minority.[4] Another publication by Prosvjeta also proved to be highly controversial, despite its apparent innocuousness. The book *Govor Banije i Kordun* (The speech of the Banija and Kordun regions) contained illustrative sentences like, "When I see this person Nogic or hear something about him, I remember that his grandfather killed my own father," an unmistakable reference to the wartime massacres.[5] The pettiness to which such national-linguistic disputes can descend was shown by the Croatian transport administration, which issued notices that the road between the settlements of Skrad, the "Goranka" tavern and Stubica would be closed; the reference to the tavern was to avoid having to name the village where it was situated—Srpske Moravice.[6]

From the Serbian standpoint, Croatian demands for autonomy were interpreted not only as being aimed at the integrity of the state, but also as having the *precani*, a hard-pressed group of co-nationals, as their target. And given that the *precani* had been the object of genocide within living memory, that response was not entirely surprising. The Croats further helped to intensify Serbian suspicions by the very dusty answer they gave in 1971, in the midst of their own national "euphoria," to the demands of the Serbs of Croatia.

ANOTHER facet of this problem is that pro-Soviet sentiments (Cominformism) have generally tended to be stronger among the *precani* than any other national group in Yugoslavia (in this case, this also includes the Serbs of Bosnia, the Vojvodina and Kosovo, as well as Montenegrins). The majority of those tried as Cominformists in 1974–76 were *precani*—one of them, Dusan Brkic, had been deputy Minister of Interior in Croatia after the war—and they established

[4] *Oko*, 17 May 1979 and 31 May 1979.
[5] Ibid. 31 May 1979.
[6] Ibid. 12 July 1979.

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contacts with the Soviet Union via the Soviet consulate in Zagreb. Evidently they posed a major problem for the Croatian leadership, which had used their support in the post-1971 purges and then found themselves confronted with something of a Frankenstein's monster. The fears of the *precani* for their future are very real, that in the post-Tito era there will be a settling of accounts at their expense. Hence the statement from one of their number, " the Serbs of Croatia will not become the Palestinians of Europe."

Clearly in all this there is ample ground for sowing mistrust and for intensifying already powerful fears. The legacy of the 1971–72 clampdown has driven Croatian nationalism underground and has reinforced the arguments of those who hold that the Croatian nation will only be free to determine its own destiny when it has rid itself of the Serbian incubus. Yet however strong these separatist ideas may be, they should be set against (1) the common habits of having lived together in a single state for generations, (2) the Illyrian currents that still incline the great majority of Croats to see their future in a South Slav state, and (3) the problem of the Croats outside Croatia, in Bosnia-Hercegovina and in the Vojvodina whose national position is safeguarded in Croat eyes by the existence of Yugoslavia.

At the same time, mention should also be made of the beginnings of what could be a highly significant development among the Serbs—the emergence of something like a Serbian separatism. This has been most strongly expressed by Dobrica Cosic in his " Oration," in which he argued that the Serbs had made the greatest sacrifices for Yugoslavia and had received the least in return. The background to these sentiments has been what the Serbs have perceived as a series of " defeats " of their national positions in Bosnia, Croatia and the Kosovo, the inevitable corollary of the consolidation of the national positions of the Moslems, Croats and Albanians (the last is particularly resented). Thus the Serbs may be said to be suffering from a " loss of empire " complex, one result of which is the proposition that perhaps the Serbian nation would be better off without the other South Slavs.

A Moslem nationhood?

One of the original contributions of communist policy makers to the national question has been the artificial creation of new nations, on the basis of some pre-existing factors, with the political objective of resolving actual or potential national conflicts. The emergence of the Moslems as a separate nation, while not yet completed, is a process of this kind and if it succeeds, it should have the result of ending one source of friction between Serbs and Croats.[7] Traditionally both Serbs

[7] There is still very little material on the Moslems in Western languages. David Dyker, " The Ethnic Muslims of Bosnia—Some Basic Socio-Economic Data," *Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 50, No. 119 is still useful, as is Johann Georg Reissmüller, *Jugoslawien: Vielvölkerstaat zwischen Ost und West* (1971), p. 69 ff. See also Ahmed Smajlovic, " Moslems in Yugoslavia," *Glasnik vorhovnog islamskog starjesinstva u SFRJ*, Nov.–Dec. 1978.

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and Croats claimed the Moslems of Serbo-Croat mother tongue as members of their nation; in the NDH they were classified as " Croats of the Moslem faith." But the Moslems themselves were uncertain as to their identity. Until 1918 they were the last bastion of *Kaisertreue*; between the wars, they veered towards the Croats rather than the Serbs, but after 1945 a substantial number of Moslems gave their national identity as Serbian. Moslems were regarded as potentially disloyal after the war and the Serbian-dominated secret police, the UDBa, tended to favour Serbian interests in Bosnia-Hercegovina, where the great majority of Moslems live. In the 1960s, however, especially after the power of the UDBa was broken in 1966, the Moslems began to articulate a separate identity, neither Serbian nor Croatian. They watched the 1971 crisis in Croatia from the sidelines and sought mainly to ensure that the impact of Croatian nationalism on Bosnian Croats would be limited. The 1971 census returned a plurality of Moslems in Bosnia-Hercegovina for the first time and the proportion of Serbs in the republic dropped. In other words, a statistically significant number of Moslems switched nationality.

Since 1971 Yugoslavia has witnessed something very like a Moslem religious and national revival and there has been a clear-cut movement to establish a Moslem identity which would subsume Islam as a religion into a broader cultural and political doctrine. This process has run into a good deal of opposition from Serbs, who have remained rather reluctant to accept the autonomy of Moslem nationhood (e.g. see *Borba*, 17 Mar. 1973). However, the establishment of a Moslem nationhood has posed a serious and essentially unresolved ideological problem for Yugoslav policy makers. The primary determinant of Moslem nationhood must by definition be religion. Yet religion is clearly regarded as a hostile ideology by Marxists. This contradiction has only been partly resolved by stressing the concept of a Moslem culture in which religion is only one element and there is a good deal of evidence that the rise of Moslem nationhood has been accompanied by a corresponding rise of Islam. A possible indicator of this may be the number of those who will declare themselves " Yugoslavs, undetermined " in the next census (presumably in 1981), for this category is now largely used by atheist Moslems who feel they cannot separate culture and religion.

The Kosovo and its Albanians

One of the great imponderables for the future of Yugoslavia is its Albanian minority.[8] There were over 1·1 million Albanians in 1971 and this figure must by now be approaching 1·5 million as the Albanians have an exceptionally high birth rate. Although they are often referred

[8] On the Kosovo, see Robert R. King, *Minorities under Communism* (1973), pp. 124–145; Peter R. Prifti, *Socialist Albania since 1944* (1978), pp. 222–241; and Patrick F. R. Artisien, " Some Recent Developments in Yugoslav-Albanian Relations," Conference Paper presented to NASEES Conference, Cambridge 1979, cited with author's permission.

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to as the Albanians of the Kosovo, there is also a sizeable Albanian minority in Macedonia—c. 280,000 strong—in the area Albanians call the Dzamija, the districts marching with Albania proper. The Albanians are overwhelmingly Moslem. The unresolved question is whether the Yugoslavs have succeeded in creating a separate Albanian political consciousness that is forceful enough to withstand the imperative of unity with the Albanian state. In recent years, the evidence has suggested a tentative " yes " to this question. Observers will quote the much higher standard of living in the Kosovo and the incomparably greater political freedom. In the last analysis, however, this is not wholly convincing, as in situations of crisis rationality tends to be thrown to the winds and the Albanians of Yugoslavia may well find the appeal of Albanian unity irresistible. The suggestion has even been made that it is the Kosovo that will play the role of Piedmont and absorb Albania, a possibility given the much higher level of cultural achievement and greater political sophistication of the Yugoslav Albanians.

The factors of integration and disintegration can be readily listed. A measure of prosperity, the private ownership of land and political latitude have already been suggested (one can dispense with propagandistic claims like " the superiority of the self-management system "). To these should be added the evolution of an Albanian political elite that owes its power to Yugoslav institutions and has a vested interest in them. Religious freedom should be added to this list because religion is actively persecuted in Albania. As against these, there are the disintegrative factors of the imperative of national unity, the shared culture and language. It is noteworthy that the Yugoslav Albanians adopted the Albanian standard language in the 1960s, even though it was based on the southern (Tosk) dialect instead of the northern (Gheg) dialect which they spoke themselves. To these may be added a long history of friction with the Slavs, intensified by religious difference, which is fuelled by the traditional contempt which Serbs and Montenegrins feel for the Albanians. The Albanians, on the other hand, still resent the rule of the UDBa over them until 1966, which was for all practical purposes indistinguishable from a colonial regime, and the power which Serbs still exercise over them. In the final analysis Yugoslavia is, after all, the state of the South Slavs and by no stretch of the imagination can that include the Albanians.

Furthermore it is not at all certain that the efforts of the Yugoslav authorities to integrate the newly emergent Albanian intelligentsia and political elite have gone far enough. Whilst the proportion of Albanians in employment in the Kosovo has risen markedly between 1966 and 1976, from 51·1 per cent to 59·7 per cent, this was still well below the percentage of Albanians in the Kosovo (probably over 70 per cent). In other words, there was still a disproportionately large number of Serbs working in official and managerial positions, and,

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although figures on this have not been available, the chances are that the proportion of Slavs in the police is very high. This is exactly the kind of phenomenon which breeds resentment and deters integration. In education, the Yugoslav authorities proved to be rather slow in establishing a fully-fledged, separate Albanian-language network of schools and an independent Albanian-language university at Pristina (set up in 1969). The latter was established only after the riots of 1968 which had demanded that this step should be taken.

Over and above all this, the Albanians have failed in their political claim for the establishment of the Kosovo as the seventh republic of Yugoslavia. On grounds of demography the Albanian case is strong: there are more Albanians in Yugoslavia than there are Montenegrins or Macedonians, who do have their own republics. The Yugoslav authorities, on the other hand, have held back from this move for four reasons: (1) a strong residual attachment to the Slav nature of Yugoslavia and the recognition that the elevation of the Albanians to republican status would alter this; (2) Serbian resentment of Albanian gains; (3) fears that an Albanian republic would seek union with Albania; and (4) the problem of the Albanian irredenta within Yugoslavia. This last involves the Albanians in the tangled Macedonian question. Western Macedonia, Dzamija, is overwhelmingly Albanian and the treatment of this minority by the Macedonians has been far less favourable than what the Albanians of the Kosovo have achieved. A Kosovo republic would find it difficult to refrain from pressing for the unification of all Albanian inhabited lands within Yugoslavia into a single administrative unit, but this is a demand that Belgrade cannot possibly meet. The detaching of the Dzamija from Macedonia would directly undermine Macedonian loyalty to the Yugoslav state, which is based on the principle that Yugoslavia has been the guarantor of the integrity of the Macedonian nation and its territories. The corollary of this is that a partition of Macedonia would probably result in a substantial number of Macedonians looking to Bulgaria rather than Yugoslavia. Thus with regard to the Albanians, Yugoslav policy makers are caught in an insoluble dilemma; the chances are that the status quo will win out, with the consequence of a higher risk of Albanian disaffection.

The Macedonian question

This is perhaps the most widely and vociferously discussed national issue in Yugoslavia.[9] Yet it is something of a false problem in terms of Yugoslavia's national integrity. Given the proposition that Yugoslavia has provided the impulse and the support for the creation of a separate Macedonian nationhood, Macedonian loyalty towards Yugoslavia will not be eroded by Bulgaria, the only viable pole of counter-

[9] Macedonia is covered by Shoup, pp. 144-183, and King, pp. 187-219, as well as Reissmüller, pp. 107-118.

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attraction, and can be taken for granted. As long as the Bulgarian attitude to Macedonian nationhood is to deny its existence and, for example, to refuse to sign international agreements in Macedonian on the grounds that there is no such language, Macedonians will not be tempted to switch loyalties. Thus with the exception of the Dzamija, the Macedonian national question mostly concerns Soviet-Yugoslav relations and Macedonian self-assertion at the expense of the Bulgars. The evidence is that today Macedonian nationhood is a going concern and that the bulk of Macedonians accept it. Hence even in a serious crisis, Belgrade can place greater reliance on the loyalty of the Macedonians than might appear at first sight, for they have far more to lose from a disruption of Yugoslavia than they can possibly gain.

The factors of central power

(1) The Party. Since the 1971 crisis, when the Party was seriously affected by republican nationalism, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) has been revitalized and detached from republican-national loyalties. Control by the centre is assured and discipline has been restored. This does, of course, arouse fears of Serbian hegemonism, but until now the leadership has been extremely careful to maintain a national balance at the top of the LCY (and in state bodies) and to prevent domination by any one national group. This is why the death of Edvard Kardelj, a Slovene, was felt to be such a problem at the time, for he was acceptable to both Serbs and Croats and was besides a senior party figure of recognized all-Yugoslav standing.

(2) The armed forces. The army has traditionally been something of a Serbian and Montenegrin preserve and a very high proportion of officers are of these two nationalities. This has meant that the Yugoslav armed forces, which are more politicized than is customary in communist states, are perceived as an instrument of Serbian power (Montenegrins are generally regarded as more Serbian than the Serbs, a somewhat questionable proposition). This perception is not necessarily accurate. The armed forces themselves see their role as being the only serious all-Yugoslav institution and as the guarantor of the country's integrity in the face of fissiparous local nationalisms. They were specifically entrusted with this guarantor function by Tito in his 1977 armed forces day (22 Dec.) speech. In 1971 the loyalty of the armed forces to Yugoslavia was proved by their readiness to back Tito and the recentralization against the Croats and then the other republican leaderships. The only remaining question is how the armed forces would interpret their guarantor role if the Serbs, say, chose a closer link with the Soviet Union and the other nations rejected this. Whether the armed forces would interpret the best guarantee of Yugoslav integrity as Soviet support from without and Serbian centralism within is impossible to predict, but it is a very real fear among the other nations of Yugoslavia.

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TABLE 1

The National Composition of Yugoslavia 1948, 1953, 1961, 1971

	1948		*1953*		*1961*		*1971*	
Nationality	*Number*	*Per cent*	*Number*	*Per cent*	*Number*	*Per cent*	*Number*	*Per cent*
Serbs	6,547,117	41·4	7,065,923	41·7	7,806,213	42·1	8,123,246	39·7
Croats	3,784,353	24·0	3,975,550	23·5	4,293,860	23·1	4,526,782	22·1
Slovenes	1,414,432	9·0	1,487,100	8·8	1,589,192	8·6	1,678,032	8·2
Moslems	808,921	5·1	[a]	—	972,954	5·3	1,729,932	8·4
Yugoslavs	[a]		998,698	5·9	317,125	1·7	273,077	1·3
Macedonians	810,126	5·1	893,247	5·3	1,045,530	5·6	1,194,784	5·8
Albanians	750,431	4·8	754,425	4·5	914,760	4·9	1,309,523	6·3
Hungarians	496,492	3·2	502,175	3·0	504,368	2·7	477,374	2·3
Montenegrins	425,703	2·7	466,093	2·8	513,833	2·8	508,843	2·4
Turks	97,954	0·6	259,535	1·5	182,964	1·0	127,920	0·6
Vlachs	102,953	0·7	36,728	0·2	—	—	21,990	0·1
Other	532,616	3·3	497,279	2·8	408,492	2·2	530,869	2·6
TOTAL	15,772,098		16,936,573		18,549,291		20,522,972	

[a] In the 1948 census, individuals were permitted to declare themselves "Moslem," but there was no category of "Yugoslav"; this was reversed in the 1953 census, so that most Serbo-Croat Moslems of Bosnia used the "Yugoslav" category for their national affiliation. In 1961, "Moslem" reappeared and the Bosnians switched back; the disproportionately large increase in their number between 1961 and 1971 indicates that a large section of this group, which had previously declared itself Serbian, now felt free to declare itself "Moslem."
Source: Yugoslav statistical accounts for 1948, 1953, 1961 and 1971.

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TABLE 2

Nationality Breakdown by Republic, 1971

Republic	*% of Yugoslav Population in Republic**	*Nationality breakdown (by per cent)*
Bosnia-Herzegovina	18·3	Moslem 39·6; Serb 37·2; Croat 20·6; other 2·6
Croatia	21·6	Croat 79·4; Serb 14·2; other 6·4
Macedonia	8·0	Macedonian 69·3; Albanian 17·0; Turk 6·6; other 7·1
Montenegro	2·6	Montenegrin 67·2; Moslem 13·3; Serb 7·5; Albanian 6·7; other 6·3
Slovenia	8·4	Slovene 94·0; Croat 2·5; other 3·5
Serbia	25·6	Serb 89·5; Moslem 2·5; Albanian 1·2; other 6·8
Vojvodina	9·5	Serb 55·8; Hungarian 21·7; Croat 7·1; other 14·6
Kosovo	6·1	Albanian 73·7; Serb 18·4 Montenegrin 2·5; other 5·0

* Total Yugoslav population in 1971 was 20,522,972.

Source: Adapted from *Popis stanovnistva Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1971).

Reproduced from Bogdan D. Denitch, *The Legitimation of a Revolution: the Yugoslav Case* (1976), p. 109.

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TABLE 3

Nationalities Breakdown of the Officers' Corps of the Yugoslav Army

According to a recent study by A. Ross Johnson of the Rand Corporation,[10] this over-abundance of Montenegrin representatives also emerges in a breakdown of the nationality composition of the Yugoslav People's Army officer corps (in per cent):

Nationality	*General officers (1970)**	*Entire officer corps (1970)*	*Total population (1971)***
Serb	46·7	57·4†	39·7
Croat	19·3	14·7	22·1
Moslem	3·2	4·0††	8·4
Slovene	6·3	5·2	8·2
Alibanian	—	1·2	6·4
Montenegrin	19·3	10·3†	2·5
Hungarian	0·4	0·6	2·3
Other	0·9	1·0††	4·6

† estimate.
†† approximation.
* latest available figures.
** official census data.

As can be seen, the Montenegrins, who represent only 2·5 per cent of Yugoslavia's total population, have 19·3 per cent of all generals and 10·3 per cent of the entire officer corps, while the Moslems, with 8·2 per cent of the country's total population, have only 3·2 per cent generals and 4·0 per cent of the entire officer corps.

10 A. Ross Johnson, "The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: An Historical Sketch," the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, Jan. 1978, p. 19.

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TABLE 4

The breakdown of the nationality composition of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, both of the republic's population (official estimates) and the party (official data) is as follows:

Nationality	*Number of Population*	*% of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Total Population*	*Number of Party Members*
Moslems	1,500,000	37·5	86,869
Serbs	1,400,000	35·0	120,438
Croats	800,000	20·0	30,493
Others	300,000	7·5	18,450
Total	4,000,000	100·0	256,250

As can be seen, even though the Moslems represent 37·5 per cent of the total population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, their share in party membership is only 33·9 per cent; that of the Serbs, however, is 47 per cent, even though they represent only 35 per cent of the total population in the republic. As far as the Croats are concerned, they represent 20 per cent of the total population, while they form only 11·9 per cent of party membership.

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TABLE 5

Nationalities Breakdown in Croatia and certain communes in Croatia: population and Party membership (in percentages)

	Population			*Party membership†*			*Participation in Party membership by nationality*		
	Croats	*Serbs*	*Yugoslavs**	*Croats*	*Serbs*	*Yugoslavs*	*Croats*	*Serbs*	*Yugoslavs*
Croatia	79·4	14·2	1·9	64·3	23·7	7·5	5·6	11·6	27·1
Bjelovar	79·9	13·2**	2·6	44·7	65·3	n.a.	1·7	12·7	
Gospic	65·0	31·6	1·7	41·0	59·0	n.a.	4·4	13·5	
Karlovac	67·8	28·6	2·5	47·5	52·5	n.a.	6·5	18·3	
Sisak	69·8	23·1	2·8	53·7	46·3	n.a.	6·3	16·4	

* The proportion of Yugoslavs (nationally undetermined) is especially high in ethnically mixed areas, in industrial centres and garrison towns (percentages in brackets) like Pula (4·3), Vukovar (6·1), Osijek (4·9) and Rovinj (4·1). This suggests that children of mixed marriage in some areas opt for this national category and the disproportionately high number of Yugoslavs with Party membership implies that for many Party members, this category is the one that resolves Serb-Croat tensions most easily.

** In *NIN*, the percentage of Serbs in Bjelovar is given as 2·6, clearly an error, which was corrected from the census returns. Out of 105 communes (*opstina*) in Croatia, there is a Serbian majority in 12 (Benkovac, Donji Lapac, Dvor, Glina, Gracac, Knin, Kostjanica, Obrovac, Pakrac, Titova Korenica, Vojnic and Vrginmost). Figures from 1971 census returns.

† The figures in this category are slightly misleading, inasmuch as Party membership breakdown was calculated on the basis of the 1971 national breakdown figures and from the figures in column 3, that is *without* the data for nationalities other than Croats and Serbs. Furthermore, the Party membership figures probably date from the late 1970s, whereas the nationality figures are from 1971, so that there will be some distortion here—but it should be within tolerable limits.

Compiled on the basis of information in *NIN*, 16 Dec. 1979, Dorothea Kiefer, " ' Strukturmängel ' des BdK-Kroatien," *Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa*, Vol. 29, No. 1–2 (1980), pp. 21–22 and SFRJ, *Popis Stanovnistva i Stanova*, Vol. 6, Tab. 1.2 (Belgrade, 1974).

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TABLE 6

The nationalities structure of the LCJ Political School, 1979

Serbs	62·2
Yugoslavs	21·7
Montenegrins	8·4
Croats	3·5
Macedonians	1·4
Moslems	1·4
Slovenes	0·7
Albanians	0·7

Komunist, 11 Jan. 1980.

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TABLE 7

Nationally Mixed Marriages in Yugoslavia
(in percentages)

	1965	1976
Croat men with Croat women	88·35	86·39
Croat men with Serb women	6·40	6·98
Croat men with women of other nationality	5·25	6·63
Serb men with Serb women	88·45	89·41
Serb men with Croat women	5·98	4·22
Serb men with women of other nationality	5·57	6·37
Montenegrin men with Montenegrin women	67·56	68·83
Montenegrin men with Serb women	20·66	21·05
Montenegrin men with Croat women	5·38	3·67
Montenegrin men with women of other nationality	6·40	6·45
Slovene men with Slovene women	93·82	92·86
Slovene men with Croat women	3·95	3·56
Slovene men with women of other nationality	2·23	3·58
" Yugoslav " men with " Yugoslav " women	83·10	67·09
" Yugoslav " men with Croat women	5·15	12·52
" Yugoslav " men with Serb women	5·19	11·92
" Yugoslav " men with women of other nationality	6·56	8·47

These figures suggest a comparatively high rate of Serb-Croat intermarriage and one which has remained stable over the given period. The figures for Montenegrins would imply a high and stable rate of intermarriage with Serbs, something which appears to confirm assumptions of " closeness " between these two national groups. There is no apparent explanation for the curious intermarriage figures for " Yugoslavs."

Source: Based on the figures in Dorothea Kiefer, " Eine Ubersicht in Zahlen: Nationale Mischehen in Jugoslawien," *Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa*, Vol. 23, No. 6–7 (1980), pp. 162–164, which cites *Statisticki bilten*, No. 728, p. 14 and *Jugoslovenski Pregled*, No. 11–12, 1979, p. 395.

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Yugoslavia after Tito

The Grey Zone on NATO's Balkan Flank

Stevan K. Pavlowitch

As Yugoslavs, we need the Americans to protect us from the Russians. As Communists, we need the Russians to protect us from the Americans.[1]

THE Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, coupled with Tito's illness, seemed to startle the dreamers of *détente*. All of a sudden, every news commentator discovered that the Soviet leadership, during or after Brezhnev's lifetime, when facing major problems and confident of possessing military power, might be presented with other temptations. Some of these could well be on the Balkan flank of NATO: the Greco-Turkish dispute, Turkey itself shaken by crisis, an isolated and uncertain Albania after Hoxha, Yugoslavia without Tito. Europeans at large (not just Italians and Greeks) discovered that the land of the South Slavs was no longer what its public relations agencies told us it was—the dashing and progressive leader of the third world—but a poor and unsteady country in Europe which could become a Soviet target, and that if Soviet tanks were to rumble around Trieste, or Soviet nuclear submarines berth in Adriatic ports, the whole strategy of NATO in the Mediterranean would have to be reconsidered. For a while, all Western eyes were turned on what has been called the " grey zone of NATO." [2]

The Succession

Tito's reign was a long one, and Yugoslavia was " Tito's Yugoslavia " [3] for longer than most people could remember. His death, like his reign, also lasted a long time. He was taken ill on New Year's eve and died on 4 May 1980, a few days before his 88th birthday, after a macabre series of unprecedented medical interventions. From the moment the President went into hospital in Ljubljana until his death four months later, the government operated in an eerie atmosphere. Even though

[1] This was allegedly said by a Yugoslav foreign secretary, and is quoted by Pierre Hassner, " Western European Perceptions of the USSR," in *Daedalus*, Winter 1979, p. 137.

[2] In 1968 the NATO Council had sent up warning signals to deter the USSR from any move against Yugoslavia while US Secretary of State Rusk had spoken of a " grey zone," including Yugoslavia, that was to be shielded by the Alliance.

[3] This has been a *leitmotiv* of Yugoslav propaganda, and it is also the title of Sir Duncan Wilson's recent book, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (Cambridge, 1979).

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it was obviously functioning for the first time without Tito as high arbiter, there was a constant coming and going of dignitaries between Belgrade and Ljubljana. It was necessary for the collective leadership to be seen to function normally without the supreme leader. At the same time, the supreme leader had to be seen to breathe his authority, his legitimacy, his charisma, his life almost, into his collective heirs. In all this there was a certain amount of clumsiness, due to the lack of precedent and the habit of secrecy.[4] Through the contradictions and mysteries, one could sense the wish to show that the regime could cope, but that it could hardly admit as much as long as the old leader was even vaguely conscious. The dying leader had to be kept alive long enough to give the government time to make the necessary preparations, funereal, psychological, diplomatic, military; but then no one dared switch off the machines.[5]

The one subject absolutely taboo in Yugoslavia was speculation on the succession. Tito had created a collective leadership, which he saw as a transition to a leaderless mechanism. During the previous five years, his notion of collective government had been institutionalized and extended to the point where, when and if fully implemented, all political and social organizations, from the commune to the federation, were to have a collective executive with an annually rotating chair, in order to discourage personal leadership. The two bodies at the top that were operating under Tito, then without Tito, are the nine-man State Presidency (Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) representing the six federated republics and the two autonomous provinces along with the presiding officer of the Party Presidency, and the Party Presidency of 23 men and women (Presidency of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia) representing the constituent Party organizations of the republics, of the provinces and of the armed forces. The latter is the supreme policy-making body.

A collective leadership under two rotating annual chairmen is not a system that promises to have a long life, especially if it is to implement fully Tito's idea of a permanent game of musical chairs. It is believed by many not so much to institutionalize a perpetual collegiate regime of rotating office-holders as to give all possible contenders for the succession an equal chance, even though the more

[4] Work on the mausoleum started immediately, yet there was a long delay in announcing the President's death, which occurred just after 3 p.m. At 4.30 p.m. on that day, the usual second daily medical bulletin announced that Tito's health had again reached a critical stage, whereas he had already been dead for almost an hour and a half. The proclamation announcing the death of the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, Marshal of Yugoslavia, Comrade Josip Broz Tito, was not made until shortly before 6 p.m.

[5] The parallel with Franco's death immediately comes to mind, even though Tito survived for almost twice as long (105 days) as Franco (57 days) after his final operation. In fact there is many a fascinating parallel to be drawn between the two dictators, from the moment when each entered his country's capital as the leader of the victorious faction in the civil war, until his death as uncrowned king 30-odd years later.

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popular or stronger figures that had emerged had already been removed.

The Armed Forces

Only the armed forces have been spared collegiate and rotating command. Furthermore, Tito had pointed to the armed forces as the bastion, not only of the country's independence, but of its social and political system as well. For the past decade, Yugoslavia's defences were shared between the regular forces (Yugoslav People's Army) and the territorial militia (All-People's Defence). The Defence Law of 1969 made the nation-in-arms concept the basis of the country's defence strategy, institutionalizing an old myth—that the heroism displayed by the South Slavs in fighting guerrilla wars against their foreign foes made them invincible.

The doctrine is well publicized, but the only data available come from foreign estimates, along with propaganda public statements by Yugoslav officials. Estimates for the regular forces are about 250,000 and another 500,000 in the reserves, with territorials ranging between 600,000 and over a million. New legislation in 1974 introduced an extensive system of defence education. Children from the age of 12 receive basic military training as part of the school curriculum and through the Pioneers communist youth organization, before compulsory military service at 18. There is also a system of "social self-protection"—a network of citizens who can be relied upon immediately to report anything suspicious. Furthermore, all persons from 16 to 65 who do not otherwise serve are involved in civil defence. Because the system is so ambitious, diffuse and complex, it is hard to give precise figures for the total number of people trained, equipped and organized for combat participation.[6] With such a dispersed system, the 1974 legislation also restored a much clearer and stronger central command.

An arms industry has been developed that supplies much of the country's military needs, yet high-technology weapons and spare parts still have to be imported. The backbone of its armoured and aircraft power comes from the Soviet Union. In the mid-1970s military leaders wanted to acquire equipment in the USA, but Tito and his advisers drew back from the deal once it became a subject of discussion in the American press.[7] The Americans themselves were suspicious of their technology finding its way to the Russians.

Yugoslavia is finding it hard to finance her vast defence effort. While the defence share of the federal budget has increased regularly in

[6] At Army Day celebrations in 1975, the figure was officially mentioned of 6 million people receiving defence training, and Tito is on record as saying in 1978 that 8 million people could be deployed if necessary.

[7] "Couldn't we buy the arms without anybody knowing about it?" Defence Secretary General Ljubicic is said to have asked a senior American official (Dusko Doder, *The Yugoslavs*, London, 1978, p. 150).

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recent years, to 59 per cent in 1980,[8] this does not cover territorial defence, which is financed locally, with all the problems this implies. The regular officers' knowledge of the outside world is scant, for they are not allowed to travel privately, and many of the upper ranks studied in the USSR. At the other end of the scale, many of those who are on the books of the territorials are working in western Europe Even those working at home do not show much enthusiasm in spending so much time in war games. The official ideology inculcated upon all ranks, regular and territorial, is that the country is threatened by American imperialism and its pawns, such as Italy and Austria, no less than by Soviet hegemony and its auxiliaries, such as Bulgaria or Hungary: NATO is as dangerous as the Warsaw Pact. If believed, the doctrine that both blocs threaten Yugoslavia can only cause defeatism. Clearly the dissuasive value of Yugoslavia's military preparedness is considerable, but it is obviously less so than is made to appear. At best, it can be no more than a psychological deterrent of limited value.[9]

Tito's revival of the concept of partisan warfare from 1968 onwards was not only the result of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. It was also related to the end of the liberal experimentation of the late 1960s in Yugoslavia. The partisan myth was also needed for domestic purposes, and by 1974 the defence system was officially meant to defend the existing order in the country no less than its independence. The enemy was everywhere, within and without, East and West, left and right. The diffusion of the system to involve the whole able-bodied population in the security of socialist Yugoslavia amounted to a real militarization of society. At the same time, the introduction of the territorial militia contributed to giving a greatly increased political role to the regular armed forces. The army has not been federalized, and it has assumed a greater role in ideological education. Members of the armed forces represent some 6 per cent of the total Party membership. The officer corps is well indoctrinated. Practically all officers are members of the Party, as are 90 per cent of NCOs. Individual officers have been integrated as active participants into all levels of the political machine.

Right at the top, since 1974, the armed forces have been represented as such in the Party Central Committee and Presidency. Since 1978 there have been no fewer than 21 generals on the Central Committee. Furthermore, whenever in difficulty, Tito in these last years turned to generals as individuals, and appointed them to important positions even outside military or Party matters.[10] The whole structure was

[8] $4 billion or 5·7 per cent of the national product.

[9] Cf. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, "The History behind Yugoslavia's Psychological Deterrent," in *Review of the Centre for Yugoslav Affairs*, II/2, 1975, pp. 106–21.

[10] Apart from the Defence Secretariat, held by General Ljubicic since 1967, the Home Secretariat (and thus State Security) has been under a general since 1974, and the intelligence services, civil aviation and the chief public prosecutor's office are held by generals. So were various court positions which lapsed with Tito's death.

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designed by Tito for the post-Tito era, and one should remember that army and Party are not two separate entities. The army is but the Party in arms, or the armed force of the Party. It has also become something of an extended praetorian guard in the last decade. As in all communist-ruled states, it has always been a political army, but political adaptability and even personal yes-manship to Marshal Tito had lately come to be more important criteria for a successful career than professional efficiency.[11] In the military as elsewhere, Tito in the 1970s avoided stronger personalities. The army's increased political role could possibly harm its capability of defending the country against a foreign aggressor.

The Myth

Titoism, or the Yugoslav "model," is a myth. It is a heroic rendering of historical events; it emanates from a deep reality, conceptualized and personalized; it is a set of ideas intended to substantiate pre-existing beliefs, and to hide existential difficulties by reference to something which seems new.

It is essential to remember that Titoism was the consequence, and not the cause, of the conflict with Stalin. It is the result of the efforts made by a Party leadership to stay in power. Whatever changed in Yugoslavia and its ruling Communist Party, the central leadership never relinquished its monopoly of power, and Tito himself remained firmly at the helm until the last days of 1979, steering the regime this way and that. It was he who was instrumental in first "Stalinizing" and then "de-Stalinizing"; in crushing Djilas, then Rankovic; in pursuing Croatian "nationalists" followed by Serbian "liberals"; in reluctantly approving the process of self-management, then applying the brakes to its genuine implementation. Tito survived by dubbing his efforts at staying in power against the Soviet Union his own superior brand of socialism, and by creating the illusion that new Marxist thoughts had been discovered. His regime, by the force of things, had become independent of the Soviet Union, and it had implemented a different strategy of domestic development, but the liberty of political regimes, or of nations, does not necessarily lead to the same degree of liberty for their citizens or subjects. There were basic principles from which Tito never deviated, and limits beyond which he never went. In so far as it was different, Titoism was so closely linked to its domestic circumstances that it could hardly be transplanted. For the rest, it retained much in common with the Soviet model.

The logical consequences of anti-Stalinism appeared so clearly that there have been many liberal deviations in the Yugoslav Communist Party, and many were its members who took the quarrel with Moscow

[11] Top military appointments have owed much to court intrigue in recent years, and this seems to have been one of the reasons for Mme Jovanka Broz's fall.

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to be a clue for more internal freedom. For political or for economic reasons, Tito had to give way to them for a while, in the early 1950s, and then again in the late 1960s. All sorts of things were allowed, and many still are, on condition that the system be not questioned. As soon as he could, however, Tito would put the ship of state back on course, the last time he did so being in 1971–72.

Tito was always confident in his own judgment, he had a sure political instinct, and was ruthless over decisions. In the final analysis, these had always been his, but in the 1970s the companions of the old guard were dead, ailing, retired or disgraced. Those of the new generation who had come to the fore by the independence of their discernment or by the constituency which they had acquired, had been disposed of. The last decade had an unreal appearance. Tito was old, and obviously no longer in direct day-to-day control, spending less and less time in the capital, but living in a state of solitary luxury, in his retreats (castles, hunting lodges, seaside villas, islands), in royal visitations or in foreign travels. Yet the decade was his more than ever. Basking in the cult of his personality, of which he had become the victim as well as the subject, he indulged in the megalomania of the aging despot. He had become simply an absolute monarch. His exceptional authority had been able to impose the maintenance of political monolithism. The paternalistic character of his reign enabled him to discipline Party cadres without losing their support, and his popularity at large to take unpopular decisions. In all this he was helped by the fact that economic decisions on credit and investment were not monopolized, thus enabling local Party worthies to distribute the spoils and satisfy their regional bases. In what had always been fundamentally an autocratic state of contradictions in equilibrium, Tito had become—depending on one's point of view—the charismatic leader who alone was able to conciliate all those contradictions, or the dead weight that blocked all solutions.

Tito did not, like the Western media, see himself as the embodiment of defiance to the Soviet Union. He saw himself as one of the world leaders of communism, and wanted to be treated as such, because he considered that the success of the Yugoslav revolution entitled him to that status, because he believed his tactics were subtler than those of the Soviet dictators, and because he wanted to build himself into a world figure—a role for which his country alone did not provide a big enough stage. He certainly agreed with the Western media when they described him as a champion of socialism, eventually as one of the titans of this world, only to end up as the last of the titans. Since the communist world did not allow him to play this role, his government devoted enormous efforts to building up a progressive movement of non-aligned countries which he would lead.

All the time, however, he retained a nostalgia for a socialist world, cleverly used the West to protect him against the Kremlin, and jockeyed

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for a leading position in the communist front, attempting always to have the best of two, if not three, worlds. The non-aligned movement having to all intents and purposes collapsed, it is plausible to read in Tito's policies of the late 1970s the ultimate ambition of mediating between Moscow and Peking. The wish to patch up the quarrel between the great communist powers, and to revitalize international communism, would tally with his policies at home. In a variety of ways during the 1970s, Tito had entered into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union without compromising his country's independence.[12] In the roles that he played or wanted to play, however, all that he had to work with was Yugoslavia, his initial catapult, but also his limiting factor.

The Economy

Yugoslavia had entered the modern world, first by destroying the old order and by fanatically aping the Soviet model for a few years, then by following the zig-zags of the economic consequences of Titoism. She has progressed, often frantically, but not as quickly as other countries of southern Europe. In truly non-aligned fashion, she competes today with Portugal and Rumania for the title of poorest country in the continent but one—Albania.[13] The principle of self-management in the economy has been applied more according to political than to economic criteria. In its present form, it can hardly be considered a model for a highly-industrialized, market-geared economy. It has produced eight competing regional economies; it still favours heavy industry at the expense of agriculture and services; it still widens the gap between extreme north-west and extreme south-east. Yugoslavia's overstretched industries import 80 per cent of their raw materials, while the country's own mineral and agricultural resources remain underexploited. 43 per cent of the active population (including the temporarily employed abroad) is still in agriculture, and yet Yugoslavia cannot feed herself.

Following two years of largely policy-induced rapid growth in domestic demand, the Yugoslav economy consumes more than it earns. It suffers from a highly unfavourable foreign-trade balance, serious inflation and unemployment. The trade deficit in 1979 rose to $6·4 billion, partly covered by invisible earnings (mainly tourism and remit-

[12] As late as 1975, Tito told Czechoslovak army representatives: " Formally we are not members of the Warsaw Pact, but if the cause of socialism, of communism, of the working class, should be endangered, we shall know where to stand. . . . We hold our aims in common with the Soviet Union " (*Narodna armija,* Belgrade, 1 May 1975).

[13] Not including Turkey. Compare OECD, World Bank, WHO and UNESCO statistics for gross domestic product *per capita,* as well as various indicators of living standards, such as private consumption *per capita,* proportion of doctors to population, infant mortality, school attendance, illiteracy, energy consumption. . . . On the other hand, Yugoslavs appear better off than statistics suggest, because of the " black economy " that evades statistics, in both private and social sectors.

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tances of emigrant workers) which left a record $3·4 billion balance-of-payments deficit accounted for, in about equal proportion, by the overheating of the economy and by special factors (rise in oil prices and bad harvests). In order to cover her foreign deficits, Yugoslavia has borrowed heavily. Her debts to foreign banks have gone up in the last two years from $8 billion to 13 billion,[14] and repayments in 1979 amounted to $1·8 billion, but she has an impeccable record for servicing her debts on time. Inflation was officially admitted to have been 26 per cent in 1979. It was believed to be running at a rate nearing 30 per cent when, in June 1980, the dinar was devalued by that percentage. With unemployment already high, the Yugoslav economy is in a poor condition to reabsorb comfortably the workers returning home from western Europe since the mid-1970s, so that people registered as seeking employment numbered 765,000 (8 per cent of the total active population) at the end of 1979, quite apart from another 800,000 who were still registered as working abroad.

When the International Monetary Fund[15] held its 35th assembly in Belgrade in October 1979, Tito lectured it, and upheld his own country as a model for the world. Deficit and debt for the "insufficiently developed" was an accepted phenomenon, he said, which ensured equality between regions, whatever their degree of development. This seems to confirm the view that no drastic redeployment of resources was possible while Tito was alive. It would mean the gradual closure of whole sectors of industry: it would be unthinkable without Western support, and the opening of Western markets to Yugoslav exports. The problem is that Yugoslavia has a huge trade deficit with the industrialized West, especially the EEC which supplies her with capital goods, modern technology, and even raw materials. The EEC, however, does not take enough of Yugoslavia's exports to meet the cost of her imports. In 1979, OECD countries provided 57 per cent of Yugoslavia's imports, but took only 41 per cent of her exports. EEC countries on their own took no more than 26 per cent, while providing 38 per cent, and the deficit with the EEC alone amounted to about half of Yugoslavia's total trade deficit.

Yugoslavia's first agreement with the EEC was in 1970—valid for three years, and non-preferential. When it came up for renewal, the Yugoslavs were offered a preferential agreement, which could have broadened their co-operation with the EEC, as the Community had, in the meanwhile, launched a system of generalized preferences for its trading with developing countries. This suspended duties on manufactured products up to a certain ceiling, and partially suspended tariffs on a range of food products. The Yugoslavs, however, preferred to retain their most-favoured-nation designation. The five-year agree-

[14] This compares with Poland's total of $27 billion.

[15] Yugoslavia is one of its greatest beneficiaries; she now has an accumulated debt to the IMF/World Bank of $2,559 million, going back 30 years.

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ment which was then signed in 1973, and temporarily extended from 1978, did not produce a great transformation in Yugoslavia's trade relations with the EEC. What her economy had to offer did not complement the needs of the Community, and too many of the Community's interests were threatened by an agreement which would have been truly useful to the Yugoslav economy. Negotiations were deadlocked by western European protectionist policies on the one hand, by Yugoslavia's insistence on not compromising her non-aligned status and on being treated as a special case on the other.

In the meanwhile, her trade deficit with the EEC soared, and Yugoslavia played an increasing role as an associate member of the Eastern-bloc Comecon or CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). In 1979, countries with centrally-planned economies took 42 per cent of Yugoslavia's exports, and accounted for 27 per cent of her imports, the USSR on its own ranking as Yugoslavia's top trade partner. Yugoslavia is, for them, a valuable supplier of better consumer items. Soviet representatives buy up in advance the total annual production of some Yugoslav firms without even seeing the products. Eastern countries can also, without having to spend hard currency, buy Western goods made in Yugoslavia under licence, but they cannot, on the whole, supply her with the industrial goods she now imports from the West, and even with them Yugoslavia's trade is in deficit. Her occasional veiled blackmail that she would be forced to turn to Comecon if the EEC were not more generous, was not based on a reasonable economic option.

Tito's illness then gave new impetus to the negotiations. The EEC foreign ministers took the political decision to draw up a more generous negotiating mandate, and a new agreement, initialled in February and signed in April, became operative on 1 July 1980. A " co-operation agreement " rather than a mere " trade agreement," it refers to Yugoslavia's unique blend of socialist, non-aligned and other characteristics. Valid initially for five years, it is intended to reduce Yugoslavia's trade deficit with the EEC, and it is preferential. It grants Yugoslav industrial exports free access to the Community, with exceptions which will remain subject to (raised) ceilings. It also gives improved access to Yugoslavia's agricultural goods. In addition, the EEC will make $250 million available in the form of low-interest loans to finance development projects.

Reducing the balance-of-payments deficit has a priority claim to the Yugoslav leaders' economic considerations. So far they have agreed on the overall targets to achieve this, by curtailing investment, raising exports, reducing domestic demand pressure and preventing too large increases of nominal incomes. The devaluation introduced in June 1980 was intended as the first stage of a two-year stabilization programme.

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The Soviet Threat

For a long time Yugoslavia had covered her domestic difficulties with the costly coat of her "prestigious" (in both the older meaning and the newer, fashionable, one) foreign policy, but signs of strain in her institutionalized non-alignment were being revealed to Western observers in the autumn of 1979. Tito had been to Moscow, and seemed satisfied enough with his visit, but if relations appeared quite good at government and even Party level, concern was caused by the pressures applied directly by Soviet representatives at self-management level. Yugoslavs were asking how much of an international underwriting there really was to their independence. They were expressing anxiety over the amount of Soviet infiltration in the non-aligned movement, and over the actual expansion of Soviet control over non-aligned socialist states. At a time when Soviet troops had not yet marched into Afghanistan, and when Brezhnev seemed much closer to death than Tito, it was reported [16] that the Yugoslavs had sent warnings to the Americans of the risks to their own country of potentially more hawkish successors.

The strains in Yugoslav-Soviet relations were there, and they were obviously being made apparent to Western eyes. Were the Yugoslavs not exaggerating them, in order to extract more help, economic and diplomatic, from the West, as well as some indirect, unsolicited, cover, at a time when non-alignment no longer seemed much of a screen? The Yugoslav leadership has always nurtured a sense of chronic international threat to the country's independence—in order to maintain unity around the Party—from the East where it has some reality, but also from the West where Yugoslavia really has few enemies.

We know how obsessed the Soviet Union is with security. A subservient Yugoslavia would substantially increase the USSR's security on its south-western flank, and facilitate access, otherwise blocked by member-states of NATO, to the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa. Any decision to go into Yugoslavia would consider the following: the degree to which the Soviet government could claim it was answering a call for help; the degree of resistance the Yugoslavs could offer; and the nature of any reaction from the West—NATO in particular. Yugoslavia's defences would not offer adequate protection if the Soviet Union chose to invade her territory, but such intervention is unlikely, except as a last resort in an internal or international crisis. The USSR does not have a common border with Yugoslavia. Troops would have to be sent through Rumania (where there are no Soviet troops) or through Hungary (where there are six Soviet divisions). The Soviet leaders have come to accept that Yugoslavia must be considered a special case among communist-ruled countries. They know that her independence is considered by the West as an important factor in

[16] By Nora Beloff, who had just been to Yugoslavia: "Russian Eyes on Yugoslavia," in *The Daily Telegraph*, 31 Oct. 1979.

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international relations. They are aware that the world is now watching their behaviour towards Yugoslavia. They probably cannot afford another Afghanistan just yet, especially not while they are having to cope with the Polish upheavals. For that reason, one could even go so far as to guess that they might not want a crisis in Yugoslavia which could tempt them to intervene.

For the time being, and perhaps for quite a long time, the Soviet leadership is unlikely to make any move that could seriously frighten the suspicious Yugoslavs. It will probably first wait and see how the situation develops. After all, even the Kremlin hawks would probably agree that the best policy, to start with, is to let Yugoslavia become weaker. A more positive policy could be put forward by the doves in the form of blandishments. They could offer substantially bigger trade incentives. Closer economic ties having been achieved, pressure would gradually increase to obtain political and strategic concessions. Internal tensions—regional, ethnic, political—would naturally be exploited. A weakening of the country's fibrous structure, combined with increased dependence on the USSR, would reduce Yugoslavia's freedom to manoeuvre; it could cause the country to slide more or less quickly into the Soviet compound, without much drama or international complications. And it could even be claimed that Titoism had thereby been saved.

Although no immediate threat appeared to face them at the time of Tito's illness, the policy of his heirs read as though they believed that outspokenness was a good way to ward off any evil intentions. It got the Yugoslavs to close ranks behind their leaders, and it drew the attention of world opinion to the country's plight, as it had done at the time of the Cominform crisis, and again at the time of the Czechoslovak crisis. Official pronouncements have censured the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, condemned the practice of imposing socialism on other people by military force, recalled the periods of friction between the USSR and Yugoslavia since the war, reminded everybody of Yugoslavia's hostility to the theory of "limited sovereignty," stressed that her security was an integral part of world security, and proclaimed that the country could and would defend her independence. When, however, TASS dismissed as "crude, provocative and false" the Western contention that there was a Soviet threat to Yugoslavia, praised the profound friendliness of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, and accused NATO of meddling in Yugoslav affairs, officials in Belgrade expressed themselves irritated by Western talk of a Soviet threat. They obviously welcomed expressions of interest in their country's independence coming from the West, but were afraid lest they might be seen to hinder her non-alignment, and cause even a gentle Soviet attempt to defend Yugoslavia against Western interference. Having said what they had to say, and having had the right response from the West, they

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were, in their turn, able to stress how good were Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

The Other Balkan States

Of Yugoslavia's three communist-ruled Balkan neighbours, Bulgaria is the USSR's most faithful ally, Rumania is a Warsaw Pact member with a difference, and Albania alone maintains Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist purity against the revisionism of Moscow, Peking and Belgrade alike. All three, in the course of Tito's illness, expressed concern about the international situation. Albania publicly stated her readiness to fight for Yugoslavia. Rumania announced that she would reinforce her defence capabilities. President Ceausescu went to Sofia where he stressed the need to adhere to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, and sent his foreign minister to do likewise in Athens. Even Bulgaria's leader Zhivkov issued a joint communiqué with Rumania's Ceausescu, expressing " preoccupation at the recent aggravation of the international situation."

Relations between Yugoslavia and Rumania are good. Ceausescu makes careful use of his country's nationalism to bolster up his regime without having to resort to other popular measures, and he tends to stress Rumania's independence in questions of foreign policy, but not to the point of military co-operation with Yugoslavia. In spite of normalized relations since 1971, and of her unexpected recent verbal rallying to Yugoslavia's defence, it is Albania who could, one day, become the most awkward neighbour for Tito's successors. Isolated in an imaginary world, she will undoubtedly cause trouble if she ever re-enters the real world, and if the ideal urge of Yugoslavia's Albanian minority to unite with the nation-state stops being counter-balanced by the fact that, as citizens of an alien state, they can own land and practise Islam—not to mention all the incentives lavished on them by the Titoist regime. There is a succession problem in Tirana as well, and Hoxha's successors could be tempted to return to the Soviet fold.

Polemics on the subject of Macedonia were waxing strong again in 1979 after the publication of the memoirs of Tsola Dragoycheva, a veteran lady of the Sofia Politbureau who had given the reins to her Bulgarian chauvinism over the disputed region. There were sharp reactions in Yugoslavia when the Bulgarian press returned to the topic early in 1980. Yugoslav officials expressed the fear that such " flagrant expressions of territorial claims " were inspired by the doctrine of limited sovereignty.[17] But the Bulgarian government would not push matters too far, for it hastened to deny rumours of military exercises near the Yugoslav border, and Zhivkov went along with Ceausescu in

[17] Off the record, officials in Skopje, the capital of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia complained to Manuel Lucbert of *Le Monde* that Bulgaria was trying to undermine stability in the Balkans, and to make way for " extra-Balkan influences " (" La République de Macédoine est résolue à s'opposer aux ' influences extra-balkaniques ',' 19 Feb. 1980).

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attributing recent international tension to, *inter alia*, " the interference of imperialist forces." Sofia had again spoken its mind on Macedonia, but did not seem to want to do more. Relations with Belgrade tend to reflect the state of relations between Moscow and Belgrade. Bulgaria holds a key position in the Balkans, because she can affect Yugoslavia through Macedonia, and because she borders on two members of NATO, Greece and Turkey.

The Truman Doctrine in 1947 had taken these two countries under the wing of the USA, after the other Balkan countries had been seen to pass under Soviet control. In 1950, the fear of the Korean War spreading to Europe led the Americans to want to extend the newly-established military organization of NATO to that corner of south-east Europe, but not all their western European allies were so keen. The Scandinavians were strongly opposed, and even the British were cool about extending guarantees to Turkey who was right on Russia's doorstep, so that in 1950 Greece and Turkey were just invited to be associated with the military planning of the Alliance in the Mediterranean. The British then came round to accepting Turkey, as she undertook to enter the never-to-be Middle-Eastern Defence Pact, and the Scandinavians withdrew their objections, so that in 1951 Greece and Turkey became full members of NATO.

The nearest Yugoslavia ever got to NATO was in 1953–54. Having helped Tito's regime to survive the break with the Soviet Union, the Western powers, at the height of the Cold War, had wanted to integrate Yugoslavia into their plans for European defence. They had encouraged a reluctant Tito to commit himself in some manner to the Western alliance in return for protection. Common fear, which had drawn Greece and Turkey together, also brought them and Yugoslavia closer, as the former two were separated by the latter from their western European partners. They first joined in the Ankara Treaty of 1953, which in 1954 was turned into a 20-year alliance, providing for common institutions, mutual consultation in the event of crisis, and mutual armed assistance in the event of aggression. There still remained the Trieste issue with Italy, but by the time that this obstacle to Yugoslavia's incorporation in the Western defence system had also been removed, Stalin had died, and Tito had already begun to move away from too close an association with NATO. Within a year the Balkan Pact had become a dead letter.[18]

The Greco-Turkish Issue

Together with changes in the Kremlin and Yugoslav reluctance, the Cyprus issue had also contributed to the demise of the Balkan Pact.

[18] By 1960 a Yugoslav spokesman proclaimed that it had ceased to exist in fact. Under the terms of the treaty, any party could have cancelled it when the 20-year period came to an end, but no one even bothered to do so. It had expired without a whimper.

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Indeed, the dispute over Cyprus, which originally involved three NATO allies (Great Britain, Greece and Turkey), has at times come near to changing the orientation of both Greece and Turkey. Animosity has never been far below the surface. When each side sees the other as being, once again, the principal enemy, and is not able to obtain satisfactory support from the Western alliance, each accuses it of favouring the other, and both have toyed with neutralism.

In 1974, American mismanagement of the Cyprus crisis further alienated both Greeks and Turks. When the invasion of Cyprus caused the collapse of the Greek dictatorship, Karamanlis, who had just returned to take over the government from the discredited colonels, followed the French precedent and withdrew Greek forces from the integrated allied command. This was done because of indignation at the allies' inaction over the Turkish military intervention, but also as an alternative to war with Turkey. There were other issues involved besides Cyprus, including the continental shelf and air space in the Aegean. When the US Congress eventually imposed an embargo on arms sales to Turkey, the Turks also turned against the Americans, and made them leave most of the bases.

In 1977, the Greeks indicated their wish to return to the military command structure, and the USA devised a plan to maintain a 7 : 10 ratio in their military aid to Greece and Turkey, in exchange for bases. On this assumption, a defence co-operation agreement was initialled with Greece, but never signed. The Turks successfully argued that their country formed a land bridge to oil-producing Iraq. Since the bridge was defended by the Turkish army, they got the better of any American philhellenic prejudices, Congress authorized the lifting of the embargo in 1978, and an American-Turkish defence and economic co-operation agreement was signed in March 1980. Reacting to the massive military aid promised to Turkey by the USA and by other NATO allies under this agreement, the Greeks saw the balance of forces being tipped against them. Not only did the Greek government decide to renegotiate its accord with the USA; it also linked the future of American bases in the country and the balance in military aid with the problem of Greece's military reintegration in NATO.

Greece is by far the most successful polity in the peninsula, but her government has its problems. Economically it faces a sudden surge of inflationary pressure (19 per cent in 1979), and needs to rescue the country's balance of payments from a deficit that doubled in 1979 to $1·9 billion. Its attempts to improve Greece's diplomatic leverage against Turkey through the UNO, the EEC and the Balkan states have not yielded results. The unwillingness of her friends to give her unconditional backing against Turkey has been seen in Greece as neutrality favouring her rival in the Aegean, and the left has been able to indulge in patriotic outbidding. The opposition stated that it would take the country out of NATO if it won the next elections,

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which are due in 1981, and that it would also seek to pull Greece out of the EEC of which she is just becoming a full member. If combined with an increase of Soviet influence in the Balkans, this could significantly affect the political evolution of Greece, and NATO generally.

The Greek government is worried about future developments in the Balkans, particularly in Yugoslavia. With most of her armed forces deployed to face Turkey since 1974, Greece was more vulnerable to the north, especially as it no longer had the immediate protection of the integrated military structure of NATO. That is why she has lately been interested both in returning to the NATO command, and in establishing regional links of some sort with the communist-ruled Balkan states in order to help stabilize the situation in the peninsula. In particular, Greek efforts to establish again some military contacts with the Yugoslavs have had to remain extremely discreet and restrained because of the latter's determination to remain, and be seen to remain, non-aligned.[19]

If the Turks have been claiming enhanced significance to NATO in the wake of events in the Middle East, so have the Greeks in view of the uncertainty caused by Yugoslavia. In spite of their own clear wish to return to the command structure, they have put a price to it which, in turn, the Turks would only accept at their price. Fearing the possibility of a pre-emptive Greek air strike across the sea, the Turks demanded a rough share of Aegean sea and air space. Fearing the possibility of Turkish territorial designs, the Greeks could not accept proposals that would, in effect, put hundreds of their islands under Turkish control. Both sides insisted that the return of Greece to the NATO command in itself did not form part of their differences, goodwill gestures were made, and the climate of relations had improved by the time of the military coup in Turkey. On 20 October 1980, a formula was found to this long triangular negotiation between Greece, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and Turkey, when the NATO Defence Planning Committee approved the return of Greek forces to the integrated military structure as the result of a proposal developed by General Rogers, endorsed by the Alliance, and acceptable to both Ankara and Athens.

Both sides have, in effect, agreed to separate the question of Greece's return to the command structure from their Aegean issue.

[19] It would seem that Yugoslavia is keen to see Greece integrated again firmly in NATO, in order to discourage the USSR from taking risks in the Balkans, directly or indirectly, and perhaps even as a lifeline for herself in case of war; but the contradictions of Titoism being what they are, how does one explain the presence in Yugoslavia, in November 1979, of General Markos, one-time leader of the Greek communist uprising? From an interview in the Belgrade popular evening paper *Večernje novosti* (28 Nov. 1979) it was learnt that he had been living in the Soviet Union for the past 30 years, and that he had come to Yugoslavia to visit Greek friends. Markos had been closely connected with Yugoslav support for the communist uprising in Greece. Could he have come without the express authorization of both Soviet and Yugoslav authorities? What were the Yugoslavs up to?

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In spite of this important step, the issue remains, essentially as one of mistrust and prestige, while it is Cyprus that continues to poison the relations between the two riverain allies of that sea.

The End of Titoism

Yugoslavia has so far managed to retain her independence as a communist-ruled country. Her status, established under trying circumstances, is the result of her leaders' determination, with much support from the West. Yet Western security could never be sought or even acknowledged, except in despair and fleetingly, for fear of the consequences that a Westward turn could have on the communists' monopoly of power, even though the main threat to the country's security, ever since 1948, has come from the Soviet bloc. In such circumstances, neutrality, far from having been chosen, was initially thrust on the Yugoslav leadership.

It was an instinct of self-preservation, along with love of power and desire to propagate communism, that made Tito resist the Soviet leadership and stand for non-interference, but support almost any take-over bid by a communist, socialist or "progressist" minority, provided this was not done with direct Soviet military involvement. The struggle against Stalinism in Yugoslavia was, anyhow, always carried out from above, and with methods that were all too often inspired by Stalinism.

The origins and nature of Yugoslavia's independence did not bother Western governments. They were concerned above all that Yugoslavia should not revert to the position of a Soviet satellite. Repression in Yugoslavia has generally been ignored,[20] and the fear has been expressed that, without Tito, the country might democratize too quickly, to the point of provoking Russia. The Western media, no less than the personality cult in Yugoslavia, had turned Tito into a one-man bulwark of national and international stability.

The unease felt in the West by Yugoslavia-watchers is naturally even greater in Yugoslavia itself. For the average Yugoslav, it stems from the fear that his way of life could be disturbed. After 1948–50 Tito had become the lesser of two evils and then, gradually, the symbol of a Yugoslav style, made up not so much of socialism, of self-management and of non-alignment, as of freedom of movement, of consumerism and of fending for oneself. In such a perspective, the "Russian threat" is seen as the curtailment of all that. It was for this reason that the Yugoslavs had generally come to play according to Tito's tune, accepted its variations, and minded their own business.

[20] According to a report on foreign intelligence and security operations in the United States, compiled by the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and which found its way to the press in August 1979, the Yugoslav security service was one of several such agencies from friendly regimes (including the Iranian Savak) that were allowed to operate freely against opponents living in the USA.

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They felt that he provided a barrier. For most of them, it was a barrier against the Russian threat, and as such it also provided them with the hope of better things to come. But for some of them, it was also a barrier against further liberalization. Intermingled with unease, there is the expectancy which comes from the knowledge that the end of the reign will eventually lead to change; the fear in some quarters that things will change too much; the hope in other quarters that change will bring more freedom. At any rate, for the Yugoslavs, the end has probably come to a situation which they had grown accustomed to, which provided stability of sorts, and much consumer satisfaction. In the unknown to come, there is both fear and hope.

One has the impression that the governments of the Atlantic Alliance envisage only this alternative for Yugoslavia after Tito: Titoism will continue, or the USSR will try and restore its authority. They appear to hope that, the latter course being too risky, the former will prevail. If that is really what they envisage, they should give up their hope and prepare for the worst, for Titoism without Tito is an absurdity. However much it has been institutionalized, Titoism cannot survive its creator. During its last decade, Titoism had already run its course, and its prospects were not all that good. The country seemed to have reached the point where it was ready for the ultimate test, that of personal and economic freedom, but Titoism had already gone back on what were seen by most Yugoslavs as the genuine advances of the late 1960s. Without that ultimate test, Titoism ran the risk of appearing to have been a series of illusions performed by a ruling élite to retain power. If it had appeared to solve the country's problems, it was increasingly by a mixture of magic, pretentiousness, consumerism, corruption and foreign loans.

"How can a country, which is not a country at all, hold together at a time of crisis?" The question appeared in one of the "heavy" Sunday papers at the beginning of Tito's illness.[21] The answer is that one can certainly not expect it to hold together for long if it is held together merely by a charismatic leader (or the perpetuation of his memory) and an oligarchy with their armed forces and security services, for the sake of the power structure, and the greater good of international relations. The answer is also that it *is* a country, and one whose different components were brought together at the end of the First World War, when they were not quite yet ready for it, by common strands in their culture, their way of life, and their past, as well as by their common interests; that they have been kept together by those interests and by ties that have grown since, and not just by strong men and their power structures. To go by past precedent, Yugoslavs do usually sink their differences in the face of outside threats, but the bonds of unity have already given way once, under the weight of actual invasion, in 1941.

[21] Mark Frankland, "Like Waiting for Godot," in *The Observer*, 13 Jan. 1980.

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Yugoslavia is a country facing two great problems: that of its national identity, and that of its transfer to "modernity." Her communist rulers have contributed to the solution of both. A policy of federalism and ethnic pluralism has done much for the consolidation of unity. On the other hand, regional and ethnic pluralism has also been manipulated as a substitute for political pluralism, and as an excuse for the maintenance of a political monopoly. But if the South Slavs are to go on living together in a united state, they should be allowed to participate fully in all spheres of their country's development; to express their diversity, their different approaches to their state, their society and their international position, otherwise than by hurling themselves into their sectional nationalist impasses. Yugoslavia today is a country without a past, to the extent that a real understanding of its history, from 1918 to the present day, means a completely free enquiry and a public debate which the regime still thinks it cannot afford. The young have only been taught the approved version of events since 1941, and do not know much of what happened before their own childhood, except in the form of dangerously distorted sectional and private myths. If one may be allowed to quote, admittedly right out of context, President Mijatovic (of the Yugoslav State Presidency), "every country must have the right to the truth about itself." [22]

The surge into modernity has also been a major contribution to the consolidation of unity. To the extent, however, that it began by brutally destroying the old, and went on under severe control from above so as to prevent any realignment of political priorities, it has created a moral void in which most people think only of promoting their own immediate personal interests, either by joining the privileged class, or by cheating the system.

In the post-Titoist 1980s, ethnic rights and modernity may no longer be sufficient. With modernity now less obvious, at a time when Yugoslavia lags at the tail end of Europe, with the poorest of the Mediterranean countries that have emerged from right-wing authoritarian regimes, and with the poorest of the Soviet-controlled communist countries, a new generation that does not remember the deprivations and degradations of the past may come to demand greater political control over its own existence.

A Limited Freedom of Choice

The alternative is not one between the status quo or a return to the Soviet fold. It is a question of knowing which way the collective leadership will turn to try and make up for the authority that has departed with Tito, and to what extent its members are likely to agree among themselves. They can make up for the disappearance of Tito's auth-

[22] From his opening speech to the 21st general conference of UNESCO, Belgrade, 23 Sept. 1980.

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ority by increasing, or by lessening, the rigidity of their system of government. They can turn even more to the army, and reinforce the repressive apparatus, with yet greater emphasis on a more orthodox pattern of domestic control. Initially such a trend could be adopted in order to maintain continued independence from the USSR, with what has been called a " Rumanianization" of Yugoslavia.

Such a choice, however, would mean a loss of much that has been considered as acquired by the population at large, and it could hardly make use of any common Yugoslav anti-Russian nationalism. Political rigidity divides citizens and regions. The controlling political force would have to block, even more than it has done hitherto, the dynamic forces in society that are pulling towards more independence from the centre, and generally pulling towards Europe. An " imposed " stability contains the germs of dissension. The Communist Party of 1980 is a mass organization (1·7 million strong, or 7·7 per cent of the total population), fragmented, inefficient, heavy with political time-servers, where real political activities are confined to the higher ranks. Could the leadership, even if it were united, hold out against both the Soviet Union and a decrease in popularity? The likelihood is that the people in power, isolated from the rest of the world, would then let themselves be carried along by the drift which would bring the country back to the side of the USSR, or would even have to turn to the Soviets for help. A variety of grades could be envisaged, including some form of a special relationship which need not necessarily mean full satellite status.

On the other hand, the leadership can increase its authority by returning to forms of more open government. If it were seen to be working for the good of the country at large, through plain speaking and without dogma, in full consciousness of the gravity of the situation, it could look for support beyond the Party, to a broader consensus in which the population at large accepted the hard facts of reality, gave their confidence to the government, and did not feel that the future was blocked. A wider platform could thus be obtained for a certain style of government, which could pursue a modest policy in an atmosphere of responsible internal *détente*. This would, in the very least, not worsen existing problems, and would not upset the established principles of the union of differentiated nationalities, of socialist self-management and of non-alignment with existing power blocs.

The leadership could thus hope to save the country's union, its independence and a certain form of communism which, in the words of a shrewd Italian observer, does offer at least one major advantage over the Soviet system, that of having sent its unemployed to the richer parts of western Europe rather than to labour camps.[23] There again, a variety of grades could be envisaged, not all of them necessarily unacceptable to the Soviet Union. It might well be that if the

[23] Enzo Bettiza, *Il comunismo europeo* (Milan, 1978), p. 174.

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Yugoslav frog stopped trying to puff itself out to be as big as the Soviet ox, it would not burst. Furthermore, it would attract less attention to itself and cause less offence.

The limits of Yugoslavia's freedom of choice depend on the attitude of the international community. "Hands off Yugoslavia" has been the theme song of an international chorus of voices ranging from Thatcher to Hoxha, and including both superpowers. Today the Soviets can no longer rely on Carter's election statement of 1976, that he would not go to war for Yugoslavia, even if the Soviet Union sent in troops, because he believed this would not directly threaten American security. That is a statement the former President Carter would undoubtedly prefer to forget, but it has not yet been disavowed. As for America's European allies, they too have expressed "concern," while the EEC has rushed to bring to a rapid conclusion its two-year negotiation with Yugoslavia. For the rest, they hope, in the words of the French socialist leader François Mitterrand, that, "in a way, Afghanistan protects Yugoslavia." [24]

The scope of NATO is textually limited to the security and the defence of the member states, and all bases arrangements in the Mediterranean are structured to NATO-related operations. At the same time, it can be argued, and has been argued, that the total security requirements of the Alliance require a broader view, and since the 1974 Ottawa meeting, the allies can discuss events in other regions of the world, if they influence their common interests. At the June 1980 meeting held in Ankara, it was widely recognized that members shared common security interests which were directly affected by events beyond the NATO area. But will the US put an end to the recent incoherence of its foreign policy? Will a genuine European foreign policy emerge among their allies? Will the traditionally rather loose arrangements for co-ordinating the two be adequate for the tensions of the 1980s? Do the Europeans still consider that they have "vital" interests beyond their immediate present-day borders? If they do, what sacrifices are they ready to make in order to sustain such interests? And to what extent does Yugoslavia figure as one of them?

Neutrality in Europe

The Balkans were long considered not to be in Europe, because of the Ottoman connexion, whereas until the fifteenth century they had been very much in Europe. The process of emancipation of the nationalities of the peninsula in the nineteenth century was also an uphill struggle to become part of Europe again, and it was only in 1914 that the region was brought fully back into our continent. It did so with a bang that caused a conflagration, and yet no historian can accept without qualification the worn-out cliché of the "powder keg of Europe" for,

[24] Interview on Europe 1, 15 Feb. 1980.

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in the words of Hugh Seton-Watson, the big powers provided the powder. All that the Balkan nationalities did was to cause the spark, and it occurred because the entire process of emancipation and modernization came to be condensed in nationalism. Nationalism was both the positive cause of their partial success, and the negative consequence of their partial failure. The main element of contestation, ever since she appeared late on the stage in the 1870s, has been provided by the aspirations of an increasingly isolated Bulgaria, in turn whetted, encouraged, influenced and disappointed by this or that power. By wanting to manipulate the Balkan nationalities, the powers prevented them from ever finding their own equilibrium. The powers became involved in Balkan conflicts, and involved the peninsula in their own divisions. The several attempts made by the Balkan nationalities to overcome their quarrels all involved coming together against foreign interference, but they never succeeded in quite achieving their aim.

For as long as Ottoman Turkish power survived in Europe, Turkey was not considered to be part of Europe, and it was only when the modern Turkey of Kemal Ataturk decided to turn her back on Europe geographically that she also chose to be part of Europe politically. Turkey today, like Greece, is a member of the Council of Europe, and her government had even declared its intention of applying to follow Greece into the EEC, when the generals seized power to maintain the legacy of Ataturk that had made her part of Europe. As for Yugoslavia, the impression that she gives at all levels except that of the political leadership, is that of a longing for Europe, in the sense that it is western rather than eastern Europe that it takes as the yardstick. At any rate, dogmatically rather than pragmatically non-aligned, she has been left dangerously isolated. Would it not suit her interests better to moor somewhere, especially since geography has placed her at a cross-roads, and to moor precisely where she happens to be physically? She should not find it difficult, as an absolute neutral, to hitch on to the Balkans, a region across military alliances, with some states belonging to NATO, others to the Warsaw Pact, and some of whose leaders have clearly expressed the wish to turn the peninsula into an area of " trust, co-operation and peace." [25]

The present Yugoslav leadership reacted negatively to the Carrington plan for the neutralization of Afghanistan. Neutralization implies a solution imposed by the powers, whereas Yugoslavia's own formula of non-alignment implies a positive choice, freedom of movement rather than limitation. Tito's successors were probably still paying obeisance to a magic formula, unless they really wanted the freedom to be able to decide to move closer to the Soviet Union. They now admit the failure of their own attempt to stimulate a move by the non-aligned

[25] From the joint statement issued by the Greek and Rumanian foreign ministers on 4 March 1980 in Athens.

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countries concerned with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan: it was just not possible to find a minimal consensus. Yugoslavia's non-aligned arrogance, which consisted in making moral judgments on every issue under the sun, and in giving advice to all foreign governments, but in accepting only praise from the outside world, and in refusing to take any advice even from its non-aligned friends, was part of Tito's policy of grandeur which has already begun to shrink. In so far as it attributed any crisis to superpower rivalry, this policy was already sheltering behind the simplistic belief that it could remain safe, by assigning blame evenly to both power blocs, in a non-aligned movement where Yugoslavia's influence had diminished, and which had become too radical for Tito's liking.

The country's limited freedom of choice to evolve this way or that would be helped by an accepted and acknowledged neutrality, which would be no imposed power deception, but rather a self-denying ordinance by the powers. It would also mean Yugoslavia renouncing her self-proclaimed and self-deluding position as mentor and model to the world, and concentrating on unravelling her own accumulated problems. Without Tito, it should not be too difficult to acknowledge the limited nature of leadership in the present world. It would need somewhat more assurance for the system to renounce, not only the authority of one man as its inspiration, but also the partisan movement and the civil war, and to find a new form of legitimacy, based on its own effectiveness, on popular support and on its ability to evolve.

Yugoslavia's limited freedom of choice would be helped if the Soviet Union were told ambiguously (if this has not already been done) that the Western allies, individually or collectively, regard that country's military neutrality as part of the established balance of power, even to the point of declaring Yugoslavia to be a potential war zone. Keeping the Russians, and the Yugoslavs, guessing, may be no more than keeping oneself guessing in the hope that the problem may go away. Only Albania has declared herself ready to fight over Yugoslavia. It would be necessary for the West also to decide whether Yugoslavia was, in the last instance, worth fighting for, and to give the Russians clear notice that this was so. It would be necessary to keep talking to the Russians, and to bargain hard, in the name of *détente*. "*Détente* is . . . the only policy instrument we have to influence events in Eastern Europe during these very critical times, when great changes may occur. So it would be foolish to throw it away." [26]

The country's limited freedom of choice would also be helped if it were decided that Yugoslavia was, not quite in the last instance, worth some economic and financial sacrifices at a time when the West tends to be sorry for itself. In a businesslike atmosphere, no one could then object to some advice being given to the Yugoslav leaders, as to how

[26] Arrigo Levi, "Western Role in Aiding a Polish Compromise," in *The Times*, 18 Sept. 1980.

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to approach certain of their problems, by friends in the West who helped them, or their elders, into power, and who have helped them to remain in power ever since. The friends in the East will, after all, certainly not refrain from doing so. If everything were made clear, there would be no need to worry so much about a bit of " de-stabilization " that would encourage those who want to open out rather than those who want to close in, and give the Yugoslavs that genuine, if limited, choice, with a chance to grope towards some broadly based modicum of accepted stability. Western support for Tito's regime has been anti-Soviet, a support that Yugoslavia's communist leaders have shared with their Chinese opposite numbers, and with a variety of dictators, generals, colonels and monarchs, Catholic, Orthodox, Moslem and socialist, in the past 30 years. It is an old Western illusion that autocracies and oligarchies necessarily provide a stable framework for development and unchanging commitments in foreign policy. Rather than encourage those who want to maintain the status quo, the West could, for a change, think of encouraging those who were looking for a more pluralistic, if less anti-Soviet, regime. Now that the immediate attention of Soviet leaders is turned elsewhere, and before any crisis comes to Yugoslavia, might be the right moment to make them understand that such a development need not be to their disadvantage. Everyone could stand to gain—East, West and Yugoslavia.

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Yugoslavia's Debate Over Democratization

Pedro Ramet

SCARCELY had comrade Tito been laid to rest in mid-May 1980 than, amid continuing tributes to his wisdom, foresight and infallibility, critics both on the Left and on the Right began to call for change in the political system. These calls, at first scattered and uncoordinated, elicited rebuttals both from the reactionary centralist faction and from the Titoist "moderates" and have spawned a fully-fledged debate concerning the democratization of Yugoslav politics and society.

An early symptom of this trend was a call for relaxation in the already loose party control of journalism, by Saban Hiseni, the newly elected president of the League of Journalists of Yugoslavia, in May. Lashing out at what he called the "bureaucratic mentality," Hiseni called for journalists to strive for greater objectivity in reporting.[1] Several of Yugoslavia's newspapers and magazines, notably *Borba, Vjesnik* and the weekly *NIN* soon began to show a new investigative spirit that challenged the old taboos and there were hints that the process of liberalization may continue. *NIN*, for instance, cautioned that "it is quite clear that the system of public information cannot be changed overnight, but it is possible to change it gradually." *NIN* then urged that "everything that is not a state secret should be made public"—a daring suggestion even in maverick Yugoslavia.[2]

THERE are, broadly speaking, three groups in this debate over democratization: the liberal "left" who want to exploit the weak grip of the post-Tito regime in order to win greater freedoms for the press, the universities and the public; the centralist "right" who would like to reduce the powers of the federal units and generally tighten central party control; and a small group of "moderate" Titoist loyalists, caught in between and who struggle to maintain what they regard less as an inviolate heritage from Tito than as a precarious stability which could easily be shattered.

Even before Tito died, while he was still in the hospital, ideological right-wingers began clamouring for a reversion to the pre-reform "unitarist" system. Stirrings among this reactionary faction evidently became sufficiently serious to prompt Vladimir Bakaric, the Croatian member of the collective presidency, to tackle the issue head-on. "The old system was condemned," he told *Borba* in January 1980. "The only thing that hasn't been worked out is how to implement the

[1] "Sta smo: cinovnici ili novinari," *NIN*, 18 May 1980.
[2] "Garancija za istinu," *NIN*, 18 May 1980.

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new system. . . . The new system does not solve all the problems. But it solves the main problems." [3]

But once Tito was buried, the regime became frightened lest the fragile equilibrium be shaken. A law was passed allowing university professors to be fired for political reasons. Foreign journalists were expelled for interviewing former Croatian communist party leaders. Milovan Djilas, the one-time vice president of Yugoslavia and current champion of pluralism in Yugoslavia, came under blistering, and apparently unprovoked, attack in the pages of *Politika* in July. So uncertain, so fearful of change did the regime become that it caused a certain Professor Jovicic to be fired from his university job and expelled from the party for having dared to level a few critical remarks at the regime in the privacy of a neighbour's apartment.[4]

By July, arch-reactionary Stipe Suvar, secretary of health, education and culture for the republic of Croatia, called for the closing of all university departments of political science, declaring that "we only need a certain number of people" informed about such matters, and that it was dangerous to have too many educated "*politikolozi*" floating around.[5] The proliferation of political scientists could only undermine the party's control, thought Suvar. At approximately the same time, Tihomir Vlaskalic was telling the central committee of the League of Communists of Serbia that Yugoslavia's waxing economic woes could only be handled if the party played an active "leading role." [6]

Bosnia's Branko Mikulic, a prominent party leader, distressed by repeated admonitions from the reactionary faction for the party to exercise "greater vigilance" and to reclaim some of the prerogatives devolved to the republics and provinces in the early 1970s,[7] warned in September:

> Views are heard here and there that "the party should take matters into its own hands." What does that mean? Where would it lead us? It would lead us into a situation in which the organs and organizations of the League of Communists would usurp the self-managing rights of the working people and citizens, the duties and responsibilities of the self-managing organs, the delegate

[3] *Borba*, 3 Jan. 1980.
[4] *Le Soir*, Brussels, 11 Sept. 1980, translated in *FBIS*/Yugoslavia (19 Sept. 1980).
[5] *NIN*, 3 Aug. 1980.
[6] *Politika*, 4 July 1980.
[7] This current has been, as of this writing, unintimidated. Thus, at a session of the Federal Conference of SAWPY 22 October 1980, Risto Dzunov, member of the Conference Presidium, blasted "republican statism": "We have often interpreted the slowness with which accords are reached as a normal phenomenon, caused by the democratization of relations, but in fact, he said, what we have had are powerful statist trends which are still in evidence, especially in the republics and provinces, which continue to manifest themselves more as 'states' and less as self-managing socio-political communities which should synthesize the authentic interests of associated labour." (*Tanjug*, 22 Oct. 1980, translated in *FBIS*/Yugoslavia, 23 Oct. 1980.) Thus, by a dialectical conjuring trick, the devolution of power from the centre is equated with "republican *statism*," while the call for the return of devolved powers to the central apparatus is disguised as "synthesizing the authentic interests of associated labour."

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> assemblies and other institutions of the system. It would lead us back to a strengthening of statism and political centralism.[8]

Far from reverting to its earlier "vanguard" role, in a spirit of misguided ideological atavism, the League of Communists (LCY) should, on the contrary, said Mikulic, seek to foster not only the further democratization of society, but also that of the party itself.[9]

THERE have been previous calls for political reform at the party level to be sure. In 1967, for instance, Stevan Vracar openly advocated the inauguration of a two-party system in Yugoslavia, the only proviso being that both parties be committed to socialism[10]—a project some circles subsequently endeavoured to put into effect, hoping to use the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia, the party's umbrella organization and mobilization arm, and convert it into an opposition party parallel to the LCY.[11] And at the end of the 1960s, there were aggressive attempts to federalize the party itself.[12] The difference between these earlier situations and the current one, however, is that the chief adjudicator is gone and there is no one, thus far, who has been able to take his place. Hence, the democratization debate is wide open, and, for the first time, the very premises of the whole system are being called into question. Self-management, for instance, which constitutes the crux of the system's claims to legitimacy and which, as proof of Titoism's distinctive accomplishments, was, until recently, considered sacrosanct,[13] has, since Tito's death, become subject first to "qualification" and then to outright criticism. Thus, in August, Mihailo Popovic, a *NIN* contributor, cautiously challenged the pretension that self-management has universal application:

> In reality the system of self-management has indisputable advantages over other systems of decision-making, but not even [self-management] has the "magic formula" to produce the best results *always and everywhere.*

Warning against the centralists' tendency to ascribe all problems to "underdeveloped self-managing relations," Popovic suggested that it would be better to employ "real sociological analysis" to probe current problems rather than to pretend that the self-managing formula

[8] *Borba,* 22 Sept. 1980, translated in *FBIS*/Yugoslavia, 25 Sept. 1980.

[9] *Tanjug,* 22 Oct. 1980, *FBIS*/Yugoslavia, 23 Oct. 1980.

[10] Stevan Vracar, "Partijski monopolizam i politicka moc drustvenih grupa," *Gledista,* nos. 8–9 (1967), cited in Othmar Nikola Haberl, *Parteiorganisation und nationale Frage in Jugoslavien* (Otto Harrassowitz, Berlin/Wiesbaden, 1976), p. 56.

[11] Report by Jure Bilic, in *Deveti Kongres Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije* (*Beograd, 27–30 Maja 1974*), *Stenografske beleske* (Komunist, Belgrade, 1975), p. 369.

[12] See, for instance, Leopold Kobsa, Vjekoslav Koprivnjak and Ines Saskor (eds.), *Nacionalno pitanje u djelima klasika marksizma i u dokumentima i praksi kpj/skj* (Centar Drustvenih Djelatnosti SSOH, Zagreb, 1978), pp. 65–6.

[13] See Lyman H. Legters, "Ideology and Integration: Marxism in Yugoslavia," in Stephanie G. Neuman (ed.), *Small States and Segmented Societies* (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1976), pp. 150–151.

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will cure all social ills.[14] By October, some Yugoslav newspapers were openly saying that self-management was not working—an unprecedented act of sacrilege which party moderates fear might play into the hands of the "unitarists" and lead ultimately to a restoration of strong-arm rule.[15]

IN the current atmosphere of uncertainty, Yugoslavia's liberals have once more taken up a crusade for political reform. Some 60 Slovenian writers asked for official permission to publish what, by their own admission, was to have been a rather liberal magazine: permission was denied and the applicants came under fire for irresponsibility. Others, such as Filip Vukovic, president of the Political Commission of the League of Socialist Youth of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have been pressing for the democratizaton of the youth organization, charging that the youth are often not consulted on vital matters concerning the organization and that meetings are frequently deliberately scheduled at the last minute in order to minimize attendance by the members.[16] Finally, in mid-October, Professor Ljudomir Tadic and writer Dobrica Cosic distributed a letter, highly critical of the regime, in which they espoused the establishment of Western-style democratic socialism in Yugoslavia and announced their intention to launch a magazine, *Javnost* (*The Public*), to promote that goal.[17]

The liberals seemed to have found a welcome ally, moreover, when Mitja Ribicic, former president of the Federal Executive Council and current president of the Republican Conference of the SAWP Slovenia, in a highly controversial interview in the Yugoslav men's magazine, *Start,* suggested that censorship should be drastically relaxed. Indeed, Ribicic went so far as to urge the party to publish all hostile literature, including that coming from émigré sources, and to collect it in university libraries, where it could be made available to the Yugoslav public.[18] In Ribicic's view, the more open and informed the dialogue, the more productive it might be.

The liberal current was reinforced in February 1981, when Aleksandar Grlickov, a member of the Central Committee Presidium and a long-time advocate of "democratization" within the party, called for a "wide-ranging dialogue in the League of Communists," and the fostering of an earnest dialogue between the party and other socialist forces in the system.[19] Grlickov's comments, furthermore, appeared to come as a direct reply to hardliners Radovan Radonjic

[14] Mihailo V. Popovic, "Nema univerzalnog leka," *NIN*, 24 Aug. 1980.
[15] See *Tanjug* report 22 Oct. 1980, translated in *FBIS*/Yugoslavia, 23 Oct. 1980.
[16] *Oslobodjenje*, 3 Sept. 1980.
[17] *Le Monde*, 19-20 Oct. 1980, translated in *FBIS/Yugoslavia*, 23 Oct. 1980.
[18] Mitja Ribicic, in interview with Jelena Lovric, in *Start*, 10 Dec. 1980, translated in JPRS/East Europe Report: Political, Sociological and Military Affairs, 2 Mar. 1981.
[19] *Vjesnik*, 6 Feb. 1981, translated in Slobodan Stankovic, "Two Groups in Yugoslav Party Fighting over 'Ideological Purity'," *Radio Free Europe Research*: RAD Background Report No. 37 (13 Feb. 1981), p. 3.

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and Fuad Muhic, who had been clamouring for a purge of wayward elements from party ranks and for a stiffening of the party line.

In the wake of the Albanian nationalist demonstrations in Kosovo in April 1981, the rift between hardliners and liberals in the Yugoslav leadership became open, as they debated the errors made in press policy and treatment of the demonstrations. *NIN* and *Politika* openly complained that party leaders had been dissembling and misrepresenting the situation, while there were reports that Yugoslav police organs, a traditional bastion of hardline views, hoped to exploit the Kosovo crisis to tighten the political screws and reorient policy in a hardline direction.[20]

Frightened by the rising critical spirit, party elder Stane Dolanc admitted in Split already in late October that the political system was going through a critical phase.[21] The solution, as he saw it, was to strengthen " the authority of the working class." What did this mean? It meant a frantic clutching at the old Titoist slogans in an effort to shore up a party that, however firm in the saddle it may seem to be, did not welcome this debate in the least and felt threatened by the assertive readiness of its participants to raise sensitive issues. Was there a possibility of party reform? Was it finally time to declare the principle of democratic centralism antiquated and to scuttle it in favour of something " more progressive "? Far from it," Stevan Doronjski told the editors of *Komunist* when asked that question, " democratic centralism has been and remains the basic principle of our organization." [22] The fact of the matter is that Yugoslav party leaders are openly fretting that the critics on the Left and on the Right will, between the two of them, succeed in dismantling the power apparatus and thus that Yugoslavia is evolving into a " non-party system" [23]

THE core of the problem is that present-day Yugoslavia hovers between legitimacy and illegitimacy, being neither the one nor the other. The Belgrade regime of the LCY is what Guglielmo Ferrero has called a " quasi-legitimate " regime.[24] It is this element which accounts for the Titoist and post-Titoist regime's relative liberalism, for the relative freedom of the domestic media, for the availability of the Western press in Yugoslavia, and for the readiness of the regime to let Yugoslavs travel out of the country. Yet the essence of quasi-legitimacy is the lack of any clear principle of legitimacy (such as democracy or royal heredity), which is often a factor of the conflict of two rival principles—in this case, perhaps, the tension between the

[20] *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 24 Apr. 1981, and 30 Apr. 1981.
[21] *Tanjug*, 25 Oct. 1980, translated in *FBIS*/Yugoslavia, 28 Oct. 1980.
[22] Reported in *Oslobodjenje*, 18 Oct. 1980.
[23] See Stephen C. Markovich, " Whither the League of Communists? " in *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1980), pp. 92–8.
[24] Guglielmo Ferrero, *The Principles of Power*, translated by Theodore R. Jaeckel (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1942), pp. 213–29.

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anarchic oestrus of self-management and the democratic principle increasingly cited by Yugoslav parliamentarians.

> Of all governments, quasi-legitimate ones are the hardest to understand. Because they seek justification in two conflicting principles of legitimacy, they live under an inadmissible contradiction; because they live under an inadmissible contradiction, they are in constant danger of insulting the common sense and morality of their subjects; as a result, they must strive to conceal their real nature. They may enjoy the advantages of quasi-legitimacy only insofar as they succeed in disguising themselves. Whole generations may obey a government of this kind without even suspecting its real nature. . . .[25]

Yugoslavia is, in fact, neither an anarchic nor a democratic state, and its claims of having created an entirely new system of government—self-managing socialism—are open to serious question. The problem is that quasi-legitimate governments have not been able to establish secure, institutionalized political patterns: Yugoslavia, thus, is currently operating under its fourth post-war constitution, which it is in the process of amending. Having failed to institutionalize political relationships, quasi-legitimate governments are, by that virtue, far more fragile than they appear, and can disappear overnight, offering very little resistance.[26] With Tito gone, and only a faceless collective presidency in his stead, the LCY has reason to feel insecure.

Both Left and Right therefore advance their arguments in terms of these rival principles of legitimacy. The liberals, seeking to transform Yugoslavia into a legitimate democratic-socialist state (on the pattern of Sweden), argue in terms of the democratic principle: their by-words are "democracy" and "democratization." The reactionary unitarists, on the other hand, preen themselves as the "true revolutionaries," and manipulate the symbols of the anarchic principle in order to further their goal of reverting to *illegitimate* one-party rule: their code-words are "self-management relations" and "self-managing socialism."

It is conventional wisdom to observe that the collective leadership, at least as it is currently set up, can only be a transitional form of government, however much Yugoslavs may protest that this is a stable form. Yet the reasons why this is likely to be the case are generally not understood. Whatever the constraints of economic pressure, international tensions, personal ambitions, and the loss of Tito, the underlying issue which makes all these problems more difficult to bear, and which is itself the basis for the debate over democratization, is the quasi-legitimacy of the LCY regime.

[25] Ibid. pp. 235–6. It is therefore quite intelligible that the people whom I, in accordance with Western concepts, have called "left-wing" liberals are denounced for "right-wing nationalist rotten liberalism," while those whom I have referred to as "right wing reactionaries" are described in Yugoslav sources as "left-wing unitarists."
[26] Ibid. p. 234.

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Lithuania's Catholic Movement Reappraised

V. Stanley Vardys

DESPITE the reverses suffered by Soviet dissidents since 1977 through the arrest or expulsion of their leaders, the dissident movement, though weakened in Moscow, remains vigorous in several parts of the Soviet Union.[1] This fact is important not only because national or religious protest movements help to sustain Russian civil rights initiatives but even more so because the Soviet Union is neither ethnically nor ideologically monolithic. Even by Soviet calculations, the slim majority the Russians still enjoy in the population will disappear by the year 2000. The percentage of Russians, it is predicted, will sink to 46–47,[2] that is, it will fall closer to the percentage the ruling nationality had in the Russian empire in 1897.

In such a situation, and despite the assimilationist gains the Russians are still making among the Slav and non-Slav groups, Soviet nationalities are bound to become more involved in the country's development and gain more influence in determining the direction of its life both positively and negatively. Non-Russian nationalities played a crucial role in the success of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917–20, and while history does not necessarily repeat itself, forces that moved Russia's social development in the past have not disappeared; on the contrary, they are gaining in strength. It is therefore important to monitor not only the development of Russian dissent in Moscow or Leningrad, but also that of Soviet nationalities, of religious or social groups beyond the confines of these Russian political centres.

One such movement with close ties to Moscow but with its own ideological and political profile is the Catholic dissent movement in Lithuania. It has deep popular roots and accounts for a disproportionately high percentage of dissident activities in the Soviet Union.[3]

IN a seminal work on Soviet dissidence, this Lithuanian Catholic movement has been identified as a group which unrealistically seeks single issue satisfaction and, in addition, employs violence to achieve its

1 In answer to Roy Medvedev, Peter Reddaway has shown that dissent in the Soviet Union is spreading. This is demonstrated by the increase of dissident publications, the appearance of new dissident groups and a wider circulation of *samizdat*. See *Index on Censorship* (Sept.–Oct. 1979), pp. 77–78. Medvedev's criticisms of the dissent movement appeared in the 2 Nov. 1979 issue of the same journal.

2 M. B. Tatimov, *Razvitie narodonaseleniya i demograficheskaya politika*. (Nauka, Alma Ata, 1978), p. 121.

3 According to David Kowalewski ("Lithuanian Protest for Human Rights in the 1970s: Characteristics and Consequences," *Lituanas*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1979, p. 45), Lithuanians held 10·3 per cent of all Soviet demonstrations in 1965–78. Religious protest accounted for two-thirds of these demonstrations.

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goals.[4] The volume's editor, Professor Rudolf Tokes, has classified the Lithuanian Catholic programme as belonging to the rightist "militant-anomic" spectrum of Soviet dissent ideology.[5] According to Webster's dictionary, "anomic" indicates a condition "commonly characterized by personal disorientation, anxiety, and social isolation" in a society "in which normative standards of belief have weakened or disappeared."[6] According to Tokes, anomic-militant ideologies indicate "programmes and statements that represent affirmations of national identity or spiritual autonomy or expressions of extreme alienation from the political philosophies, institutions, laws, and governing practices of the Soviet system."[7] The programmes and goals of the leaders of "persecuted religious believers [of] articulate Ukrainian, White Russian, Baltic, and Central Asian intellectuals, and [of] Jewish dissidents seeking to leave the USSR for Israel" belong to this group of ideologies.[8] Tokes, however, excludes from this list Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov, the Moscow Human Rights Committee as well as the *Chronicle of Current Events.* The Lithuanian Catholic movement, in Tokes's classification, does not belong with the *Chronicle of Current Events* but with the "militant-anomic" ideologies. It is important to stress in our context, that in Tokes's view, movements like that of the Lithuanian Catholics do not strive for an accommodation with the status quo, but "rather, without any hope of obtaining satisfaction, seek to confront and combat existing realities, such as officially sponsored or tolerated practices of religious, ethnic, and racial discrimination. . . ."[9]

Another student of Soviet dissent, Professor Barbara Jancar, recognizes that the Lithuanian Catholic protest is not a single issue movement but covers, in addition to the religious, "both the civil rights and nationality aspects" of dissident activities.[10] However, she maintains that Lithuanian Catholics differ from the other religious dissidents by the use of violence. "The Lithuanian Catholics," she writes, "benefited from the combined experience of all the religious dissenters to move beyond dissent to add the new ingredient of violence." In her view, this has no counterpart among other religious groups in the Soviet Union. As evidence, she

[4] Rudolf Tokes, ed., *Dissent in the USSR* (The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 1975). See his introduction, "Varieties of Soviet Dissent: An Overview," pp. 1–34; see also Barbara Jancar, "Religious Dissent in the Soviet Union," op. cit. pp. 191–232. For other interpretations of the Lithuanian Catholic dissent movement see Bohdan Bociurkiw, "Religious Dissent in the USSR: Lithuanian Catholics," in Richard T. De George and James P. Scanlan (eds.) *Marxism and Religion in Eastern Europe* (Dordrecht-Boston, 1974), pp. 147–75; Christel Lane, *Christian Religion in the Soviet Union* (Albany, 1978), pp. 208-17; Helene Carrere D'Encausse, *L'Empire éclate: La révolte des nations en URSS* (Flammarion, Paris, 1978), pp. 226-33).

[5] Ibid. pp. 14–15.

[6] *Webster's Third International Dictionary* (G. S. Merriam Co., Springfield, 1966), p. 89.

[7] Tokes, op. cit. p. 14.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid. p. 222.

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cites the self-immolation of Romas Kalanta in 1972 and the "rioting it touched off." [11]

These conclusions, based as they were on early and inadequate evidence of dissident Catholic activities, cannot be accepted as definitive. This is not the place, of course, to debate Tokes's classification of Soviet dissent ideologies, but even if Tokes's chart is accepted, Lithuanian Catholic dissenters cannot be put together with "hopeless" protesters but must be classified with the "instrumental-pragmatic centre" of the Soviet dissident movement which in Tokes's view includes Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, and Moscow's *Chronicle of Current Events.* More recent evidence from the Soviet Union provides further grounds for raising the question of whether Lithuanian Catholics oppose accommodation with the Soviet system, as suggested by the Tokes study, and whether they have added violence to the arsenal of their tactical weapons, as proposed by Jancar. A careful examination of the causes, ideology, and tactics of the Lithuanian movement shows it rather to be a peaceful, public-issue oriented protest movement, allied though not merged with the nationalist Lithuanian underground which constitutes one part of the democratic dissident movement for constitutional reform both in Lithuania and in the Soviet Union as a whole.

DISSENT is a form of opposition characteristic of the Soviet Union and of other Party-oriented community systems. A Soviet dissenter is an ideological heretic who expresses disagreement either with the system's rules of the game or with its policies or who questions aspects both of official ideology and of the practices of political culture. The dissenter has sometimes rather limited goals and usually employs modern peaceful means to achieve his ends. He thus differs from the professional revolutionary of the past as well as from the fanatical terrorist of the present, both of whom are dedicated to a total and violent overthrow of their target systems.

Such ideological heretics of course are found not only in communist but also in democratic societies. A dissident in the Soviet system, however, functions in a radically different political environment. This fact largely dictates his methods and his chances of success. First, since the Soviet system refuses to legitimize heresy, it refuses to provide channels for the latter's legal expression. Secondly, while democracy seeks a compromise by attempting to absorb many of the dissident ideas into the dominant political ideology and by integrating protesting citizens into the structure of power, the Soviet system refuses to seek such accommodation. It opposes ideological change; therefore it rejects both the heretic and his heresy, and relegates dissident activities to criminal jurisdiction. This of course threatens to widen the gap between the rulers and the dissenting segments of the population, thus endangering stability, but Moscow prefers to use the KGB for keeping closed this

[11] Ibid. p. 226.

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potentially fatal social gap. The Soviets drive the dissidents into the underground which then has to be monitored and kept sealed off from society by the secret police. Such response to dissent has not, however, lessened Soviet society's schizophrenia; on the contrary, the Kremlin's rejection of its own heretics has further intensified the split in the Soviet social personality.

In Lithuania, opposition to Soviet rule has taken various forms, from insurgency to dissent. A cruel partisan war (1944–52) cost the small country enormous casualties—40,000 dead in the battlefields, according to Soviet sources—and additional tens of thousands of civilians deported to Gulag territories. This insurgency was larger in scope than the Algerian or Rhodesian struggles of the 1950s and 1970s, but it was crushed by the Soviet military and security machine in the early post-war period under Mikhail Suslov's direction, Moscow's plenipotentiary in Lithuania. Afterwards, organized protest was only sporadic. In the 1960s and 1970s, Lithuanian opposition manifested itself in the form of dissent. While new protest activities have involved tens of thousands of Catholics, their totals have been considerably smaller than those engaged in the earlier guerrilla war, and have led to the detention and imprisonment of only relatively small numbers of activists. The earlier insurgency represented a national protest against the imposition of Soviet power. Current dissent is much narrower in scope; it protests against certain institutions and practices of the new rulers. The post-war insurgency was totally hostile to Moscow's control; the dissidents are selectively critical of Moscow's policies, though some of the protesters seem to be losing patience.[12]

CHARACTERISTICALLY, this newly articulated protest against the Soviet system did not begin in the shape of a nationalist political movement but as a voice of grievance against the suppression of one aspect of social life, namely, the maltreatment of the Catholic Church and discrimination against Catholic believers. Lithuanian dissenters thus originally concentrated not on the issue of national freedom, but started with the defence of individual rights. Why this shift from total opposition to selective protest, from a nationalist political movement to civil rights activity? The answer must be sought in the international post-war development and in Soviet policies toward nationality and religion. After the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Lithuanians seemed to have generally concluded that the Soviet control of their

[12] Western literature on this insurgency is rather scarce. For an authentic memoir of guerrilla activity see J. Daumantas, *Fighters for Freedom: Lithuanian Partisans Versus the USSR (1944–47)*, (New York, 1975). The author, a prominent partisan leader who perished in 1951, describes the first three years of insurgency. Further see K. V. Tauras, *Guerilla Warfare on the Amber Coast* (New York, 1962); V. Stanley Vardys, "The Partisan Movement in Post-war Lithuania," *Slavic Review*, XXII, No. 3 (Sept. 1963), pp. 499–522. The Soviets have published a series entitled *Faktai kaltina* (Facts Accuse) (Vilnius, 1961–68). This series represents the main Soviet source and interpretation.

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country would not end in the immediate future. While the desire for national sovereignty did not decline, a policy of total confrontation with the government was no longer judged realistic. Furthermore, although the Soviet system—at least in the post-Stalin period—assured a wide use of the native language and a certain latitude in the development of national culture (albeit denying any possibility of political sovereignty) religion was left completely outside the protection of the system. In addition, various institutional arrangements and administrative decisions were aimed at the suffocation of religious life and beliefs. In the modern decade many Lithuanians felt the greater threat to the survival of the religious, traditionally very influential, sector of Lithuanian society.

There were, in addition, some very specific reasons for the emergence of religious protest. Both the Stalin (1936) and Brezhnev (1977) Constitutions are very hostile to religion. They allow the freedom of performance of religious ceremonies but deny the right to distribute religious information. Article 124 of the old and Article 52 of the new Constitution equate freedom of performing religious ceremonies with freedom of anti-religious or atheist propaganda.[13] The Constitution, in other words, provides for an asymmetric allocation of freedom between the believers and the atheists. Two consequences, both detrimental and discriminatory to religion, have followed from this constitutional asymmetry; first, a most narrowly defined freedom of religion, and secondly, the establishment of a very adverse social environment saturated with officially financed anti-religious education and propaganda.

As a consequence, the rules of the day-to-day operation of religious groups are very restricted. The most recent legislation, adopted in 1976[14] in Lithuania, but incorporating only a rehash of the statute of 1929 with amendments, imposes extremely narrow limits on Church activity.

Restrictions begin with the requirement of a licence for the functioning of a religious association, that is, a congregation. A group of 20 adults may apply for registration which may be denied. These 20 people, the *dvatsatka*, are responsible for the administration of the affairs of the parish and for the maintenance and upkeep of Church buildings and religious Church articles, all of which are state property, leased to the association by the local government, according to the terms of a written contract. The authorities may terminate this contract at will, the religious association having no judicial recourse since it has no legal standing. The clergy are excluded from the parish (*dvatsatka*) committee which runs the association; they are regarded as employees of this committee

[13] The Stalin Constitution spoke of " anti-religious propaganda " as the opposite equivalent of " religious worship " while the Brezhnev constitution has substituted " atheist " for " anti-religious."

[14] For a recent analysis of Soviet constitutional law on religion comparing the 1936 and 1977 constitutions, see V. Stanley Vardys, *The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania* (Boulder–New York, 1978), pp. 89–107.

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and cannot perform any liturgical functions without the group's consent. Religious centres—diocesan administrations—are recognized by the law of 1976 but they do not have a clear legal status of governance over parishes which may refuse to accept diocesan decisions. Neither the parishes nor dioceses have a status of legal person in the Soviet state and thus enjoy neither legal protection (unless specifically agreed) nor can they go to court for the redress of grievances. In addition, they are completely isolated from society. Article 17 of the Lithuanian statute forbids parishes to organize " special children's and youth meetings and, likewise, work, literature, and other circles and groups which have no relation to the performance of the cult." Article 45 further prohibits the creation of " mutual aid funds, cooperatives, production associations," the giving of aid to parish members and the " use of property at their disposal for any other purpose but the satisfaction of religious needs." Clergymen are " restricted to the place of residence of members of religious association which they serve and to the location of the corresponding premises of prayer" (Art. 19). They are, finally, forbidden " to engage in visiting believers " (Art. 45).

Of special concern to the Lithuanians was the prohibition of the teaching of religion to anyone under 18 years of age. The newly formulated statute of 1976 confined religious instruction to " clerical scholastic institutions," in other words, to the single theological seminary in Kaunas which only recently was permitted an enrolment of 100 students.[15] A " systematic " teaching of religion to minors is a criminal act punishable by " deprivation of freedom for a term of up to three years " (Lithuanian Criminal Code, Art. 143). Punishment is also provided for violating other provisions of the law. It is, finally, important to note that the Criminal Code makes it illegal to lobby in an organized manner for the change of legislation that controls religion.[16]

These restrictive rules, though in existence since 1940, could not be enforced immediately in Lithuania because the Catholics fiercely resisted their implementation. The struggle for religious education, but especially opposition to the principle of registration and " association " —considered by several bishops uncanonical—led to the physical destruction or incarceration of the Lithuanian hierarchy.[17] In February 1946 the communists arrested, and in October of the same year executed, Bishop Vincentas Borisevicius of Telsiai. His Auxiliary Bishop, Pranas Ramanauskas, was arrested and exiled to Siberia, but released though not returned to office after Stalin's death in 1956. At the end of 1946, the authorities arrested Bishop Teofilis Matulionis of Kaisiadorys. He was sentenced to a seven year term in prison. Although a very old man, he survived the camps to reclaim his mitre, but was again deposed.

[15] English text of the law on religious associations adopted by the Lithuanian SSR supreme Soviet on 28 July 1978, is found in ibid. pp. 244–54.

[16] Translation of pertinent articles of the Criminal Code of the Lithuanian SSR in ibid. pp. 254–58.

[17] Ibid. p. 62 ff.

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Finally, in 1947, the communists arrested the Archbishop of Vilnius, Mecislovas Reinys, who perished in the notorious Vladimir prison on 3 November 1953. For a decade, the only bishop left in Lithuania was Msgr Kazimieras Paltarokas, the Bishop of Panevezys, who moved to Vilnius. During the same period, approximately 1946–51, which witnessed the deportation of some 350,000 of the republic's population, the authorities sent 350 clergymen to exile or about one-third of all priests left in Lithuania at the time.

THE death of Stalin brought some relief but this was short-lived as Khrushchev did not include the churches among the beneficiaries of de-Stalinization. Already in 1957 new steps were taken against the Church. In that year, Msgr Vincentas Sladkevicius, the newly consecrated bishop of Kaisiadorys, was deposed and banished from his diocese. In 1961, the government sent into provincial exile another new bishop, Julijonas Steponavicius, who had been appointed administrator of the Vilnius diocese in 1955.

The removal of Bishop Steponavicius was not an isolated incident.[18] It was part of a new attack on religion organized by the Kremlin in 1961 to eliminate competition in the Communist Party's efforts to produce the " new Soviet man," proclaimed by the Party's 1961 programme. Moscow now tightened the restrictive anti-religious legislation, pressing for more severe enforcement by local authorities. Furthermore, in 1965, the authorities reduced the number of theology students to 25. The Kremlin also reorganized the administration of Church affairs in Moscow, and in 1966, had the criminal code of individual republics amended to spell out punishment for the teaching of religion and for organizing social Church activities. In addition, the Kremlin began a new atheist drive. This drive was started in Lithuania in early 1963, even before a formal decision for a national campaign was adopted by the all-Union Communist Party. Privately, communist leaders in Lithuania boasted that as a result of these new actions, Catholicism in Lithuania would be dead in one or two decades.

All of these pressures—the new restrictions, the atheist campaign, the attempt to choke off the supply of new priests, widespread discrimination at work on religious grounds, and especially the various new measures taken against the unofficial religious instruction of children —dashed all hopes of improvement under Khrushchev. Catholics began to lose their patience. Lithuanian anxieties grew alarmingly when it was realized that while domestically the post-Stalin liberalization excluded the Church, internationally the Kremlin began gaining ground in its relations with the Vatican. The Papal *Ostpolitik*, in the view of Lithuanian Catholics, allowed the Soviets a free hand in Lithuania and helped the communists to secure appointments for subservient Catholic hierarchs who accepted Soviet limitations on the teaching of religion, the educa-

[18] Ibid. p. 85 ff.

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tion of priests, and on Catholic publications. This, many thought, would destroy the Church with its own hands.

Before appealing to the Vatican directly, however, Lithuania's clergymen attempted a dialogue with the Soviet authorities.[19] This dialogue seemed to be encouraged by a 1968 statute permitting citizens' petitions of grievances.[20] Thus, Lithuania's priests asked for the freedom of religious and theological instruction, for religious publications, for the return of deposed bishops and for an end to the discrimination against church-attending Catholics. Collective petitions signed by up to 85 per cent of diocesan priests and thousands of believers descended on authorities in Moscow and Vilnius. In this way, beginning with the summer of 1968, the Lithuanians adopted the practice of Baptist "*Initsiativniki*," and of the Crimean Tatar, Jewish, and Russian dissidents. These petitions, however, bore no fruit, rarely even a written response. When the government answered, it was in the form of arresting priests and laymen charged with the teaching of religion to minors. Four such trials were held in 16 months, between September 1970 and January 1972. Three priests, the Rev Antanas Seskevicius, a Jesuit father, Rev Juozas Zdebskis, Rev Prosperas Bubnys, and Ms Kleopa Biciucaite were sentenced to prison for giving religious instruction. These trials were seen as indicating the ultimate failure of the Vatican's *Ospolitik*. "Rome is misinformed, the Chekists [secret police agents] have infiltrated the Vatican, we have been betrayed,"[21] was the conclusion. Every effort had to be made, it was decided, to pass on to Rome undistorted information on the naked reality of religious life. In the winter and spring of 1972, therefore, an appeal to world opinion was organized: 17,054 people —a fantastic number under Soviet circumstances—signed a petition to Brezhnev asking for the situation to be set right.[22] Since in the past Moscow's authorities had refused to answer similar petitions, this one was sent through Kurt Waldheim, General Secretary of the United Nations in New York. In this way, the petition became front page news all over the world and the voice of Lithuania's Catholics finally had to be heeded. At the same time, Lithuania was the only Soviet republic where religious protest reached such mass proportions. This was repeatedly demonstrated by a continuous stream of petitions each signed by more than 1,000 people. Even as recently as March 1979, one petition, addressed to V. A. Kuroedov, the Chairman of the Council on Religious Affairs in Moscow, was signed by 10,241 persons, and another, sent to the Chairman of the Presidium Leonid Brezhnev, was signed by 148,149 people. It demanded the return to religious use of the church of Our Lady of Peace in the port town of Klaipeda, which,

[19] Ibid. p. 131 ff.

[20] *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSR*, No. 17 (1415), 24 April 1968, pp. 243–48.

[21] *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania*, No. 4 (1972). Hereafter cited as CCCL. Text published in *Lietuvos Kataliku Baznycios Kronika* (Chicago, 1974), Vol. I pp. 166–67.

[22] *New York Times*, 22 May 1972, p. 5; *Chicago Sun-Times*, 28 Mar 1972, p. 1.

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after being built in 1960, had been confiscated by the government.[23] Domestically, too, the Lithuanian Catholic voice (about 1.0 per cent of the Soviet population) became disproportionately conspicuous among Soviet dissidents. It has been estimated that for the period of 1968–77, public Lithuanian Catholic demonstrations and actions constituted 6.8 per cent of the total Soviet dissident activity.[24]

SINCE petitions generally did not produce results, at about the same time the Catholics began publishing the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania* (*Lietuvos Kataliku Baznycios Kronika*), an articulate protest journal aimed at publicizing the plight of Catholics, especially to the West. Its first issue appeared on 19 March 1972, the feast-day of St Joseph. Its avowed purpose was to gather and publicize information on discrimination against Catholics and on violations of human rights as guaranteed by the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and by other international agreements. The journal also sought to induce the Soviet government to reinterpret the meaning of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religious ceremonies, hoping for the inclusion of freedom of communication.

In the Soviet Union, this philosophy of dissident publication was not new. The very choice of the title for the journal showed that the publishers of the Lithuanian *Chronicle* felt close to the Russian sponsors of the *Chronicle of Current Events* (*Khronika tekushchikh sobytii*) which had been published unofficially since 1968, although publication had temporarily been suspended because of the arrests of its chief editors.

A number of *samizdat* documents, and especially the later trial in Vilnius of Academician Sakharov's friend Sergei Kovalev, a Russian scientist and a member of Sakharov's Human Rights Committee, revealed close ties between the Lithuanian Catholic and the Russian liberal dissidents. Both groups believed that Articles 124 and 125 of the constitution concerning freedom of religion and freedom of speech should be interpreted neutrally, as in the West. Both groups were convinced that the exposure of violations of human rights would restrain the government and that freedom of information constitutes the basis of a just political society. In other words, both groups subscribed to the democratic principles of civil rights as these are understood by Western democracies. "As long as the Lord will permit its existence," the *Chronicle's* editors wrote celebrating three years of publication, "the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania* will continue to present facts about Soviet observance and practice of the Universal Declaration

[23] CCCL, No. 38 (1979), p. 60; No. 41 (1980), pp. 42–45. Copies of the petition were sent to the Lithuanian Council of Ministers and other official agencies, and also to the Committee for Defence of Believers' Rights. The signatures were bound in a 1,589-page book, with 56 photographs.

[24] Percentage data courtesy of Professor David Kowalewski, Benedictine College, who in 1977 completed a Ph.D. dissertation entitled "Protest Uses of Symbolic Politics" (University of Kansas). See also note 3.

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of Human Rights and the spirit as well as the letter of the decisions of the Helsinki Conference of 1975." [25] In other words, the *Chronicle* which continues as the chief spokesman for the Lithuanian Catholic dissent movement was not preoccupied with single issue satisfaction, but acted as the voice of a movement not confined to the achievement of narrow denominational goals. It showed itself to be interested not only in the survival of its own Church but in the establishment of freedom for others. It staked its own future on the commitment to the universal principle of freedom of information.

This commitment, furthermore, was not abstract. For the *Chronicle*, information represented power. Catholic dissidents used it to secure human rights guaranteed by the United Nations declaration which, as we will recall, grew out of Franklin D. Roosevelt's promotion of the four freedoms of man. This aim dictated the movement's tactics. The dissidents concentrated on reporting events so that the Western press would then publicize them and Western radio stations beam information about them (such events are not reported by the official Soviet press) back to Lithuania and the Soviet Union. To attract attention and sympathy, the dissenters had to use peaceful methods of protest. Dissident terrorism is unknown in the Soviet Union not only because Soviet security conditions make the use of violence much less practical and possible, but also because the use of violence would be counterproductive to democratic or religious dissident goals. Thus, informed Western public opinion, it was apparently believed, would generate sufficient strength to induce the Soviets to ease pressures and make concessions. In addition, through this channel the dissidents around the *Chronicle* gave notice to the government and the Vatican that if the Church's condition were not improved, they would take it into the underground where the authorities would not be able even to monitor its activities, let alone control them. It was apparently considered important to voice this warning because the Soviets were known to be extremely nervous about any domestic activity they were incapable of checking. The Vatican also had to be given a dramatic warning of the seriousness of the situation. The threat has been partially carried out, at least in some spheres of life. In 1979, for example, dissidents in Vilnius confirmed the existence of an underground theological seminary. It was known before this confirmation that the republic had a number of secretly ordained priests. Prayerbooks continue to be printed unofficially by a variety of duplication methods though this latter activity seems by and large to be monitored by the KGB.

Dissident tactics, thus, included the mobilization of public opinion and pressure on the government but excluded violence. The view of Professor Jancar that Lithuania's Catholic dissidents adopted violence as an instrument and have moved beyond dissent in their struggle for the

[25] CCCL, No. 18. Text in Chicago Vol. III, p. 121.

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rights of religion is founded on a mistaken notion that Kalanta's self-immolation and the subsequent demonstrations of young people during which police cars were overturned, windows smashed, the old national flag hoisted, and the national anthem sung, was a religious event. An investigation of Kalanta's background and the circumstances which surrounded his self-sacrifice show no religious and certainly no denominational origins.[26] Kalanta himself came from a communist family and formally belonged to the Komsomol. His friends were those young people who imitated Western styles, wore long hair and blue jeans. There is no evidence of their close relations either with clergymen or devout Catholic laymen. The Kaunas revolt—as one witness has called the riots of 1972—was a nationalist phenomenon, not occasioned by religious motives, though it did help to ease the Church's situation. The fact that the youth of Kaunas publicly supported the principle of freedom of speech and religion should not be taken to mean that they had a religious goal. They were, rather, patriotic students and workers seeking freedom for Lithuania.

However, while Lithuania's religious dissenters have never resorted to violence, their views as to what constitutes it very likely differ from those generally accepted in the West where an act of self-immolation frequently is regarded as a suicide, that is, a self-inflicted violent death. In Lithuania, the dozen self-immolations which occurred in 1972 were not regarded as acts of violence but of supreme sacrifice. Among the clergy, Rev Antanas Ylius successfully used the threat of self-immolation[27] to extract a promise from the government that the atheist museum in Vilnius would change an exhibit description which falsely accused him of using torture during the partisan war of the late 1940s.

The case of Rev Ylius is very likely a rare exception—he did not need to imitate Kalanta to win his objective—but recently a large majority of the Lithuanian clergy threatened, though without sanctions, to refuse peacefully to obey Soviet laws they considered to be unjust. The catalyst for this development was the new law on religious associations passed on 28 July 1976, by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR.

On 16 November 1978, the newly organized Catholic Committee for the Defence of Believers' Rights[28] condemned this legislation as contrary to the Helsinki agreements on human rights and as a discriminatory decree which relegated believers to second class citizenship. On 25 December 1978, this Committee sent a letter to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet asking for the repeal of the Lithuanian law. The group considered that this law violated the Lithuanian constitution, the

[26] For a detailed story see Vardys, op. cit. p. 168 ff. Like Barbara Jancar, Helene Carrere d'Encausse in her excellent book makes a similar mistake concerning Kalanta and the Kaunas events, op. cit. p. 231.

[27] *Dievas ir tevyne*, No. 2 (1976), pp. 39–41.

[28] Statement of purposes in CCCL, No. 36. Text in Chicago Vol. V, p. 233 ff.

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Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various other international agreements to which the Soviet Union is a signatory. This letter was supported by clergymen from all five Lithuanian dioceses who sent to various authorities in Moscow and in Vilnius five separate petitions signed by a total of 522 priests. This constitutes 75 per cent of all of Lithuania's clergy.[29] The conspicuous exceptions among the signatories were primarily diocesan administrators and deans. The punch line of various arguments in these documents was the charge that the law of 1976 was "legally invalid" because it discriminated against the believers, violated the USSR and the Lithuanian constitutions, contradicted the teaching and the canon law of the Catholic Church and also violated the freedom of individual conscience. Since the law was invalid, clergymen were not bound by it and therefore would refuse obedience. Forced to choose between the law and their conscience which demands different behaviour, the clergymen would choose the dictates of conscience.

Returning to the dissident concept of human rights—especially in view of the ambiguity of the pre-Vatican II Catholic disposition towards freedom of speech and conscience—it is important to stress that the *Chronicle*'s philosophy established common ground with the liberal though not libertarian, philosophy of civil rights. This attitude, it appears, is shared not only by the dissident movement but also by the official leadership of the Lithuanian Church as well. It was unequivocally defined by Lithuania's bishops and administrators in their commentary on the draft of the new Soviet Constitution written to Leonid Brezhnev in the summer of 1977. In this petition the bishops asked that Brezhnev drop the old and ominous phrase which severely restricted and qualified the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech in the Soviet Union. This phrase in the new Article 50 (formerly 125) guaranteed freedom "in conformity with the interests of the working people and for the purpose of strengthening the Soviet system." The bishops suggested that this qualification concealed "discrimination against the rights of some citizens and legal preference as well as privileges for specific groups of citizens."[30] Their request that this limitation be struck out was of course disregarded, but the record was left that, as in Poland,[31] all Lithuanian church leaders favoured the historically won democratic rights for their society.

[29] Texts of protests in CCCL, No. 38 (1979), pp. 2–37. These texts contain names of clergymen who signed the protests-petitions. Percentages for individual dioceses, compiled by the Soviets and reported by the CCCL, No. 39 (1979), p. 13, are the following: Kaisiadorys—60 per cent; Kaunas—63 per cent; Vilkaviskis—78 per cent; Vilnius—3 statements; 64 per cent demanded the return of Bishop J. Steponavicius to his post; Panevezys—84 per cent; Telsiai—76 per cent.

[30] Text in CCCL, No. 33 (1978), pp. 12–16; English translation in *Lituanus*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1979), pp. 49–53.

[31] Texts of statements by Polish Catholic bishops in A. Ostoja-Ostaszewski et al., eds. *Dissent in Poland*, 1976–77 (London, 1977).

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FOR a number of years, the authorities chose to disregard Catholic petitions and complaints. If the government answered them at all, it did so by strictly and vigorously enforcing Criminal Code provisions which forbade the teaching of religion. In one case, the authorities even disregarded the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic demanding the reinstatement of a teacher who was a believer. However, in 1972, confronted by the double-headed opposition of the *Chronicle*'s protest on the one hand and the national demonstrations by young people on the other, the regime opted for a course of pacifying the Church. Two possible reasons explain this choice. First, the Party in this manner hoped to reduce the support religious protesters could extend to the nationalists, and secondly, the authorities needed to gain time to deal separately with the explosive nationalism so vividly displayed by the Soviet educated generation. In August, three months after the quelling of the Kaunas riots and five months after the Brezhnev-Waldheim petition reached New York, the Russian language daily *Sovetskaya Litva* admonished its readers (and informed Western correspondents who do not read Lithuanian) that religion should not be fought by " administrative attacks " and " insults on the feeling of believers." The government paper further suggested that instead of helping to combat religion, such " incorrect methods " of struggle incite " religious fanaticism." [32]

This explanation signalled a shift in communist policy. The change soon became apparent. No further clergymen or laymen were tried for teaching religion as in 1970–72, although religious instruction, such as it was, continued unabated. Until mid-1973, local governments did not even impose administrative fines for such " crimes " although administrative punishment was resumed shortly afterwards. However, the government now permitted the admission of a larger number of theology students to the only official theological seminary in Kaunas. In addition, in 1972, the authorities allowed the publication of a delayed translation of the New Testament. While the volume was printed in an edition of only 10,000 copies for a population of three million, its publication—the first in the post-war period—represented a breakthrough for which both the official Church administrators and the dissident Catholics claimed credit. Finally, in 1976, two bishops and eight clergymen were allowed to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Philadelphia, and pressures were eased on the bishops in internal exile, V. Sladkevicius and J. Steponavicius. The first hierarch was reliably reported to have been offered a position in Church administration by the Soviets which he refused out of solidarity with Bishop Steponavicius whose exile the government was unwilling to terminate. The name of the latter bishop, however, was prominently mentioned in 1978 in the Western press as that of the new secret Cardinal *in pectore* appointed by Pope John Paul II.[33]

[32] *Sovetskaya Litva*, 12 Aug. 1972, p. 3.

[33] For example, Craig R. Whitney, " In Lithuania, Too, Catholics Look Hopefully to New Pope," *New York Times*, 26 July 1979; Jim Gallagher, " Is He the ' Secret Cardinal '? " *Chicago Tribune*, 10 June 1979; Communist *Unita* (Rome), 1 July 1979.

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Policy changes were further stressed by the reassignment of communist personnel who had failed to control the rising tide of religious and national protest. Thus, the republic's Commissioner for Religious Affairs, J. Rugienis, a former KGB operative who usually addressed bishops and clergymen in the impolite form of the singular "you," was replaced by K. Tumenas, a suave diplomat with a candidate's degree in history. An educator and party *apparatchik*, Tumenas was to symbolize the new twist of religious policy. In addition to this change, the Kaunas riots apparently caused the temporary eclipse of P. Misutis, the chief of the Central Committee's Agitprop, who did not regain this position until 1978. The demotion of second Party secretary, A. Barkauskas, to the ceremonial position of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, too, appeared to be caused by what the authorities saw as his unsatisfactory performance as chief Party officer in charge of propaganda.

The new Commissioner Tumenas, needless to say, did not suspend the laws on religion nor stop atheist propaganda against the Church. The new strict law on religious associations was passed in 1976, as scheduled in Moscow, and after a longer break, in 1977, the Party ordered intensified anti-religious activities in schools. Tumenas, in addition, did not accept the legitimacy of the *Chronicle* but instead sought its demise by persuading the clergy that its publication was counter-productive. While Tumenas failed to destroy Catholic protest by peaceful means, the KGB had more success with the use of force. 10 collaborators of the *Chronicle* were caught and tried in 1974–75 in four separate trials and given sentences of up to seven years in prison and three additional years in exile. Nevertheless, during Tumenas's tenure, 1973–78, the authorities gave more elbow room to Church administrators, discouraged arbitrary outbursts against clergymen and believers from local government officials and atheist groups, and tried to "normalize" the implementation of the restrictive laws. By 1979, all but 36 religious "associations" had signed "contracts" with the local government.[34] Generally, the believers could breathe a bit easier. Churches filled with young people. The fear of reprisal eased and a spirit of self-assertion spread through various sectors of social life.

Catholic dissidents saw in this change a justification of their policy of articulate and peaceful protest. Indeed, underground activity resulted in some relaxation instead of the punishment threatened by the authorities. The *Chronicle*'s tactic of concentrating on religious and civil rights instead of combining these issues with a strictly nationalist programme also seemed to be paying some dividends. It is reasonably certain, however, that the unexpected nationalist upheaval in Kaunas, accompanied by a dozen more self-immolations in provincial localities was interpreted by the authorities as a return of the spectre of nationalism and persuaded them to relieve anti-Soviet tension by first easing pressures

[34] CCCL, No. 39 (1979), p. 13.

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on the Church.[35] It is also highly probable that in the period of détente, shortly after the signing of the SALT I agreement, the Kremlin reacted with more sensitivity to the world-wide publicity given to the trials of the priests, the Brezhnev-Waldheim petition, the self-immolation of Kalanta and the Kaunas riots which, too, were interpreted by Western media as part of " Catholic " upheaval in Lithuania.[36]

Indeed most Western journalists and scholars have tended to characterize the Lithuanian struggle for religious and national rights as invariably " Catholic." While in terms of the denominational membership of its participants this very likely is true, such identification over-simplifies the nature of dissidence in Lithuania. As *samizdat* evidence shows, there exists between the religious and national dissent much overlapping and even convergence, but not general identification. A brief look at Lithuanian activities may be helpful in clarifying this important question.

Lithuanian dissidents pursue a three-fold activity: (a) they struggle for religious rights, (b) they monitor civil rights violations, and (c) they continue efforts of preserving national and political traditions eventually aiming at the restoration of Lithuania's national independence.

The movement to gain freedom for religion undoubtedly continues to be nurtured by the *Chronicle* which since 1978 has been aided by the Catholic Committee for the Defence of Believers' Rights. According to the founders of this group, its establishment was partially inspired by the election of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla as Pope John Paul II. This Committee consists solely of clergymen well known for their previous engagement in dissident Catholic activities. They are: J. Kauneckis, A. Svarinskas, S. Tamkevicius, V. Velavicius, J. Zdebskis. In over two dozen documents sent to government and Church authorities, this group has defended the rights not only of Catholic but also of Russian Orthodox and other believers and has stood in the forefront of lobbying activities demanding a revision of restrictive anti-religious legislation. The group's members have been searched, harassed, privately and publicly warned and viciously attacked in the press but not arrested.

The Soviets have not spared, however, the activists of the second category of dissidence, namely, the Lithuanian Helsinki group which monitors Soviet violations of the international agreement signed in Helsinki in 1975. Established in the fall of 1976, it originally consisted of Catholic activist Viktoras Petkus, poet Tomas Venclova, another poet Ms Ona Poskiene-Lukauskaite, the Rev. K. Garuckas, S.J., and Doctor of Science N. Finkelshtein, an activist in the Jewish emigration movement. This group was severely weakened by the arrest of its leader Viktoras Petkus, who was sentenced to a 15-year term of labour camp prison and internal exile. In an obviously orchestrated

[35] See Vardys, op. cit. p. 182 ff.
[36] See, for example, *New York Times*, 14 June, p. 1 ff.

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performance, a Lithuanian court passed judgment upon him on the same day, 13 July 1978, that the Russian republic's courts sentenced A. Ginzburg and V. Shcharansky. The latter, according to reports, became Petkus' cell mate. The Committee suffered another loss by the departure and later involuntary exile in the West of Tomas Venclova, and then in 1979 by the death of Rev. Garuckas. These members were replaced by Rev. B. Laurinavicius, a Catholic pastor of Adutiskis, and by A. Statkevicius, a physician, previously unknown in *samizdat* documents, as well as M. Jurevicius, a worker in the fourth largest Lithuanian city of Siauliai and an active participant in the movement for religious rights. A political prisoner, B. Gajauskas, rearrested and sentenced in 1977, joined the group symbolically from the camp in which he is serving a sentence as long as that of Petkus. The Helsinki group, nevertheless, has succeeded in publishing some 30 documents interceding with the authorities and bringing to public attention violations of personal rights of people of diverse religious and national backgrounds.

The third activity in which participants in the Catholic rights movement take part is the struggle against the destruction of national traditions, demanding, in addition, the restoration of national independence and taking sides on domestic and international political issues. Such, for example, was the expression of solidarity with the striking workers of Poland, the denunciation of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and " the declaration of the 45 " signed by 45 Balts (36 Lithuanians, among them four Catholic priests; five Estonians, and four Latvians). Known as the Baltic declaration, it was issued on 23 August 1979, the 40th anniversary of the Stalin-Hitler non-aggression pact which precipitated the demise of Baltic independence. This declaration, petitioning the annulment of the act and the restoration of independent statehood, invoked the Final Act of the Helsinki Agreement in support of nationalist, not just civil or more specifically religious, rights as was usually the case with civil rights groups. This is important to note because until then nationalist dissidents in the Baltic region were very critical of the Helsinki Agreement and considered it detrimental to nationalist hopes.

The KGB tolerated this third type of activity even less than the others, and shortly arrested several signers and alleged organizers, among them A. Terleckas, an economist and worker who was seized just 10 weeks after signing the Baltic declaration (see note 48). On 21 September 1980, Terleckas was sentenced to three years of prison and five years internal exile for the violation of Criminal Code Art. 68 which punishes anti-Soviet " agitation and propaganda." With him the Lithuanian court sentenced 20-year-old Julius Sasnauskas, also a signer of the Baltic document. Still another signer and Helsinki group member A. Statkevicius, was confined to a psychiatric hospital. Following this KGB hunt which was extended to Estonia, still another signer, Vladas

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Sakalys, an optician, active in dissident circles (he prefers the term " patriot " to that of " dissident ") adventurously fled the Soviet Union on foot and succeeded in reaching Sweden.

Information contained in the November 1980 list of Lithuanian political prisoners compiled by the Lithuanian Information Service of Brooklyn, New York (it contains 122 names but is incomplete) further confirms that while there exists overlapping between the nationalist and religious civil rights activism, there is no identity between them. Underground press, too, speaks about separate " wings " of the dissent movement. It should be noted, however, that of the currently known *samizdat* periodicals possibly only one, *Varpas*, started in 1977, is not Catholic church-oriented. At least, it does not editorialize on the importance of the Catholic faith. Yet only its somewhat more detached tone and a bit more academic style distinguishes it from the rest of *samizdat* literature perceived as " Catholic."

IT is natural to expect that in traditionally Catholic Lithuania dissident Catholicism and nationalism would be closely related. The nature of this relationship, however, is not as self-evident as frequently assumed, although the interaction of these two ideologies substantially influences the development of Lithuanian society and indirectly affects the social evolution of the multinational Soviet state. Nationalist convictions colour Lithuanian Catholic relations with the Russians in Moscow and with Russian immigrants in Lithuania. These convictions influence attitudes on the use of the Russian language, acceptance of Moscow's rule, relations with non-Russian nationalities and also on the very sensitive problem of communications between Lithuanian Catholics and the ruling communist, as well as dissident nationalist, atheists.

For four years, until the appearance of new underground publications in 1976, the *Chronicle* functioned as the sole " uncensored " voice [37] of Lithuania. It was therefore probably inevitable that sooner or later the journal would address itself to national and social as distinct from strictly religious issues. It soon began reporting not only religious events, but also national news, as for example, strikes, social problems, arrests not related to religious matters, Russification policies, environmental pollution, and finally, efforts made to keep Lithuanian culture free of ideological communist requirements and restraints. It assumed, in effect, the role of a people's tribune on national, not only religious, affairs and, in some cases, even of personal difficulties with the government. The publicity it gave to the plight of some dissidents, for example, helped them to gain permits to emigrate or visas to travel to the United States.

The journal's role of representing Lithuanian national interests emerged especially clearly from the coverage of the activities, arrests, and reports on the trials of ethnographic and amateur film-making

[37] *Soviet Analyst*, IV, No. 4 (3 July 1975), p. 6.

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groups.[38] Commitment to the defence of these interests was further clarified in the journal's editorials. They pointed to the convergence of national and religious philosophy in the work of Catholic dissidents. For example, the *Chronicle*'s view of the political, as differentiated from the ideological, function of the officially promoted atheism shows the conviction that, as in the nineteenth century, Catholicism strongly enhances the survival of Lithuanian national awareness. Paradoxically enough, the *Chronicle*'s interpretation of the function of atheist indoctrination in non-Russian provinces of the Soviet Union is strikingly similar to the official Soviet view, namely, that atheist indoctrination is an essential part of the "internationalization" of the Soviet population. The *Chronicle* put the idea in the following way:

> Seeking to destroy religious faith, the atheists want to become absolute rulers over the people's spiritual world so that faith in God and religious ethics do not interfere with their purposes. Atheist Marxism seeks to make all people think, speak and act in conformity with the Communist Party's programme. By fighting religion in Lithuania, the atheists attempt to break the spirit of the Lithuanian nation, to deprive it of its spiritual values, to enslave the Lithuanian's personality and to de-nationalize the believing people. When Lithuanians will become atheists, start entering into mixed marriages, disparage their own Christian culture, then conditions will be achieved for them to submerge in a homogeneous mass of people who adopt Lenin's native language as their own.[39]

In other words, atheism prepares the way for Russification. The conclusion is obvious: the Lithuanians will preserve their identity only if they remain religious or respect Christian ethics and culture.

A more complete view of the nationalist philosophy among Lithuanian Catholic dissidents may be gained from a brief survey of *samizdat* periodicals which have appeared since 1972. The first addition to the *Chronicle,* in 1976, was *Ausra* (*The Dawn*), a journal which by the end of 1980 had published 21 issues as compared with *Chronicle's* 44. *Ausra,* named and numbered after the main journal which in the nineteenth century spurred Lithuanian national awakening, shares a Catholic commitment with the *Chronicle* although it concentrates on national rather than religious issues. In 1977, there appeared two issues of *Varpas* (*The Bell*), named after the second most important journal of Lithuania's national awakening which was of more liberal orientation than *Ausra.* Hence the assumed affinity of the new *Varpas* with the liberal-populist strand of political thought. Apparently eight issues of this journal were published by mid-1980 though only three of these are known to have reached the West. Also in 1977, *Tiesos kelias* (*Way of Truth*) appeared, presumably produced by a clerical group, a journal aimed at helping priests in the preparation of homilies and in

[38] Vardys, op cit. p. 158.
[39] CCCL, No. 10, Chicago Vol. II, pp. 116–17.

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the discussion of theological and professional matters for which the government allows no official forum. By mid-1980, it had published 14 issues. At about the same time the West was introduced to another journal, *Dievas ir tevyne* (*God and Fatherland*) which discusses both the arguments proving the existence of God as well as the role of Mikhail Suslov in the Sovietization of Lithuania (11 issues published by mid-1979).

A journal which never reached the West but which published eight issues before it was "choked to death"—in the words of another underground publication—was *Laisves sauklys* (*The Herald of Freedom*). Its ideological direction is not very clearly known, but it apparently represented the more secular, that is, layman's, segment of society, as compared with publications which allegedly are directed or strongly influenced by Catholic clergymen. Another journal which reached the West only with its 6th issue, and then only sporadically, is *Rupintojelis* (*Sorrowful Christ*). Its very title indicates the publishers' symbiotic view of religion and nationalism; the title refers to the traditional Lithuanian folk wood-carving of the seated melancholy figure of Christ. By 1980, it had published 13 issues. Another journal, *Ausrele* (*Little Dawn*), appeared on 16 February 1978, the traditional Lithuanian independence day, with the aim of uniting the secular and clerical Catholic forces, and in this manner to substitute for the loss of *Laisves sauklys*. The fate of this publication is not known. A journal of high intellectual quality and philosophical disposition is *Perspektyvos* (*The Perspectives*) started in 1978. It publishes original and translated material, among them Andrei Sakharov's and Roy Medvedev's writings. This journal considers itself to be a forum for the airing of different points of view. 19 issues were published by mid-1980 though not all have reached the West.

On 16 February 1979, there also appeared the first thick (99pp.) issue of *Alma mater*, a journal directed towards the student community of the University of Vilnius which in 1979 celebrated its 400th anniversary. In the four issues published by the end of 1979, its editors have put to typewriter essays, literary criticisms, short stories. Its orientation is academically Catholic. In January 1980, Provilas Peceliunas, a teacher, was arrested by the KGB and charged with editing the journal. Another Catholic literary publication dedicated, as it says, to literature without censorship is *Pastoge* (*Under One's Own Roof*). Since 1979, its two issues published the poetry of Mindaugas Tamonis, a dissident intellectual who perished from KGB treatment in psychiatric hospitals after demanding independence for Lithuania, as well as the works of Oscar Milosz, an elder cousin of Nobel Prize winner Czeslaw Milosz, who wrote in French though was a patriotic Lithuanian and Lithuania's envoy in France. In 1979 and 1980, finally, some dissident groups began publishing other periodicals and annals which have not yet reached the West, among them *Kulturos archyvas*

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(*Archive of Cultural Heritage*) which included works by dissident poets Tomas Venclova and Ona Lukauskaite-Poskiene; *Archyvas,* reputed to contain significant documentation on Soviet deportations from Lithuania; *Ateitis* (*The Future*), a Catholic youth journal in the tradition of a 70-year-old and well-known Catholic academic youth association of the same name (three issues by mid-1980); *Vytis* (*The Riding Knight*), the title of which represents the emblem of the historical Lithuanian state now forbidden; and *Tautos kelias* (*Way of the Nation*). The titles of *Vytis* which has published four issues and *Tautos kelias* (one issue) indicate a nationalist emphasis in editorial orientation. Their publication has been reported in the *Chronicle* which even included the latter's editorial statement.

The shared feature of these underground publications is the view that religion and nationalism go hand in hand and support one another. At the same time, these publications take their ideological orientation from Academician Sakharov. *Ausra,* in addition, promotes the co-operation of Baltic dissidents and of Baltic nations. *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania* has returned again to concentrating on registering violations of primarily religious but also other civil rights protected by the Helsinki agreements while *Ausra* and the others deal with questions of nationalist importance. All of them publish historical articles so that young Lithuanians do not lose their national memory.[40]

Dievas ir tevyne probably uses the strongest language against Moscow and the Russian immigration. The majority of Catholic dissidents, however, disdain the Russians primarily because of their assumed opposition to Lithuania's national aims. Generally, *Ausra* has opposed the fomenting of national hatred and has taken the view that all people of goodwill, without regard to their background, are to be regarded as Lithuania's friends.[41] However, *Ausra* has also voiced a deep disappointment with the Russian immigrants in Lithuania. The journal insisted in an editorial that of the 250,000 Russians in Lithuania it had not heard of a single person condemning the government's Russification policies.[42] In the journal's view,

> the counter-revolution of October 1917 [the term applied to Lenin's *coup d'état*] threw back the Russian political mind (consciousness) to the previous centuries. The Russian Tsars have liberally repaid and still are paying Russian citizens for their political and economic inactivity by giving these citizens the right to trample on the freedom and independence of "small" nations, to take pride in the victories of Russian arms, to consider themselves the sons of the great Russian nation (great by its despotism). . . . In all probability, only one out of 10,000 or 100,000 Russians in the Soviet Union recognizes the right of sovereign existence to the national minorities of the empire.[43]

[40] *Alma mater,* No. 1, p. 7.
[41] *Ausra,* No. 1, p. 2.
[42] Ibid. No. 12, p. 3.
[43] Ibid.

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However, on the same page, the journal praised Academician Andrei Sakharov who supports independence for the Baltic countries.[44] The close co-operation with the Russian democratic movement has softened Lithuanian views. The *Chronicle* wrote in 1976 that the Kovalevs, Sakharovs, Solzhenitsyns, and generally the democrats of the Russian intelligentsia have forced the Lithuanians to change their attitude towards the Russian nation.[45]

All dissidents of course denounce Moscow's rule over Lithuania. Yet some publications, for example, *Ausrele*, recognize the effects of Soviet political socialization among some strata of the Lithuanian intelligentsia and acknowledge the existence of loyalties implanted by Moscow even among some Catholic clergymen.[46] However, there is no despair; instead, there exists hope that the Soviet empire is not eternal. *Ausra* has published the declaration of the newly formed Lithuanian Freedom League which demands independence for the republic. In this, *Ausra* shares the general goals of other, less religiously or even communist oriented, dissidents. The League places hope in the domestic opposition which is said to have developed in the Soviet Union. This opposition, according to the League, has crystallized into three groups: socialist, nationalist, and democratic.[47] The League identifies itself with the democrats whose "soul" is Academician Sakharov. It will seek, it says, to win the support of democratic countries in Europe and on the American continent, and also the aid of the People's Republic of China to raise the question of Lithuania's freedom in the United Nations.

Generally, all the papers studied here seem to be unalterably opposed to the Kremlin's domination of Lithuania, and put no confidence in a dialogue with the rulers. The *Chronicle* again offers a different slant to this view. It believes that Western public opinion can force the communists to make concessions, thus producing a more bearable life. The purpose of its publication is to encourage the formation of such opinions, especially, of course, in the Vatican and among Western co-religionists. If civil rights are not granted, in the *Chronicle*'s view, then Lithuania's independence becomes a necessity. The *Chronicle* has no doubts about independent Lithuania's commitment to civil rights.

The other great question that is frequently discussed in the underground press is the relative importance of religion and nationality for Lithuanian development and the position of atheist Lithuanians. The liquidated *Laisves sauklys* apparently had expressed doubts (as related in *Ausrele*) that the contemporary Lithuanian Church can ensure

[44] Together with Andrei Sakharov, this Baltic denunciation of the Hitler-Stalin Pact was endorsed by Malva Landa, Victor Nekipelov, Tatiana Velikanova, and Arina Ginzburg. The English text of the Baltic appeal has been published in *Congressional Record*, 28 Sept. 1978, pp. S-13722-23. See also *Elta* (New York), Oct. 1979, pp. 1–6.
[45] CCCL, No. 15, Chicago, Vol. II, p. 357.
[46] *Ausrele*, No. 1, p. 4 ff.
[47] *Ausra*, No. 12 (52), p. 3.

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the survival of nationality. At a meeting in 1979 with Western correspondents, a dissident speaker criticized the "Catholic Opposition" for maintaining that "only religion can save our nation from a slow death."[48] It was wrong, this critic continued, to concentrate all the attention of the protest movement on the issue of religious freedom. "In our view," he said, "the main problems of Lithuania are of a national character. Even the granting of full religious freedom would not solve these problems."[49] Both *Laisves sauklys* and some participants of the meeting—very likely the same persons—claimed that it was not the Church helping the nation, but the nation aiding the Church. Where Lithuanian nationality had been lost by assimilation, as in Belorussia, they insisted, religion did not survive either. Catholicism is a positive factor; it is like a rock which "defends our nation and increases its resistance, but religion is incapable of aggressive, offensive action. Such aggressive force, however, is needed for victory or even for self-defence."[50] Therefore in Lithuania's struggle for survival "religion does not play a decisive role. It serves merely as a stabilizing factor."[51]

IN addition to this divergent evaluation of the role of Catholicism in the national movement, *Laisves sauklys* as well as some speakers at the meeting with foreign journalists were critical of Catholic clergymen. Lithuania's priests, the journal said, were losing their loyalty and dedication. Furthermore, they suffered from a "complex of infallibility," which led them to identify criticism directed at the clergy as "an expression of hostility to the Church and to [the idea of] national unity."[52] Finally, the West was criticized for giving exclusive attention to the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania* as the sole spokesman for the country.

Other dissident journals, however, did not share these views. Answering *Laisves sauklys,* the journal *Ausrele* insisted that "the nation will live as long as the Catholic Church. . . . There is no other force in the entire world," the journal said in an editorial, "that today can better

[48] *Perspektyvos,* No. 7 (1979), p. 43. According to Dan Fisher of *Los Angeles Times,* this meeting was organized by Antanas Terleckas, "an outspoken Lithuanian nationalist." ("Foreign Correspondents' Foreign Intrigue," *Los Angeles Times,* 9 Nov. 1979, Part II, p. 11.) An economist, born in 1928 to a family of poor farmers, Terleckas began opposing Soviet rule in his teens though he briefly joined the Komsomol at 21. In 1958 and again in 1973, he received prison sentences for nationalist political activities. The KGB suspected him as collaborator of the *Chronicle* and later as sponsor of other underground publications. A Catholic believer, he has nevertheless stressed the importance of national vs. religious rights. Many times held for questioning by the authorities, he was again arrested on 4 Nov. 1979 (See *The Washington Post,* 5 Nov. 1979) and sentenced on 4 Nov. 1980. For Terleckas's autobiographical story see his letter to KGB chairman I. V. Andropov (LKBK, Chicago Vol. 3, pp. 291–313; English transl. *Respect My Rights,* Chicago, 1976).

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid. p. 47.

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help the Lithuanians in Lithuania to keep their national identity." [53] *Ausrele*, moreover, doubted that a doctrinaire atheist could be a good Lithuanian patriot, a proposition apparently maintained by the liquidated *Laisves sauklys*. "Every Lithuanian should be a Catholic," *Ausrele*'s editors said, "though it is not necessary that he actively promote the Gospel. It is important merely that he live as the Gospel teaches." [54] While this sounds like an outright identification of Lithuanian nationality with Catholicism, this statement merely argues that a person of Lithuanian nationality should have a positive attitude towards values derived from Catholic religious beliefs. In concrete terms, it probably means a requirement that every Lithuanian patriot, whatever his ideological convictions, should help the Church as the national institution, as in Poland.

The Perspectives, the journal which aired criticisms of Catholic tactics, did not share the views of the critics either. According to its editors, not even the Soviets consider clergymen to be suffering from the complex of "infallibility," and modern history shows Lithuanian priests to be very sensitive to national interests. The *Chronicle* reflects this sensitivity. As far as the relationship between nationality and religion is concerned, *The Perspectives* referred to evidence published in the same issue to show that the loss of Lithuanian nationality in Belorussia did not necessarily result in the loss of religion. Defending the *Chronicle*, the editors of *The Perspectives* further insisted that the *Chronicle's* emphasis on religious freedom was placed correctly for at least two reasons. First, the accent on the struggle for religious rights made it much easier to attract attention to general Lithuanian problems in the West, and secondly, the acquisition of freedom of religion in modern Lithuania "to a large degree would contribute to the regaining of other civil rights." [55] The journal, however, did not appear to share the view of *Ausrele's* publishers that a Lithuanian should be at least a Gospel practising Catholic. This is clear from the fact that *The Perspectives* publishes the work both of Roy Medvedev, a Marxist who still believes in state socialism, and of the group which calls itself the Free Association of Lithuania's Communists (a group of national communists).

The *Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania*, though generally favouring the convergence of Catholicism with nationality, does not seem to subscribe to the identification of the two concepts as found in *Dievas ir tevyne* (*God and Fatherland*), *Rupintojelis* (*Sorrowful Christ*), *Tiesos kelias* (*Way of Truth*) or even *Ausrele* (*Little Dawn*). In the first years of publication, the *Chronicle* had more than once implied that even membership of the Communist Party or occupancy of another position which requires official atheist commitment does not disqualify a person as a good man or a patriot because a person cannot be judged on the

[53] *Ausrele*, No. 1, p. 7.
[54] Ibid.
[55] *Perspektyvos*, No. 9 (1979), p. 48.

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basis of his formal associations. Nevertheless, since 1977 the journal began openly identifying and denouncing subservient clergymen and also individuals the journal called " eager beaver atheists " who either for philosophical or opportunist reasons in various ways seriously harassed church-going students, parents or workers. This indicates a stiffened attitude toward " regime atheists." The journal, however, does not question the patriotism of non-religious dissidents. It recognizes contributions " the believing and non-believing brothers can make " to the national cause " in compensating for the work the *Chronicle* was incapable of accomplishing." [56]

Generally, Lithuanian dissidents insist that whatever their attitudes toward the modern role of religion in national development, they are united as a movement.[57] Differences are said to involve only secondary matters. The issue of disagreement, if such still exists, clearly is not a negative or positive philosophical attitude toward Catholicism—all dissidents agree on its beneficial influence—but the tactical preoccupation with religious freedom and the sometimes perceived " arbitrariness " of the clergy in the dissident movement.

In addition to these issues, Lithuania's Catholic underground publications frequently discuss another problem of social communications, namely, the question of cooperation with the Soviet rulers. What price should religiously or nationally committed Soviet citizens honourably pay for selective opportunities to further religious or national interests? Is " collaboration " politically possible and ethically admissible? In a typical exchange of views, two authors of *The Perspectives* suggested two different approaches to relations with the authorities, one of militant and of almost open opposition including civil disobedience, the other of quiet work within the system doing whatever possible for the national and religious cause. The author arguing for quiet resistance showed great respect for the militant idealist " who looked towards his star in heaven but marched into destruction on earth," to wit, was idealistically but conspicuously opposed to the rulers and thus was caught and destroyed by the KGB. Such was, for example, the celebrated dissident poet and architect Mindaugas Tamonis who on philosophical grounds refused to work on the renovation of Red Army monuments. According to the author advocating a softer approach, " we need every person alive, we need his living brain and talent; we are more impoverished by the loss of such people than we are enriched by monuments honouring them after death." [58] So formulated, the issue of collaboration transcends the religious sphere and becomes a problem for all Lithuanians and indeed for all Soviet dissidents. If the Balts are as resigned to their fate as David Shipley recently insisted in *New York Times*,[59] discussion

[56] *CCCL*, No. 38 (1979), p. 82.
[57] *Perspektyvos*, No. 9 (1979).
[58] *Perspektyvos*, No. 11 (1979), p. 38.
[59] David Shipley, *New York Times*, 11 Mar. 1979.

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like this should no longer take place 40 years after the establishment of Soviet rule. But the issue is aired; hence, it apparently is still real.

THE Catholic dissident movement, then, is growing in scope and dissident views are not philosophically uniform. In terms of political realism, many dissident attitudes, and certainly the general philosophy of the *Chronicle,* have proved to be pragmatic rather than fanatic, Since 1968, the movement has won some successes. Lithuanian Catholic protest cannot be identified with desperation. It is a movement of determined people but it is based on a rational belief that both the trends of Soviet domestic development and more recently the election of Pope John Paul II support their expectations. The fly in the ointment may be their still great, and for publicity purposes essential, reliance on Western, both broadly religious and secular, interest in helping the Lithuanians to achieve many, if not all, of their religious and national objectives.

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Roy Medvedev: Dissident or Conformist?

Alexander J. Motyl

THREE waves of arrests swept the Soviet dissident movement in the 1970s, yet Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev, author of *Let History Judge, On Socialist Democracy,* and numerous other books, has remained untouched. No other dissident has managed to be so active for so long. Men of such diverse views and backgrounds as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Sakharov, Leonid Plyushch, Yuri Orlov, Pastor Georgi Vins, Anatoly Shcharansky, Valentyn Moroz, and Mustafa Dzhemilev have all endured persecution of one form or another. Even Roy's twin brother, Zhores, was stripped of his Soviet citizenship in 1973 and currently lives in England. However, despite all this Roy Medvedev was left undisturbed. A freelance historian in Moscow, he has established himself as one of the most respected of dissidents by virtue of his many scholarly and publicist writings published in *samizdat* and in the West. Clearly, more than good luck must account for the relative calm of Medvedev's dissident career.

Just as clearly, Medvedev's immunity to official persecution must have something to do with the nature of his dissidence. Richard Pipes has recently suggested that the explanation lies in the fact that Medvedev is a " revisionist Leninist." According to Pipes,

> The fact that Mr Medvedev can publish books . . . abroad without being subjected to the punishments usually meted out to dissenters suggests that there are highly placed individuals in the Soviet party and police apparatus who sympathize with his revisionist views, perhaps as an acceptable alternative to the status quo.[1]

Although Pipes may be correct to infer that higher-ups in the Party and KGB find Medvedev's revisionism appealing, the inadequacy of his attributing Medvedev's good standing to this factor alone becomes painfully obvious when the same reasoning is applied to other dissident communists. Ivan Dzyuba, author of *Internationalism or Russification?*, was arrested and forced to recant his views; Leonid Plyushch, living in Paris since 1976, spent two-and-a-half years in a psychiatric prison hospital; Marxist philosopher, Vasyl Lisovy, is currently serving a 10-year sentence in Siberia; and Ukrainian monitor of the Helsinki agreements, Yuri Badzio, a self-declared Euro-communist, was only recently arrested and tried for " anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." The point is that Roy Medvedev is the *only* " revisionist Leninist " of

[1] Richard Pipes, " The Revolution: Conventional Attitudes," *New York Times Book Review,* 30 Dec. 1979, p. 18.

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the post-Stalin period—and there have been many besides him and the four listed above, including at least 23 dissident communist organizations [2]—to have enjoyed such "sympathy" from the authorities. Surely, Medvedev's revisionist Leninism cannot fully explain his immunity to arrest. Where, then, does the explanation lie?

Exactly where is suggested by a group of special dissidents who, just like Medvedev, have received unusually lenient treatment from the Party and KGB apparatus—the Russian chauvinists and nationalists. With the prime exception of Vladimir Osipov, the former editor of the *samizdat* journal *Veche*, Russian nationalists have been and still are relatively free to express their views, form such clubs as *Rossiya* and *Rodina*, and even publish their works in such official journals as *Molodaya Gvardiya*, *Nash Sovremennik*, and *Ogonek*. Unlike the Russians, however, non-Russian nationalists almost invariably get very severe sentences for their usually far less extremist and generally non-chauvinist views. Why? Why does the Soviet regime tolerate the nationalism of Russians, but not the nationalism of non-Russians? Are not both equally dangerous forms of "bourgeois nationalism"? Clearly, the Soviet regime does not think so. Indeed, the conclusion appears to be inescapable: the Russian nationalists are tolerated, perhaps even encouraged, precisely because they are Russian and, as such, have a very particular, because distinctly Russian, view of Russian/non-Russian relations in the USSR. At the core of this view lies the conviction that Russia must remain "*edina i nedelimaya*"—single and indivisible. With regard to the Soviet Union, the Russian nationalists see it as a Russian state whose unity, indivisibility, and "Russian-ness" must be preserved.

Theoretically at least, the Soviet Union is both Soviet—that is, socialist—and a Union, a conglomerate of over 100 nationalities. Since the days of the Bolshevik consolidation of power, however, when the Red Army forcibly annexed most of the non-Russian areas of the former Russian empire, the Kremlin leaders have known that solving the nationality question was crucial to the continued existence of the new Soviet state. Realizing that their strength lay in Russia, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev all adopted policies which utilized Russia and the Russians as a base for their exploits in the peripheral areas, the national republics. Foremost among the Kremlin's tactics has been to Russify the non-Russian nationalities both culturally and linguistically in order to reduce their sense of "otherness" from the "elder brother," the Great Russians, and thereby to facilitate their integration into the Soviet state. For that purpose the myth of the emerging "Soviet people" was created to serve as a convenient smokescreen for Russification in the republics. Within such a context, were a dissident (and a famous authoritative one at that) not only to propagate the official version of Soviet nationality policy among dissident circles in

[2] Alexander Motyl, "Soviet Dissidents and Eurocommunism," *Dissent*, Spring 1978, p. 234.

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the USSR, but also make this version respectable in the West, he would be invaluable to the Soviet regime in its efforts to implement Russification and give it the pretence of legitimacy. Whether Medvedev is indeed playing this supportive role, however, is a question which requires a closer look at his views of the nationality problem in the Soviet Union.

MEDVEDEV'S fullest exposition on the nationality question is found in his most prominent work, *On Socialist Democracy*. "The Soviet Union is a multinational state," he writes. "Therefore relations between the different national groups have always been one of the most important factors in the life of our country, though they have not always been ideal. One could expect, however, that after half a century there would no longer be grounds for national and nationalist movements," which are "so very unexpected and extremely disagreeable." [3] According to Medvedev, "there are in fact many very complicated causes for the increasingly troubled relations between national groups in the USSR." These causes include:

1. The effects of "Stalin's criminal actions" which "have left a residue of injured pride and defiant nationalism." In particular, Medvedev refers to the Chechen, Ingush, Kabardians, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, and Volga Germans, who were "disgraced and deported under Stalin."
2. Stalin's "discrimination in the treatment of various nationalities, putting some in a more advantageous position than others. Therefore the end of Stalin's rule, and the abolition of certain national privileges along with it, gave rise to discontent in a number of regions," in particular, in the countries of the Caucasus, Stalin's own homeland.
3. The "extremely centralized bureaucratic administration" which "cannot adequately take account" of the "many local peculiarities and traditions . . . and often results in total disregard of national interests and attitudes that ought to be respected."
4. "Rapid scientific advance and economic development . . . are accompanied by a degree of internationalization," and "give an impetus to nationalist sentiment, with its emphasis on the need to preserve obsolete habits and customs."
5. "Certain demographic processes," spurred on by "industrial and agricultural development" have resulted in the "rapid increase" of non-indigenous settlers in a number of republics, with the result, for example, that "in certain regions and cities of Ukraine, Ukrainians have become a minority."
6. The "process of natural Russification taking place in many republics, particularly with regard to language (and often the culture as a whole)."

[3] Roy A. Medvedev, *On Socialist Democracy* (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1975), p. 82.

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7. "Certain international events and processes" such as the "growth of a nationalist mood in Rumania" and "developments in the Middle East" have had "their impact." [4]

Seemingly as an afterthought, Medvedev notes that "in addition to nationalist trends in non-Russian areas, there is also the problem of Russian nationalism, now very much on the increase and, in certain circumstances, often taking on the features of 'great power chauvinism'." [5] But is Russian nationalism in reality only "also" a problem? Is there no relationship between it and non-Russian nationalism? Medvedev thinks there is not. Instead, he treats Russian nationalism in complete isolation from non-Russian nationalism, testifying to an incapacity to see that there does exist a very strong link between regional, non-Russian nationalism and Great Russian chauvinism, with the latter often being the major cause of the existence of the former. (Medvedev admits, however, that the Russian nationalists "have up to now been openly supported in such influential bodies as the Political Department of the army and the Central Committee of the *Komsomol*" [6]). This incapacity is all the more surprising since Medvedev's mentor, Lenin, insistently referred to the problem of Russian chauvinism and non-Russian nationalism in the years before his death.

But the Russian nationalists are not all that Medvedev treats in isolation from Soviet reality. His seven causes of "increasingly troubled relations between national groups in the USSR" are, so he implies, wholly unrelated to present Soviet policy making. After all, Stalin's "criminal actions" and "discrimination" are the actions of a dead man. The "centralized bureaucratic administration" is the unfortunate legacy of Stalin. "Rapid scientific advance and economic development" are irresistible aspects of contemporary life. The "certain demographic processes" are the result of economic forces. Russification is "natural" (and who can argue with nature?). The "international events and processes" are clearly beyond the USSR's control.

To a certain extent, of course, a number of these causes are indeed independent of Soviet policy making. The "certain demographic processes" and "natural Russification," however, decidedly are not. While migrations of skilled specialists, workers, or farmers to labour poor regions are motivated largely by economic considerations, Medvedev's demographic processes usually involve the intermingling of equally skilled workers from various nationalities and regions of the USSR. For example, a Lithuanian engineer may be sent to Moscow, while his Russian counterpart assigned to Kaunas. Clearly, the motivation in this case is not economic, but national. The Soviets admit as much when they argue for the "drawing together of peoples" which will culminate in a new national formation, the "Soviet people"—a process of which

[4] Ibid. pp. 82–87
[5] Ibid. p. 87.
[6] Ibid. p. 90.

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Medvedev is not only aware but also heartily approves. After all, Soviet culture's "primary form of expression, owing to certain historical circumstances, is the Russian language." [7]

With regard to the "process of natural Russification," Medvedev reveals, among other things, a remarkable ignorance of the "certain historical circumstances" surrounding Soviet nationality policy since the revolution of 1917. Even then, the conflict between the proponents and opponents of Russification, the centralists and decentralizers, the chauvinists and nationalists, was being waged. Lenin's own opposition to national communism is well known, in spite of the few, primarily verbal, concessions he made to the nationalities prior to his death. In the 1920s, however, NEP-related policies of fostering national cultures and languages came to be actively promoted with the result that the republics enjoyed unprecedented cultural development until Stalin cracked down. The Soviet *vozhd*, who is usually given sole responsibility for reversing the national trend and instituting Russification, was not alone in bringing it about: he had more than ample help from the Russian and Russified cadres in the Party and secret police, whose savage purges of the national intelligentsias and the national communists predated the *Yezhovshchina*. The war years even witnessed Stalin toasting the "great Russian nation." The respite that followed his death in 1953 was soon disrupted by the introduction in the republics of legislation which stipulated that the language of school instruction need not be that of a republic. Then, in the early 1960s, the notion of the "drawing together of peoples" into a "Soviet people" was formulated, and since then continually refined and implemented. Most recently, in May 1979, an all-Union educational conference held in Tashkent recommended the intensification of Russian-language instruction of non-Russian school and pre-school children. That the effect of these and other policies has been to Russify the non-Russian nations of the USSR is hardly deniable, as Medvedev himself admits. For Medvedev, however, this process is not only desirable, but also "natural," yet, clearly, there is nothing natural about a process initiated by Lenin, brutally implemented by Stalin, and subtly continued by their successors.

IN this respect, the shallowness of Medvedev's argument resembles the perfidity of official Soviet propaganda. Discussing the apparent freedom of choice exercised by non-Russians with regard to abandoning their national languages, cultures, and heritages in favour of the Russian, Medvedev writes:

> Parents often choose to send their children to Russian schools and are demanding additional ones. In the national schools, the transition to Russian as the language of instruction now takes place earlier—in some republics the native language is used only through

[7] Ibid. p. 84.

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> the eighth grade, in others through the seventh or even only the fifth grade. In certain regions children are taught in the local language just in primary schools and sometimes even only in the first two grades. In Kiev, today, there are just a few Ukrainian schools left, and they have been able to maintain their enrolment only by introducing English as the medium of instruction in several subjects.[8]

Surely, as Medvedev argues, no one is forcing parents to send their children to Russian schools. Surely, then, this must be a voluntary, perfectly natural process. Just as surely, however, Medvedev fails to see that within the context of a society and state which promote Russification, and within which the only means of social advancement and mobility is to "self-Russify," the decision to choose Russian over one's native language is not exactly free. The pressures, although not violent and usually not overt, are nevertheless there.

Just this sort of attitude was the target of Ivan Dzyuba's critical work, *Internationalism or Russification?* Dzyuba argued that under the guise of internationalism "*there is* coercion into Russification in our country and that the 'voluntariness' of Russification is only apparent, only *seeming*." [9] In answer to those insensitive to nationality problems who ask, "Who stops you from speaking Ukrainian?", Dzyuba replies:

> You forbid (stop, prevent), if you still insist on *your* rather dishonest question and want an answer to it—you, yourselves, that is to say, the *circumstances* of life that you have created. "The inequality which obtains in actual practice," the actual secondary position of the Ukrainian language (and culture)—with implacable force, past comparing with that of any whip, any rod, any command or legal enactment—with all-crushing might *compels* and *forces* the individual Ukrainian and the Ukrainian masses in general to speak Russian and renounce their mother tongue.[10]

Dzyuba, of course, is speaking for all nationalities who feel the weight of Russification and see no compelling reason why they should be subjected to this process, however natural it may appear to Medvedev. Even Dzyuba's analysis of anti-semitism, delivered in a speech commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Baby Yar massacre of Jews, placed the Jewish question squarely within the framework of the nationality question in the USSR.

Medvedev, however, sees nothing wrong in the fact that Soviet society is a Russifying society. Instead, he sees Russification as natural and progressive. As he wrote in an article on the Jewish question in 1971:

> First there is the basic core of the given nation. The Armenians in Armenia, the Georgians in Georgia, the Ukrainians in Ukraine, the Buryats in the Buryat Autonomous SSR, and so on. . . . As you know, there is going on in our country an intensive development

[8] Ibid. pp. 86–87.
[9] Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* (Monad Press, New York, 1974), p. 213.
[10] Ibid. pp. 155–56.

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> process of these socialist nationalities and their national cultures, and this is a progressive process.
>
> However, parallel with this process—the development of socialist nationalities—we have another process, and that is the process of the mutual intermingling and mutual assimilation of the various nationalities and peoples of the Soviet Union. And this process too is a progressive one.[11]

The result of this " mutual intermingling " is, of course, the assimilation of the non-Russians with the Russians, and Medvedev is dishonest when he speaks of " mutual assimilation "—as if to imply that a non-Russian, say, a Tatar, is just as likely to assimilate with the Russians, as a Russian with the Tatars.

But, however natural and progressive this process may be for Medvedev, it is still too slow. " The assimilation of the Jews," he writes with a straight face,

> is an historically progressive phenomenon. . . . But in that case all measures that hinder assimilation . . . should be regarded as *reactionary*. It would be sufficient to remove these points [regarding nationality] from questionnaires and passports and to forbid personnel departments to take an interest in the nationality of the person being offered employment, for the assimilation of Jews—and of many other persons of non-Russian origin also—to proceed at a considerably increased pace.[12]

After all, how can anyone be against what is so obviously a natural and progressive process? Incredulous, Medvedev asks:

> Can we condemn these Armenians [living in Moscow and Sverdlovsk] for having assimilated with the Russian majority? Can we demand (as Dzyuba does) that all Ukrainians, no matter in which republic they live, be obliged to study the Ukrainian language?

" Of course not! " is Medvedev's tub-thumping reply.

> For we are dealing with a natural and progressive process. And although for a section of that people this process is accompanied by a loss of some [of their] national heritage, it is also, however, accompanied by the acquisition of many other heritages, by the mutual enrichment of national cultures, and also by a more rapid development of a common Soviet culture, science and economics.[13]

INTERESTINGLY, a group of self-styled " Russian patriots " whom Medvedev calls racist, state supremacist, and chauvinist also speak of Russification as a " natural historical process." [14] For them as well as for him, any step a non-Russian nation takes towards assimilating with

[11] Roy Medvedev, " Jews in the USSR: Problems and Prospects," *Survey*, No. 79, Spring 1971, p. 195.
[12] Ibid. p. 198.
[13] Ibid. p 196.
[14] " A Word to the Nation," *Survey*, No. 80, Summer 1971, p. 197.

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the Russians is a definite good accompanied by many "acquisitions," "enrichments," and "more rapid developments." Yet, lest one be insufficiently convinced of their selflessness, the "patriots" add: "Somehow there has arisen the version—which is being intensively propagated—that the Russians are a privileged people. In fact, exactly the opposite is the case. . . ." [15] Medvedev—again—argues in the same "patriotic" spirit:

> We are all aware, of course, that the Russian language has spread rapidly all over the territory of the USSR. The Russian people is still referred to in the press as the "elder brother." However, it is nonetheless a fact that the Russian people's own national life is hampered to a very much greater extent than the national lives of, say, the Armenian, Georgian, or Uzbek peoples.[16]

Some examples of this "hampering"?

> Russian villages in the regions that form the centre of Russia are in an incomparably more neglected state than the villages in Ukraine, Moldavia, Transcaucasia, or the Baltic countries. Furthermore, the Russian people is in practice without a capital of its own. In becoming the capital of the multi-national Union, Moscow has almost wholly lost the features of a national Russian city. . . . This transformation of Moscow into an international centre, deprived of its own national features, has had far from positive consequences for the Russian people as a whole.[17]

Can this be the same Medvedev who spoke so glowingly of Kiev's loss of all but a "few" Ukrainian schools? Yes indeed, as the conclusion Medvedev draws from Russia's plight shows:

> Such a weakening of the national foundations of Russian life in the present period is neither natural nor progressive [sic!]. To be sure, a partial process of integration of all nations is going on throughout the world nowadays. Some small nations which possess no old and well-developed culture are being gradually assimilated, fusing with larger nations. In most cases, however, national culture, self-awareness and customs constitute something of tremendous value, which must be developed and cherished [sic!], in no way to the detriment of international integration in the economic, scientific, and technical fields.[18]

How revealing is Medvedev's remark! First, he unequivocally makes clear that he operates with two standards, that what is "natural and progressive" for the non-Russians is just the opposite for the Russians, himself included. And secondly, since it is perfectly reasonable that small nations should assimilate with larger ones, it naturally (and progressively!) follows that the Russian nation, as the largest in the Soviet

[15] Ibid. p. 195.
[16] Roy Medvedev. "What Lies Ahead for Us?", *New Left Review, Sept.–Dec.* 1974, p. 62.
[17] Ibid. p. 62.
[18] Ibid. p. 62.

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Union, must be the assimilator, and all the non-Russian nations, because of their comparative smallness, must be assimilated! Medvedev's clever reformulation of this "progressive" phenomenon, is, incidentally, usually known as imperialism.

But there are other objections to Medvedev's logic. If the age and development of a nation's culture also determine whether that nation is destined to assimilate or not, then how to account for Medvedev's uncompromising advocacy of the assimilation of the Jews and the Ukrainians—the former with a culture that goes back several thousand years, and the latter with a culture that is as old as, if not older, than the Russian? And if the development and cherishing of national culture, self-awareness, and customs are not to the detriment of international integration and scientific-technical progress, then why does this rule apply only to the Russian culture and not also to the non-Russian cultures? Medvedev, the patriot and nationalist, gives no answer.

IN spite of his substantial failings, it would be grossly unfair to Medvedev not to discuss his detailed and sincere proposals for resolving the nationality question in the USSR. But, even here, in the best of his attempts to be even-handed and fair, he fails to overcome his Russian nationalist streak.

Claiming that "socialist democratization will not mean the end of these nationalist movements but rather the beginning of a dialogue with them," Medvedev makes three proposals "to deal with accumulated grievances or to discourage at the very outset the growth of centrifugal tendencies." The first two are beyond reproach.

—Because of

> extensive economic progress and integration, the voluntary and reciprocal assimilation [sic] of national minorities, the adoption of Russian as a *lingua franca* and also as a second mother tongue, and finally, the growing numbers of non-Russian nationals living in Russian towns while many Russians have moved to the republics . . . changes must be adopted which will encourage the promotion of wiser, more capable and experienced personnel

regardless of nationality or "criteria of 'racial purity'," which "are not only morally corrupting but also quite clearly detrimental in a practical sense." In particular, "discrimination against Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality is particularly objectionable."

—"There should be a fundamental extension of the rights of the Union Republics, particularly with regard to a whole range of local problems." [19]

Medvedev's third and most specific proposal concerns the "right of nations to self-determination." Realizing that "no right can be genuine unless appropriate machinery exists to guarantee its effectiveness in

[19] *On Socialist Democracy*, pp. 275–76

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practice," Medvedev concludes that "it is time for the formulation of a new constitutional law giving Union Republics the right of self-determination, including the right to secede and form an independent state, and indicating the procedure by which this could take place." Medvedev's proposal is sufficiently interesting to warrant quoting in full:

> The best way to guarantee this right [of self-determination] would be to institute a compulsory referendum in every republic at least once every 10 years. Obviously this presupposes absolutely free discussion of all national problems, as well as the inevitable appearance of groups and movements in favour of secession. The referendum should be conducted by secret ballot under the supervision of special commissions composed of representatives from the other Union Republics. The Supreme Soviet of each Union Republic should also have the right to hold a referendum in exceptional circumstances before the expiration of 10 years, but not within one year of the next regularly scheduled referendum. Certainly a vast majority in all the Union Republics would vote to remain in the USSR. But if a republic were to secede, there would be a further compulsory referendum after 10 years on the question of whether or not to rejoin the Union. It could be held earlier if the population demanded it.[20]

Surely there can be no quibbling with Medvedev's suggestion: to resolve the nationality question by means of ballot and free discussion. What could be more democratic? Yet all of Medvedev's goodwill is belied by his advocacy of that natural and progressive process—Russification. After 60 years of frequently brutal Russification, after the creation of a social and political climate where, as Dzyuba argued, the "circumstances of life" promote Russification, and after the loss of national identity by large segments of the non-Russian population, is one seriously to believe that a simple vote can be anything but a reaffirmation of the status quo, the kind of mechanical hand-raising that goes on at party and trade union meetings in the USSR? And even though Medvedev assures us that such referendums would be held at least every 10 years, he undermines his own argument by calling for counter-referendums (in case anything should go wrong) and admitting that the holding of referendums would, in any case, have a "healthy effect," while the "dangers would be minimal." After all, he remarks somewhat slyly, "the results of a referendum can be predicted in advance by means of modern methods of testing opinion, and this would make it possible to influence final voting since preliminary polls would reveal the causes of existing discontent and appropriate action could be taken."[21] Can Medvedev be serious? Is he being honest, even with himself? Can he really believe that the results of such referendums would not be settled in advance, as with Soviet elections, since "groups and

[20] Ibid. pp. 278–80.
[21] Ibid. p. 280.

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movements in favour of secession" would have to contend with a giant state and propaganda apparatus that could effectively influence, if not exactly predetermine, the outcome?

The Russian "patriots" derided by Medvedev are at least honest about their greatpower aims. Claiming that their "slogan is: a Single and Indivisible Russia," they give the lie to Medvedev's extensive proposals concerning referendums by pointing out, with reference to Ukraine, that its "present day frontiers . . . do not correspond with its ethnographic [boundaries]. Seven million Russians and probably as many Russified Ukrainians live on Ukrainian territory, so that there are whole regions of Ukraine which might more correctly be annexed to Russia." After all, they ask, "Since when have we been foreigners on our own soil?" [22] Indeed, Medvedev would do well to examine his attitude toward this question as well.

ROY MEDVEDEV'S most recent addition to Western bookshelves, *On Soviet Dissent*, shows that his views on the nationality question have undergone no change. His greatpower perspective is vividly evident not only from his unintentionally disparaging references to the non-Russians as "our nationalities" upon whom Russia "conferred" great "cultural and economic benefits," but also from his categorical dismissal of "many" demands made by the "national movements" as "downright unrealistic—understandable, but impossible to meet within the context of a multinational state like the USSR." [23] Perhaps consciously avoiding the term "Russification" because of its increasingly unsavoury connotations, Medvedev instead discovers the more neutral and scientific-sounding "centripetal forces," which constitute an "inevitable process." [24] Again, that Russification might be a policy as well does not seem to occur to Medvedev in spite of his realization that "newspapers printed in regional languages or television or radio programmes broadcast in them cannot compete with those in Russian." [25]

Equally disturbing is Medvedev's continued astounding ignorance of the national movements. His contention that the nationalities "do not stage any mass protests" appears incredible in light of the 1978 riots in Georgia protesting against a draft Constitution that did not mention Georgian as the official language of the republic and of the thousands of Ukrainians who, in 1979, attended the funeral of Volodymyr Ivasyuk, a young composer popularly believed to have been murdered by the KGB.[26] Likewise, Medvedev's belief that "Those who are punished [for talking 'openly about the republic's right to secede']

[22] "A Word to the Nation," pp. 196–97.
[23] Roy Medvedev, *On Soviet Dissent: Interviews with Piero Ostellino* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1980), pp. 44, 48, 46.
[24] Ibid. p. 47.
[25] Ibid. p. 47.
[26] Ibid. p. 45.

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are usually militants actually working for their republic's secession from the USSR or trying to organize something like independent nationalist parties, or talking in public about Russia's exploitation of the republics" is downright silly in view of the never-ending campaigns to weed out nefarious "bourgeois nationalists" who have the temerity to write patriotic poems.[27]

But worst of all is Medvedev's adoption of the vocabulary of Soviet propaganda. The "separate nationalities," he says, "are drawing closer together." The official "statements about the growing friendship among the peoples of the USSR" are not "just words." "Western propaganda" speaks of "'Russian imperialism'," while Medvedev speaks of "Russia's behaviour toward the territories it assimilated."[28] Unfortunately, the political effect of Medvedev's choice of words is not "just words."

MEDVEDEV would do well to consider why dissident Ukrainian communist Ivan Dzyuba's "career" has been so much less spectacular than his own. Arrested in 1972 and sentenced in March 1973 to five years' imprisonment, Dzyuba was (no doubt "voluntarily") persuaded to recant his views seven months later, in November. In 1976, after what can only have been an impossible exertion, he even published a booklet, *The Faces of a Crystal*, which purported to refute the thesis of *Internationalism or Russification?* At present, he writes second-rate reviews for Ukrainian literary journals.

Medvedev, one hopes, will never have to undergo Dzyuba's fate. One suspects, however, that as long as he continues to be a bulwark of the Soviet regime's policy of internationalism *and* Russification, Medvedev never will.

[27] Ibid. p. 45.
[28] Ibid. pp. 49, 47.

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*A Conversation with Boris Bazhanov**

Stalin Closely Observed

George R. Urban

The Troika

Urban—My purpose is to fill in some gaps in our knowledge of Stalin in the early years of Bolshevik rule and especially the years between 1923 and 1926 when you were Stalin's secretary. This was the time of the triumvirate: Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev forming a " bloc " and holding at bay Lenin's most likely successor—Leon Trotsky.

The history of the period is too well known to need going over, but the personal characteristics of the *dramatis personae* as seen through the eyes of a perceptive observer may well add to our understanding of this turbulent time in Bolshevik history and especially to our understanding of the strange growth of the power of Joseph Stalin.

What was the " pecking order " in the triumvirate?

Bazhanov—Up to 1926 Zinoviev was No. 1 and Kamenev No. 2 in the hierarchy—Stalin was No. 3. Certain of their title to Lenin's mantle, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin were doing everything in their power to be actually accepted by the Party as Lenin's successors. Remember that in 1924-26 the Party was not—at it was to become under Stalin—a body of obedient yes-men. Support had to be fought for through rational persuasion, though yes-manship was on the increase.

Zinoviev's ambition to step into Lenin's shoes as *the* leader of the Party was undisguised. His failure to do so was due to his poor public image. Zinoviev lacked courage—his cowardice during the Civil War was one of the popular stories on the Moscow grapevine. In 1917 he had opposed Lenin's insistence on the insurrection (openly supported by Kamenev and clandestinely so by Stalin), and in October 1919, when heading the region of Petrograd both at Party and government levels, he was thrown into a state of panic by General Yudenich's offensive. It was Trotsky who came to his rescue plucking victory out of impending defeat. From then on, no love or trust was lost between Zinoviev and Trotsky.

Also, Zinoviev was a bit of a *bon viveur*. He was an ardent womanizer with a taste for chorus girls. None of this remained hidden from the then puritanical Party. Moreover, his touch of leadership was poor. He thought he was cut out to lead, but no one else did. He imitated Lenin

*Boris Bazhanov was Stalin's secretary in 1923-26 and is the author of *Stalin, der rote Diktator* (1930). He was the first major political defector from the USSR, disillusioned by what he witnessed in the Kremlin. He has been in exile for more than 50 years, having survived several attempts on his life, and, now in his eighties, he lives in France.

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in every way he could, but he didn't have the talent to do even that convincingly.

Urban—I yet have to hear a kind word spoken of Zinoviev by anyone who knew him. I well remember Bertram Wolfe's account of Zinoviev's vitriolic personality at the Banff conference of American Slavists in 1974—

Bazhanov—I will certainly not be the first one to do so. Zinoviev's unpopularity was widespread and well deserved. Kamenev, however, was a very different kettle of fish.

Here was a technocrat who would have done well as a minister of supplies or commerce in any government. He had a well-furnished and well-organized mind especially in economics, and a lively sense of humour. There was in those days a good deal of banter and leg pulling in the Politburo. The funereal dullness was to be Stalin's contribution.

Kamenev, not Zinoviev, always took the chair at the Politburo meetings, and he ran these with great professional skill. His ambitions were restrained but he had the misfortune of being drawn into the orbit of Zinoviev whom he followed to the end. In his personal life Kamenev was no less vulnerable than Zinoviev. His son, Lutik—a rake and a playboy—made a name for himself—and his father—with his drinking bouts and sexual exploits. A play in Moscow at the time exposed, under a very thin disguise, the gilded life of Kamenev junior.

Urban—You were, I take it, present at the meetings of the Politburo and the Plenary sessions of the Central Committee. How did Stalin measure up to Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky in intellectual power and political persuasiveness?

Bazhanov—Very poorly. Compared with any of these colleagues, Stalin was a nonentity. Trotsky, as you know, was an eloquent orator—a bit of a tub-thumping people's tribune, really—with a good turn of phrase and a fine sense of knowing how to catch *and change* the public mood. He was weak on theory and, at heart, a naïve man. The strength of Lenin's theoretical bequest was an albatross round his neck. He did not have the courage or the intellectual inclination to add anything of his own. Slogans and Lenin's dicta were more real for him than the world he had to deal with. He stuck to these and lost the battle for power.

Urban—How did these qualities show up at the meetings you attended?

Bazhanov—Well, Kamenev would go through the agenda in a business-like fashion, taking notes of what everyone was saying, keeping an eye on the clock and so forth. Trotsky, realizing that this was no place for the display of his public persona, was mostly calm and dignified. The tenor of these sessions was polite, reflective, and matter-of-fact, and when Dzerzhinsky attempted, as he sometimes did, to raise his voice and use intemperate language, he was promptly slapped down by Kamenev: "Felix, I must remind you that you are talking to members of the Politburo, not some audience on the hustings."

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Urban—What was Stalin's behaviour?

Bazhanov—He was mostly tongue-tied. He smoked his pipe and spoke very little. Every now and then he would start walking up and down the conference room regardless of the fact that we were in session. Sometimes he would stop right in front of a speaker watching his expressions and listening to his argument while still puffing away at his pipe. Stalin was not an educated man, and my impression was that some of the more complicated questions of state were beyond him.

Urban—There is agreement among historians that he was a man of low cunning rather than theory or culture. At the time of the "socialism in one country" debate the old Marxist scholar Ryazanov is said to have remarked to Stalin: "Stop it, Koba, don't make a fool of yourself. Everybody knows that theory is not exactly your field."

Bazhanov—I didn't myself hear Ryazanov make that remark, but it would have been in line with Stalin's reputation.

Urban—That Ryazanov could have ticked off Stalin in this fashion without getting into deep trouble tells us something about the extent to which free discussion was still possible in the Party in the 1920s.

Bazhanov—Yes, the monolithic Party had not yet matured. The freedom to argue without, mind you, taking the argument *outside* the Party, was respected, but as Stalin's gifts in matters of theory and principle were extremely modest, he sought and found security in silence.

Urban—Were Stalin's inhibitions in these areas apparent in his discussions with Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev?

Bazhanov—Oh, certainly, but (as I say) Stalin had the good sense of never saying anything before everyone else had his argument fully developed. He would sit there, watching the way the discussion was going. When everyone had spoken, he would say: Well, comrades, I think the solution to this problem is such and such—and he would then repeat the conclusions towards which the majority had been drifting. And, as time passed, it came to be said of Stalin that although he was obviously not bright enough to understand a great many things the Politburo was discussing, he had a fundamental wisdom of sorts which led him to propose the right answers to difficult problems.

Urban—This may well be the source of Stalin's one-time reputation as a "moderate" and "man of the middle"—a grotesque thing if there has ever been one, but one which survived the collectivization campaign and even the great terror. Joseph Davies, US Ambassador in Moscow in 1936–38, swallowed the myth whole when he observed that the "clean-living, modest, retiring" Stalin was "in the strictly personal sense" not responsible for the great terror.

Bazhanov—Stalin's wisdom was a myth manufactured for purposes of propaganda. Those of us in his entourage knew better. Certainly Stalin was a shrewd tactician, but his intellectual equipment was second-rate. That he could achieve so much with so little was due to the unworldliness—as far as the struggle for power was concerned—of his

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colleagues and, later, opponents—Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Bukharin, and so on. Confident of their intellectual superiority, these men never appreciated the challenge of the unbrilliant but single-minded Stalin.

Urban—*Wasn't this a fine demonstration of what one might call the* Thucydides-syndrome in the history of civil wars? " Each party . . . despairing of security was more concerned to save itself from ruin than to trust others " (Thucydides observes in *The History of the Peloponesian War*):

> Inferior minds were as a rule more successful; aware of their own defects and of the intelligence of their opponents, to whom they felt themselves inferior in debate, and by whose versatility of intrigue they were afraid of being surprised, they struck boldly and at once. Their enemies despised them, were confident of detecting their plots and thought it needless to effect by violence what they could achieve by their brains, and so were taken off their guard and destroyed.

Bazhanov—It is an attractive analogy though, of course, not a perfect fit, for I would need a lot of convincing that, given half a chance, Trotsky, for example, would not have stooped to violence, seeing that he had conducted the civil war with the utmost brutality, fathered the idea of the totalitarian state, the militarization of the trade unions and the forced expropriation of the peasants.

Urban—What were the physical arrangements for the meetings of the Politburo?

Bazhanov—Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin always sat together at the end of the table—and voted together. Kamenev, in the chair, sat at the top of the table. On his right was Zinoviev, on his left Stalin. They formed a " bloc " on all questions.

Urban—Did they have a pre-conference meeting among themselves?

Bazhanov—Yes, they did, and I was, as the Politburo's secretary, present at these restricted sessions too. All questions on the Politburo's agenda were gone over and the " troika's " policies agreed. The triumvirate was the only real decision-making body in the Soviet Union. When the Politburo met, the troika's " suggestions " were invariably adopted.

Urban—Did Stalin behave differently at these more intimate sessions than he did in the Politburo?

Bazhanov—No—at these too, he was extremely taciturn.

Urban—Did he ever brief you to rig the discussion in this or that manner, or to minute the proceedings in a way favourable to himself?

Bazhanov—No, he didn't. In fact, Stalin was, at this period, so preoccupied with the mechanics of the power struggle that he could seldom be bothered to waste time on substantive issues. As secretary of the Politburo I had to call on Stalin frequently. Time and again I submitted government files to him, but instead of examining the question

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in hand, Stalin would simply say: " Bazhanov, what do *you* think ought to be done? " And when I suggested an answer, Stalin invariably concurred and instructed me to pass it down as his own decision.

Urban—So Stalin the single-minded usurper of all decision-making was not yet evident at the time?

Bazhanov—Not at all. I soon discovered that the business of government didn't in the least interest Stalin. He was only too happy to let me deal with such problems under his signature. His sole concern, at least in the 1923-26 period, was how to outwit his colleagues and lay his hands on the reins of unrestricted power. This absorbed all his energies.

Two Early Murders

Urban—Before going any further—can you clarify for me your personal position on the Politburo Secretariat? You said you were a secretary of the Politburo but, in fact, Stalin's assistant—

Bazhanov—Yes—formally the General Secretary of the Central Committee had three secretaries, or personal assistants, but each assistant performed a particular task. My official job was Secretary to the Politburo but I was also Stalin's assistant, and my position was such that I could take certain decisions for him in his absence. Stalin's personal secretary was Mehklis, and the third man was Kanner who was in charge of many subsidiary matters (cars, living quarters, etc.) but was also looking after the " dirty tricks " department.

Urban—Meaning?

Bazhanov—Meaning that when somebody had to be got out of the way, Kanner was the one to make the arrangements. For example, he organized Mikhail Frunze's abdominal operation from which, as you know, he did not come back alive.

Urban—This was, indeed, a most ominous incident because it foreshadowed the character of the murders Stalin was to commission a decade or so later. We all know the strange case of Frunze's operation on Politburo orders, but perhaps you can tell us how it appeared to you at the time, sitting as you were in the Politburo and minuting its decisions.

Bazhanov—Frunze (a Rumanian by birth) had replaced Trotsky in 1925 as War Commissar. He was an Old Bolshevik and a distinguished military leader, but during his tenure as War Commissar he showed too much independence vis-à-vis Stalin and the GPU so that Stalin developed a great aversion to him. Frunze had been suffering from ulcers, but he was given conflicting opinions by his doctors—some saying that he would have to have an operation while others told him that he would not.

The question was finally decided by the triumvirate. In a private session—which, incidentally, I did not attend—Frunze was told through a convocation of doctors to subject himself to the surgeon's knife. Frunze obeyed; he was given a general anaesthetic which killed him.

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The man who engineered the operation on Stalin's orders was Kanner using Yagoda as his tool. It was Kanner who saw to it that the Frunze case was entrusted to the Central Committee doctor, the Armenian Pogosyants, and not to the Kremlin Clinic which normally took care of Party leaders. Kanner and Pogosyants then proceeded to comply with Stalin's wishes.

Urban—Did you think *at the time* that Frunze had been murdered?

Bazhanov—Yes, I had a pretty good idea that he had not died a natural death, as indeed almost everyone felt that there had been foul play. His widow, who suspected what had happened, committed suicide, and Boris Pilnyak in his book *Tale of the Unextinguished Moon*—poignantly subtitled "The Assassination of a Commander"—pointed an accusing finger at Stalin.

Urban—Two comments come to mind—Trotsky's and Isaac Deutscher's, and I am especially interested in your view of these because you are, as far as I know, the only surviving witness who can tell us whether they hold water.

According to Trotsky, the Frunze incident shows that by October 1925 Stalin's power was already so great that he could exact the submissive co-operation of a group of doctors and have his opponent eased out of life, even though Stalin's name was virtually unknown.

Deutscher makes a broader point which strikes me as convincing. "What is . . . most significant in the story," he writes, "is that the Politburo could arrogate to itself the right to take decisions on so personal a matter. The individual Bolshevik, whether he was the commander-in-chief or the secretary of a provincial committee, belonged in his entirety to the party. He had no existence or will beyond it . . . As a body, the party lay supine under the knife of its implacable surgeon, the General Secretary."

Bazhanov—To take Deutscher first—what he says is true but hardly surprising. Under Lenin's stewardship it was drilled into the Party that there was for a communist no such thing as a private morality. Morality was what agreed with the interests of the proletariat and the Party as interpreted by the Party leaders. Integrity, honesty, loyalty, personal friendship were so much bourgeois prejudice. For those of us, therefore, who lived within the all-embracing tyranny of Bolshevik ideology nothing seemed more natural than to assume that a man's personal affairs, even so private a matter as his medical treatment, should be subject to the Party's interests and the Party leaders' decisions. For *us*, speaking as we are in 1980, this is indeed a bizarre affair, but given the context of Bolshevik morality it was not so. I am, of course, not excusing Stalin's action, but the responsibility goes back to Lenin. Stalin merely amplified his master's voice.

Urban—Nothing demonstrates the truth of what you are saying more clearly than the medical regime imposed on Lenin himself by a committee of the Politburo after Lenin's second stroke in December 1922.

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On 24 December 1922, after a consultation with doctors, Stalin, Kamenev, and Bukharin ordered that "Vladimir Iliych has the right [sic] to dictate every day for five or 10 minutes, but this cannot have the character of correspondence and Vladimir Iliych may not expect to receive answers. He is forbidden visitors. Friends and those around him may not inform him about political affairs." Significantly and ominously —*Stalin* was appointed to maintain liaison with the doctors! And even the young and free-wheeling Bukharin did not think that he was doing anything unusual by putting his name to this arrogant document.

Bazhanov—As to Trotsky's point—yes, the Frunze incident does show that by the end of 1925 Stalin was powerful enough to engineer, through Kanner, Frunze's death. Real power was more and more concentrated in the Secretariat, and the Secretariat was the tool of the General Secretary—Stalin.

Urban—Much of the historical evidence—or at any rate suspicions that cumulatively amount to evidence—of Stalin's misdeeds in these early years comes from yourself, Mr Bazhanov. For example, in his biography of Stalin, Trotsky hints very emphatically that Stalin was guilty of foul play as early as the first half of the 1920s, and to substantiate his suspicion he quotes a passage from your *Stalin, der rote Diktator*, in which you offer certain pointed comments on Trotsky's exile to Turkey in 1929. This is how you are quoted by Trotsky:

> This [Trotsky's exile] is only a half measure. I do not recognize my Stalin . . . We have made a certain amount of progress since the days of Cesare Borgia . . . The culture of Koch bacilli mixed into food and systematically administered will gradually lead to galloping consumption and sudden death . . . It is not clear . . . why Stalin did not follow this method, which is so much a part of his habits and character.

And Trotsky continues:

> In 1930 when Bazhanov's book appeared this seemed to me merely a literary exercise. After the Moscow trials I took it more seriously. Who had inspired the young man with such speculations? What was the source of it all? Bazhanov had received his training in Stalin's ante-room—there the question of Koch bacilli and Borgia methods of poisoning were evidently under discussion as early as prior to 1926, the year Bazhanov left Stalin's secretariat.

I wonder if you would answer Trotsky's question: What reason had you to believe and to say that Stalin would murder his opponents? *Did* you, in fact, come to learn of any plans to use Koch bacilli and such like in Stalin's ante-room?

Bazhanov—No, I heard of no such plans, but remember that Stalin was a most secretive and suspicious man. He confided in and used Kanner, but he revealed nothing to Mehklis or myself.

Urban—What grounds, then, did you have for saying that Stalin had Frunze killed and for insinuating that he would poison others?

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Bazhanov—Two reasons: one circumstantial, one psychological.

The first has to do with the strange case of Ephraim Sklyanski, Trotsky's Deputy as member of the Supreme War Council. Stalin had a deep grudge against Sklyanski. That he was Trotsky's deputy was bad enough; that Trotsky once compared him to Carnot as a brilliant organizer and Lenin too had high praise for him, was worse. But what made Stalin hate Sklyanski still more was Sklyanski's part in the Civil War in which, as we know, Stalin did not exactly distinguish himself. As Vice-Chairman of the Supreme War Council, Sklyanski was, despite his youth (he was a young army doctor spotted and elevated by Trotsky), in a position to send orders to Stalin and, in many cases, to criticize and reprimand him for his insubordination. Stalin, who could neither forget nor forgive, had his knife out for Sklyanski.

In 1924 the Politburo relieved Sklyanski of his post. Some months later the triumvirate, in a private session at which I was present, decided Sklyanski's future. Stalin suggested that Sklyanski be made head of the Soviet trade mission in the US (Amtorg). This was at a time when the US and the USSR had no diplomatic relations and all official and unofficial business was conducted through Amtorg. The head of the mission was, therefore, of ambassadorial rank and, as we well knew, Amtorg was not only looking after Soviet commercial interests but also served as a cover-organization for the GPU.

Realizing the importance of this post, Kamenev and Zinoviev first objected to Stalin's suggestion. They could not see why a man they had just demoted should, in fact, be promoted to a key position in America. Stalin however, insisted and Sklyanski was despatched to New York. A month later news reached us that Sklyanski had drowned near New York in a motor-boating accident. There were no witnesses and no one came along to testify.

As soon as we heard the news, Mehklis and I went to see Kanner. "Sklyanski's death is your handiwork," we told him. Kanner made only a very feeble attempt to deny it.

This, then, was my first reason for having stated in my book in 1930 that Stalin was a killer.

Urban—Before going on to your second, it is as well to remind ourselves that Sklyanski is best known to students of Russian history as the man who asked Trotsky shortly before being despatched to America: "What do you make of Stalin?" and Trotsky gave his famous reply: "Stalin is the outstanding mediocrity in our Party."

Bazhanov—Yes, adding for good measure (as Trotsky tells us in his autobiography) that Stalin represented the coming Thermidor of the Revolution—the march of self-complacent mediocrity through Soviet institutions.

Urban—But didn't Stalin rather give the game away by covering his tracks so poorly? When Sklyanski's ashes were returned from America,

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Stalin shocked his colleagues, and especially Trotsky, by denying him the last honour—that of having his remains interred in the wall of the Kremlin. If Stalin was guilty, I would have thought he would have given Sklyanski a splendid funeral.

Bazhanov—Stalin's hatred was stronger than his caution. He absolutely loathed Sklyanski because Sklyanski knew all about his poor performance on the Southern Front, his fiascos at Tsaritsyn and Lvov.

Urban—Did Trotsky share your suspicion that Sklyanski had been murdered?

Bazhanov—No, he didn't. He was naïve, as fanatical people often are.

Urban—But later in his life Trotsky appears to have changed his mind. Although in *My Life*, published in 1929, Trotsky still says nothing to endorse your account of the story, he implied in one of his writings shortly before his own assassination ("The Tanaka Memorial," May 1940) that Sklyanski might have been killed on Stalin's orders. "Permit me to recall," he writes, "that Sklyanski, one of the outstanding and most meritorious organizers of the Red Army, was drowned in 1924 or 1925 in America. . . . Unschlicht disappeared, and was evidently liquidated. Rosengoltz was shot by verdict of the court." Trotsky's hint is indirect but unmistakable.

Bazhanov—Yes, but he left it a little too late. At the time of Sklyanski's removal from office Trotsky said nothing in the Politburo because he felt—wrongly, as I see it—that he could not violate Party discipline. After the return of Sklyanski's ashes he phoned Molotov to protest against Stalin's decision not to permit Sklyanski's urn to be interred in Red Square. But when his protest was turned down, Trotsky said no more.

Urban—What was your second reason?

Bazhanov—My second and entirely psychological reason for ascribing foul play and murderous intent to Stalin was simply that I could observe the man day-in, day-out and just *knew* what he was like. What Trotsky in his naïveté had to infer from a study of Stalin's actions, I could gather from just reading his character. It was clear to me already in those early years that Stalin was a vindictive Asiatic, with fear, suspicion, and revenge deeply embedded in his soul. I could tell from everything he said and left unsaid, his tastes, preferences, and demeanour that he would recoil from nothing, drive every issue to its absurd extreme and send men to their deaths without hesitation if they stood in his way.

To sum up: Sklyanski's mysterious drowning and Frunze's death on the operating table gave me reason enough to say what I did about Trotsky's exile. This is my answer to Trotsky's comments you have quoted. How right I was to express surprise that in 1929 Trotsky was allowed to get away with exile is amply demonstrated by the fact that in 1940 Trotsky was, after all, assassinated by one of Stalin's agents.

Urban—You are not making some of these judgments with the benefit of hindsight?

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Bazhanov—Not at all—my book *Stalin, der rote Diktator* was published in 1930, years before the principal Moscow trials. One didn't have to be a mindreader to smell out the savage in Joseph Stalin.

Urban—Roy Medvedev in his recent book *On Stalin and Stalinism* (1979) tends to cast doubt on the accuracy of some (not all) of your statements, especially those you have made in *Kontinent* half a century after your work in the Kremlin. He questions, for example, your characterization of Stalin as a man of highly limited ability and few interests outside political scheming and string pulling.

Bazhanov—Medvedev was not there—*I* was! He is a historian who works from hindsight, which is a most distorting perspective. I stand by everything I have said and written.

Urban—We have a number of tell-tale reports about Stalin the budding monster from the early 1920s. My personal favourite—told in slightly different versions by different historians—is the one recounted by Boris Souvarine: " On a summer night in 1923, opening his heart to Dzerzhinsky and Kamenev, Stalin is supposed to have said: ' To choose one's victim, to prepare one's plans minutely, to slake an implacable vengeance, and then go to bed. . . . There is nothing sweeter in the world '."

In Max Eastman's version: "Serebryakov told me a story—of how Stalin, in a gathering of comrades who were discussing their idea of a perfect day, said: ' Mine is to plan an artistic revenge upon an enemy, carry it out to perfection and then go home and go peacefully to bed '."

These anecdotes take the lid off Stalin's character in the early 1920s—your years of tenure as Stalin's secretary. Did they reach you on the Kremlin grapevine?

Bazhanov—No, I was not aware of this particular story at the time, but I do not for a moment doubt that it is true. The thrust of it accords with my own observations and offers additional evidence, if such were needed, that as early as 1923 a particularly abhorrent combination of vengefulness and love of the perfect crime was fully developed in the mind of Stalin.

Lenin's " Testament "

Urban—You have provided historians with valuable, indeed unique, evidence of the drama which surrounded the reading of Lenin's Testament at a session of the Central Committee in May 1924. *Was* it a drama?

Bazhanov—Well, it was, when you think of its consequences, drama enough, but at the time it struck me as a comedy of errors or, better still, a comedy of missed opportunities.

But let me sketch in the background.

On 21 January 1924 Lenin died in Gorky, but his " Testament," which he had dictated behind closed doors to his secretaries in two instalments in December 1922 and January 1923, was not revealed to the

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leaders of the Party until four months after his death at the May 1924, pre-Congress session of the Central Committee.

The Testament was a curiously inconclusive document. It reflected Lenin's great unease about the future of the Party. He could sense that after his death the incipient split between Stalin and Trotsky would erupt into a full-scale struggle for leadership, and he was giving brief character-sketches—a sort of headmaster's report—of six men most likely to head the counsels of the Party: Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, and Bukharin. He did not come down firmly on the side of any of them—with one exception. Of Stalin he wrote: "Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated enormous power in his hands; and I am not sure that he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution."

But this was not all. On 4 January 1923 he dictated a postscript to his Testament:

> Stalin is too rude [*grub* which connotes a kind of coarse offensiveness], and this fault . . . becomes intolerable in the office of General Secretary. Therefore I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position and appoint to it another man . . . more patient, more polite and more considerate of other comrades, less capricious, etc. This circumstance may seem an insignificant trifle, but I think that from the point of view of preventing a split, and from the point of view of . . . the relations between Stalin and Trotsky . . . this is not a trifle, or it is a trifle that may acquire a decisive significance.

Urban—That, I suppose, is the nearest Lenin came to delivering his "bomb" against Stalin—as (according to his two secretaries) he said he would at the forthcoming 12th Party Congress?

Bazhanov—Yes, but the bomb in the form in which Lenin presumably intended to deliver it—that is, a many-pronged attack on Stalin, listing his mistakes, machinations, and insubordination, especially on the nationality question—never came to be delivered because Lenin's illness took a turn for the worse and in January 1924 he died.

In the meantime his Testament was a closely guarded secret. Lenin's wife, Krupskaya, whom Stalin treated with consummate rudeness even while Lenin was still alive—so much so that under Trotsky's pressure he was forced to write an apology—was aware of the contents of the Testament but behaved with excessive and as I believe misguided discretion, not letting slip anything she knew Lenin had written of Stalin, although the Testament was addressed to the forthcoming 12th Party Congress. She might, if she had so decided, herself have unwrapped the package at the Party Congress in April 1923, speaking, as she could have done, for Lenin who was incapacitated. But she didn't. Lenin had "Open only after my death" written on the envelope which Krupskaya respected to the letter. After Lenin's death she unsealed the envelope and decided to have it presented to the 13th Party Congress.

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Urban—By May 1924 the battle-lines had been firmly drawn—with the triumvirs on one side and Trotsky on the other—

Bazhanov—Oh yes, and that is what made Lenin's Testament so important. A day or two before the Central Committee was due to meet in closed session—as it always did before a Party Congress—Krupskaya opened the Testament and sent it to Stalin to read. Mehklis—who is the source of my story—opened the envelope (all communications addressed to Stalin passed through his hands) and took it hurriedly to Stalin. Stalin happened to be in session with his propaganda chief, Syrdtsov, but he at once read the letter in Syrdtsov's presence and exploded. "Krupskaya is an old whore," he screamed. Stalin was stunned—he had been caught off base.

He then informed Zinoviev and Kamenev of the contents of Lenin's will and the three of them met to decide how to deal with it.

Urban—I am not clear why Stalin was taken by suprise. In *Pravda*, 4 March 1923 Lenin had launched an outspoken attack on Stalin's "Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate," and only a day later he sent Stalin a letter breaking off all personal relations on account of Stalin's offensive behaviour to Krupskaya. He was clearly preparing a general case to oust the General Secretary.

Bazhanov—Stalin *was* surprised, but he was also outraged by Krupskaya's determination to put the matter before the Party Congress at a time when Trotsky's chances of defeating Stalin still seemed good—and, as some would argue, excellent. After all, Trotsky was mentioned in the Testament as the most capable man on the Central Committee, which boded ill for Stalin's chances of survival at the coming Congress.

In any case, the Central Committee met in closed session in the Kremlin. We sat in one of the smaller, oblong-shaped conference rooms with Kamenev, who was chairing the meeting, at the top of the table and Zinoviev close to him on his left. Stalin was sitting some distance away, on the edge of the low dais on which the conference table was mounted, his face turned towards the window. I had a small desk to myself, on the dais, facing members of the Central Committee who were neatly arranged in rows in front of us. Trotsky (I remember) was in the third row just off the central passage, and close to him were Pyatakov and Radek. And, of course, Krupskaya was there.

Urban—Did you observe Stalin while the Testament was being read?

Bazhanov—Yes. He was staring out of the window with the ostentatious composure of a man who was inwardly extremely anxious. He displayed every sign of a realization that his fate was being decided—which was unusual for Stalin, for normally he knew how to hide his feelings. And, of course, he had reason enough to fear for his future, because in the atmosphere of worship surrounding everything Lenin had said and done—could it be supposed that the Central Committee would dare to challenge Lenin's solemn warning and leave the General Secretary in his post?

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But—Zinoviev came to Stalin's rescue with a speech difficult to match for sheer hypocrisy. The Central Committee, he said, naturally regarded every word Lenin had written as sacred. Every member had vowed to obey Lenin's orders. But on one point (he went on) the Politburo was happy to be able to report that Lenin's fears proved groundless: there was no rift between Stalin and his colleagues—indeed, as everyone knew, they co-operated in full harmony and it was, therefore, best to disregard Lenin's wishes on this particular point. In other words, as Radek was fond of telling me, the proof Zinoviev offered of Stalin's unblemished record reminded one of nothing so much as the case of the proverbial virgin who protested that—yes, yes, she did have an illegitimate baby, but it was exceedingly small—

Kamenev then moved that Stalin be left in office and the motion was carried by a show of hands. I was the one to count the votes, and I have never stopped reproaching myself for not making a note of the names of those who abstained from voting—for there were quite a few.

Trotsky, Pyatakov, and Radek voted against.

Urban—Was there any visible reaction on the part of the rank and file when Zinoviev claimed that all was well in the Politburo?

Bazhanov—No one said a word, but for me the silence was deafening, because I knew that everyone in the hall was perfectly aware of the deadly struggle between the troika and Trotsky, and especially between Stalin and Trotsky. Zinoviev had uttered a breath-taking lie but no one had the courage to nail it.

Urban—What about Trotsky? Here was a stage ready-made for the great actor he was—

Bazhanov—He didn't utter a word either, but one could read from his face that he regarded Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and many of the others as inferior creatures with whom he would not stoop to tangle. He thought of the whole session as unworthy of his attention. He looked upon himself as a man on a par with Lenin—which he was—and refused to be drawn into this unseemly wrangle for the succession. At the same time he must have sensed that he was losing. I don't know what might have passed through his mind as he was listening to Zinoviev's high-pitched screech, but he may well have remembered one of Lenin's remarks of Stalin at the time when Stalin was about to be appointed a member of Sovnarkom: One of the Commissars objected that Stalin's selection would be a mistake—he knew of an active and intelligent man to fill the post. But he was stopped short by Lenin: " Ah, but we don't need an *intelligent* man there. *Stalin* will do."

Urban—Yet Trotsky could have sprung a surprise or two on his opponents if he had chosen to fight, as he was in possession of a number of letters Lenin had written to him shortly before his death making it clear that he deeply mistrusted Stalin and favoured Trotsky.

Bazhanov—Trotsky was heaping mistake upon mistake. A year earlier, before the 12th Party Congress, he had been offered a golden oppor-

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tunity to present the Central Committee's political report in lieu of the ailing Lenin. Moreover—and most paradoxically—it was Stalin, who had insisted that Trotsky should deliver it as the Party's favourite son. But Trotsky declined, not wanting to create the impression that he was exploiting Lenin's illness in order to build up his own position. On Kamenev's suggestion the reading of the report was then given to Zinoviev, but the ultimate beneficiary of Trotsky's error was, of course, Stalin. Trotsky was digging his own grave.

Urban—Historians are divided whether Trotsky held back because he disdained dirtying his hands with petty intrigue and infighting (Isaac Deutscher), or whether he was of inferior calibre as a politician vis-à-vis Stalin (Ronald Hingley).

Hingley writes in a memorable passage:

> Though Stalin would not, or could not, indulge in Trotskyite verbal fireworks, his less obtrustive methods of debate were formidable. Few politicians have shown greater skill in selecting from a welter of complexities some potent over-simplified non-issue, whittling it to a sharp point, dipping it in poison, and thrusting it into an adversary with a deadly twist.

Personally I would agree with Hingley's reading more than Deutscher's. Trotsky had Lenin's anointment as evidence that he was the outstanding man in the leadership and Lenin's messages from his death-bed to compound his confidence. Yet, when the crunch came, he did not know how to make use of them. In the upshot the unpolished, pedestrian but sly and determined Stalin was re-elected as General Secretary and the Central Committee decided, despite Krupskaya's protestations, not to have the Testament made public.

Bazhanov—I don't at all agree with you. Deutscher has a large piece of truth on his side when he says that Trotsky felt it to be beneath his dignity to cross swords with a man as intellectually undistinguished and personally contemptible as Stalin. He despised the whole troika but realized that it was firmly in power and that his chances of dislodging it were slim. Stalin was in control of the apparat and was quite immovable.

Urban—I don't suppose you would, then, allow Roy Medvedev's point either (in *On Stalin and Stalinism*) that had Trotsky fought back at the 13th Party Congress, armed as he was with Lenin's letters, Lenin's articles in *Pravda* and his reprimands of Stalin, there would have been no question of re-electing Stalin to the post of General Secretary?

Bazhanov—Absolutely not. But whether, if by some miracle Stalin *had* been put down and Trotsky elected, Trotsky would have made a less blood-thirsty tyrant than Stalin is a question I would not care to answer.

Urban—Trotsky's *ex post facto* justification for his inactivity is rather in line with what you have said about his character. In his autobiography he argues that he " lost " power not because he was too weak or unskil-

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ful but because the revolutionaries themselves had got tired of revolution and were anxious to settle for a more quiet life, and this they saw guaranteed by the dull, workaday rule of the bureaucracy under Stalin. Revolutionaries, he wrote, come from the people. As long as they are fired by the spirit of the underground struggle and civil war, their zeal is undiminished. But when the struggle is over a reaction sets in: "the traits of the man in the street, the sympathies and tastes of self-satisfied officials" are revived. With these, Trotsky was out of tune. He lost, he argues, because the mentality of Thermidor replaced the spirit of revolution.

Bazhanov—This is, as you say, very much an *ex post facto* apology. Trotsky's position in 1923–24 was strong. If he had used the cards history had dealt him, Stalin could have been stopped. Of course Stalin *was* an accomplished schemer, but with the support Lenin had given him Trotsky could have lined up the Party behind him if his temperament had not stood in the way. But he failed to understand the nature of the Party machine, Stalin's use of it, and the full significance Stalin's position as General Secretary had acquired by the time of the 13th Congress.

Trotsky was not a man for all seasons. Fiery, vibrant, eloquent, and filled with the zeal of his historical mission, he had little patience with the sedentary manipulators in the Politburo. Such, to give you a small example, was his contempt for them that he would ostentatiously read French love stories while the Politburo was in session.

Trotsky was fond of quoting "le style c'est l'homme," and his own life is the best illustration of the truth of this observation. He was all form, sparkle, and spectacular leadership with a penchant for the memorable pose and striking formulation. He lost because he misjudged the character of his opponents and the weapons they were prepared to use against him.

No Emergency Exits

Urban—Trotsky's unwillingness to take his dispute outside the Party and appeal, as he well might have done, to his supporters over the heads of the troika, is only one example of a feature which is continuous in Party history and I, for one, find very difficult to understand. Why was it that men fighting for their careers and indeed their lives would scrupulously refrain from telling the public what their quarrel was all about, preferring, on the face of it, to be judged and often sent to the gallows by their comrades? One has to look to Church history for psychologically convincing parallels.

Trotsky's personal passivity at the height of the struggle for power is, perhaps, the least difficult to understand because he is, after all, the author of one of the most revealing pronouncements of ideological fanaticism:

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> The Party in the last analysis is always right, because the Party is the single historic instrument given to the proletariat for the solution of its fundamental problems. . . . I know that one must not be right *against* the Party. One can be right only with the Party, and through the Party, for history has created no other road for the realization of what is right. The English have a saying: "Right or wrong—my country." With far greater historic justification we may say: right or wrong, on separate particular issues, it is my Party. . . .

Bazhanov—This is a fascinating question which historians will puzzle over as long as religious and ideological movements exist. I have myself encountered certain attitudes in the Communist Party which one may ascribe to naïveté, and others which spring from an unreasoning, almost religious type of fanaticism of the kind you have described. In the early days of the movement fanaticism was very strong. Lenin and Trotsky were certainly possessed by a fideistic sort of unshakable certainty, and that is why Trotsky wrote what he did and did nothing to take his deadly conflict with Stalin outside the confines of the Party. Bukharin, when his turn came, acted likewise—although *he* was no fanatic; but Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Molotov were basically interested in one thing only: power. They had no deeper commitment to the cause they were espousing—at the same time they were well endowed with duplicity, a flare for the double-cross and an appetite for revenge.

This does not mean that Stalin and the Stalinists did not give all possible emphasis to ideology. They did, and they did so with a painstaking attention to detail, but they knew, as the Party elite as a whole also came to realize, that the ideological abracadabra was a mere passport to legitimacy which had no significance as a philosophical guide to action or a key to government policy.

Urban—It is nevertheless rather daunting to reflect that men who could, if they so wished, have saved their necks by staying abroad, dutifully trooped back to Moscow when the call came, mostly to be slaughtered in Stalin's terror. Of course—*if* one accepts Trotsky's maxim that "one cannot be right *against* the Party," no further explanation is needed. But was it really the case that sophisticated men even of the stamp of Bukharin acted on so absurd and puerile a notion? There was, in communist eschatology, no promise of resurrection—at best of rehabilitation, and that offered little comfort.

Bazhanov—Why indeed did they recant and troop back from the safety of foreign posts to Stalin's abattoir in Moscow? Because communism was their whole life and their only capital. They were born into the movement, nurtured by the movement, sacrificed all they had for the movement and had no emergency exits left when the lights inside the Party went out and Stalin ordered the doors to be shut. They could not face denouncing the Party because that would have amounted to renouncing their whole past. One might say with only slight exaggera-

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tion that they preferred to go to the stake in Moscow rather than become driftwood in a society they despised and had sworn to destroy. This was, mind you, not always their conscious choice, because each hoped that fate would somehow spare *him*, but deep down in their hearts they realized that ultimately their commitment was irreversible.

Bukharin spent time in America and Western Europe, Sokolnikov was Soviet ambassador in London, and Kamenev in Rome—but when the whistle was blown all of them meekly returned to Moscow to face the executioner. Even today, if you look at the record of old communists in the French or Italian Communist Party you will find that although the reality now surrounding them has fully exposed the mischief and error of their past commitments, and although with one half of their consciousness they realize that they have been fooled or deceived themselves, they still cling to the outdated framework and rehearse the old slogans, because they cannot disown their entire lives and have nowhere else to go.

Urban—The most bizarre manifestation of this religious streak in communist behaviour was Stalin's famous oath of fealty to Lenin shortly after Lenin's funeral. I will quote it in some detail for I'm anxious to have the reactions of one who was present at the embalmment and deification of Lenin:

> In leaving us, Comrade Lenin ordered us to hold high and keep pure the great title of member of the party. We vow to thee, Comrade Lenin, that we shall honourably fulfil this thy commandment. . . .
>
> In leaving us, Comrade Lenin ordered us to guard the unity of our party like the apple of our eye. We vow to thee, Comrade Lenin, that we shall fulfil this thy commandment, too. . . .
>
> In leaving us, Comrade Lenin ordered us to guard and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. We vow to thee, Comrade Lenin, that without sparing our strength we shall honourably fulfil this thy commandment, too. . . .

This extraordinary encomium has attracted a great deal of comment. The one I want to put to you is Boris Souvarine's (freely adapted by Deutscher in his biography of Stalin). His contention is that Lenin's embalmment like a Pharaoh in a funeral monument inspired by the mausoleum of Tamerlane, and Stalin's liturgic paean to the dead leader mark the point where Marxism passed into an oriental/slavonic creed which detached itself more and more from its real essence and its West European birthplace.

> In the tactics and organisation of the Party many Russian elements which had nothing to do with Marxism had for a long time been tending to push into the background ideas acquired in the school of Western socialism. The Muscovite past developed into the Soviet present. . . . Six years of revolution (1923) had not inculcated in a convulsed society either respect for the person, the sense of individual responsibility or consciousness of the rights

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> and duties of the citizen. On the contrary, many Bolsheviks who had been in contact with European mentality before October were to find themselves "Russified" after the Kronstadt mutiny, impregnated with the special psychology of the country in which, formerly, according to Gorky's summary, there flourished "absolute rule, the enslavement of man, cynical falsehood and bestial cruelty." A primitive and ill-digested sociology, gradually reduced to naïve schemata, offered no resistance to the inveterate habits of a society more than a century behind the evolution of the civilised world. . . .

Would you agree with that?

Bazhanov—No, I would not. In the 1920s Boris Souvarine (still alive) was one of the leaders of the French Communist Party. Unfortunately for him he backed the wrong horse in the Soviet power-struggle—he backed Trotsky and got unstuck. With Zinoviev as president of the Comintern, Souvarine was expelled from the Party. But Souvarine remained a communist—a dissident communist as we would call him today; he had little groups of like-minded comrades organized around him, and for some 15 years he tried to make it back to party membership—without success. In the meantime he became one of Stalin's most outspoken opponents and wrote, in 1935, a critical biography of Stalin, the one from which you have quoted. It was the first of its kind to come from the pen of a communist and was, needless to say, profoundly coloured by Souvarine's Trotskyism.

What, then, is wrong with Souvarine's reading of Stalin's absurd praise of Lenin? In Souvarine's interpretation communist doctrine in its pristine West European form is perfectly sound. Unfortunately for the world, he argues, communism fell into the hands of backward, barbarian, obscurantist Russians who turned Marx's libertarian philosophy into an instrument for spreading darkness and tyranny. It is the *Russian* distortion that has brought communism into disrepute—hence: peal off the Russian accretion and you have communism in its unblemished state, ready to be applied in Western Europe. These are the implications of his reasoning.

But, of course, none of this is true. Certainly the Russian connexion has not made communism more attractive to the rest of the world, but—whatever the present generation of "Euro-communists" may say to the contrary—the fact is that communism has proved to be tyrannical *wherever* it has been applied—think of China, Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, even Yugoslavia—and it cannot be anything *but* tyrannical because no one has yet invented a method whereby a dictatorship can be imposed on an unwilling population by invitation or prayer. The backwardness of Russian society, I am ready to concede, has added to the repulsiveness of the Soviet variety, but in the last (and indeed first) analysis despotism is the natural and necessary consequence of the entire programme of communism. Souvarine's attitude is dangerous because it has provided the French communists with a wonderful formula

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for arguing: "Ah, but you must not judge *our* Party by what those unwashed Russians have done in the name of communism—*French* communism is going to be a very different affair."

Urban—You don't think Stalin's early education as a seminarist had something to do with his effusions? Trained for the priesthood in the Orthodox tradition, his hymn-like praise of Lenin may well have been his natural expression of respect—and one suspects that that was the language his audience also understood best.

Bazhanov—No doubt Stalin's background as a seminarist and Georgian, and the devout Orthodoxy which surrounded him in his parents' house, had an impact on his style. But his oath of loyalty to Lenin was a matter of calculated policy decided collectively by the triumvirs. Their purpose was to turn Lenin into an icon and to present themselves as heirs to Lenin's mantle. I do not underestimate the role of Stalin's personality. He was deeply imbued by traditions of Asian despotism, and his rule was the finest example of Oriental tyranny we have seen in modern times. But his title to tyranny was *communism.* That provided him with inner justification, a tool and a rhetoric.

The only question we can meaningfully ask of the Soviet system is: has it undergone *institutional* change since the rule of Stalin? Clearly the answer is: No. Of course, there are differences. To take Solzhenitsyn's example—when Stalin wanted two innocent men arrested he had his police round up one hundred, whereas today the Soviet police will arrest just two. I suppose this is progress of sorts, but it does not change the fact that two innocent men *are* being arrested and that the system continues to be totally unaccountable.

Urban—It must have happened in your days in the Kremlin that, in talking to Zinoviev about Stalin, Lenin remarked: "This cook will concoct nothing but peppery dishes."

Bazhanov—Lenin's quip did not reach me at the time, but Zinoviev was a fine man to complain to! There was a motto in the upper echelons of the Party in those days: "Trust neither Zinoviev nor Stalin, because Zinoviev will run away and Stalin will betray you!"

Urban—You saw Stalin carrying Lenin's coffin and making his vow of undying loyalty. What was Stalin's personal reaction to the news that Lenin was dead?

Bazhanov—Oh, Stalin was jubilant! I never saw him in a happier mood than during the days following Lenin's death. He was pacing up and down the secretariat with satisfaction written all over his face. And he had good reason to be pleased with himself. Stalin was the man Lenin was most anxious to remove from the centre of power, and what was now happening was precisely the reverse: *Lenin* had been removed from the scene and, with him, the principal obstacle to Stalin's ambitions. Stalin knew perfectly well that Lenin distrusted him and that his persecution of Krupskaya even earned him Lenin's hatred. But now Lenin was dead and Krupskaya defenceless.

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Of course, Stalin's face to the outside world was one of deep shock and grief, but this was play-acting. Behind the empty verbiage of "We vow to thee, Comrade Lenin . . ." Stalin was preparing to pick of the Old Bolsheviks one by one. By 1940 every one of the five leaders mentioned in Lenin's Testament had been murdered by Stalin and, with them, hundreds of thousands of innocent people.

Urban—I must, if I may, praise the extraordinary foresight you show in your 1930 portrait of Stalin. You observed that young Bukharin, who was not widely known at the time, was the most gifted member in the Soviet leadership and predicted that for that very reason Stalin would plot his death—which he did. You also foresaw the doom of Kyrov and Tomsky and the longevity of Molotov and Voroshilov.

Bazhanov—By the end of 1926—which may strike you as early in the game—I could tell from my contacts with Stalin that here was a man who would get rid of anyone he thought was in his way. And that included not only enemies real or imagined, but literally anyone who had attained any sort of prominence, uttered an original idea or was suspected by him to possess a keener intelligence or more memorable record than his own. How could the brilliant, cheerful, and rather likeable Bukharin escape the net?

Urban—I'm told there is a play shortly to be staged in Paris in which Stalin's duplicity in 1924 and your part in showing it up are re-enacted—

Bazhanov—Yes. The author is Claude Vermorel and he has done me the honour of portraying my experiences as Stalin's secretary under my own name as one of the principal characters. The play opens and closes with myself on stage. There you can see a somewhat fictionalized account of my whole career as a communist, disillusioned communist, and anti-communist.

Urban—You were disillusioned, I should imagine, because you saw the system at work from a privileged corner. Your disillusion reminds me of that of Angelica Balabanova, the first Secretary of the Comintern and an admirer of Lenin (and earlier of the then Socialist Mussolini). She, too, left her post and the Soviet Union in a state of moral revulsion, because she discovered after a very short tenure that the Bolshevik system, and Lenin himself, were no improvement on the Tsars. But Lenin was a big enough man to put up with Balabanova's reproaches and allow her to go. Stalin's chemistry was very different.

Bazhanov—Yes, there is no greater educator in Bolshevism than observing its leaders at work in the privacy of the Kremlin.

The man in the street in Russia has a different angle of vision and works from different assumptions. He has been trained to believe that the mistakes, injustices, shortcomings, and shortages he encounters in his daily life are due to the faulty execution of rules laid down by wise and benevolent men at the top. This is partly a hangover from Tsarism when it was widely believed, especially among the muzhiks, that an all-wise and all-loving Tsar was being prevented from doing

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good by corrupt officials. But when you are in a position to study the thinking and motivations of men at the top of the Soviet hierarchy you are very quickly disabused of any idea that wisdom, foresight, and good intentions reign at the apex of the pyramid. What you do see is that the apex itself is steeped in mendacity, the repudiation of all principle, crude personal rivalries, and crime. Angelica Balabanova's experiences were in some ways similar to mine. But while she rejected Lenin's mockery of communism, I rejected communism itself.

Stalinism: A "Déformation Nationale"?

Urban—Stalin's intellectual inferiority must have played an important part in shaping his antipathies. There is nothing more galling for a man uncertain of his ability than to have others of superior intelligence or experience serving under him. Big men surround themselves with big men because they have nothing to fear from them, but one can always tell a second-rater by the nonentities and bureaucrats he selects to work for him. Wasn't Stalin a good example of this, what with Kalinin, Voroshilov, Molotov, and Kaganovich as his closest associates?

Bazhanov—Yes. Stalin feared bright men and destroyed the lot of them. Mind you, not all of his victims at the top were either models of good sense or famous for their efficiency. Rykov was passionately given to drink and Tomsky was almost totally deaf. But intellectual inferiority was certainly an important factor in Stalin's motivations—second only to his hatred of Jews.

Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev were all Jews. For some time Stalin succeeded in covering up his anti-semitism, but by 1926 he had got rid of all prominent Jews in the Politburo and Central Committee with the exception of the obedient Kaganovich and Stalin's personal secretary, Mehklis.

In the Central Committee elected in 1927 there were almost no Jews left of any consequence.

An episode in Mehklis's life is typical of the cruel farce Stalin made of all communist principle. One day Stalin, Mehklis, and I were talking together to sort out some problem concerning the Komsomol. At one point in our discussion Stalin came out with a vicious remark about "that miserable little Yid Faivilovich" who was then fourth secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol. Mehklis sat there without uttering a word, and when I asked him afterwards: "Why didn't you say something—you are a Jew yourself?" Mehklis replied rather assertively: "I'm *not* a Jew— I'm a *communist*"!—

Urban—not appreciating that for this crude anti-semitic Georgian he was and would remain a Jew whatever communist doctrine said about the equality of men—

The more I hear you talk, Mr Bazhanov, about the character and motivations of the Soviet leaders in the 1920s, the more I'm inclined to agree with Souvarine that Russianism did indeed administer a fatal

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and rather *sui generis* blow to communism as it had been originally conceived by Marx and Engels.

Bazhanov—A *sui generis* blow—yes; a *fundamental* blow—no. The beastliness of communism inheres in the doctrine itself. Stalin and the backwardness of Russia may have marginally added to it but the root of the evil of the Soviet system is *communism*, not its Russian application.

Of course, Stalin was a cautious devil. Having liquidated Jews at the top, he realized that, with the coming of Hitler, the retention of Jews and Jewish sympathies further down the line might prove useful to him in his confrontation with Nazi Germany. But when Hitler was defeated and the benefits of Jewish support exhausted, Stalin's anti-semitism broke surface again and was given official currency in the " doctor's plot " and Stalin's plan for what was to follow. Fortunately for Soviet Jewry, Stalin died before he could set it in train.

Urban—Stalin's anti-semitism was indeed continuous. Djilas quotes him as making pointed remarks about Moshe Pijade, the only Jewish leader among the Yugoslav Partisans, and what strikes me as especially revealing and supportive of your reading of Stalin's character is the lack of any attempt on his part to hide his anti-semitism. One would have thought that the leader of the Soviet Communist Party and wartime Soviet state would have had the elementary decency of covering up his anti-semitic sentiments. Not so. At a time when Hitler was exterminating the Jews of Europe, Stalin's in-jokes were still on the Jews. Maxim Litvinov's widow gave me some vivid accounts of how Soviet Jewry was seized with terror when the scope and implications of the " doctors' plot " began to be known.

Bazhanov—Stalin's basic feelings about the Jews were not all that different from Hitler's, but whereas Hitler equated the Jews with communism, Stalin equated them with capitalism—hence his special hatred—

Urban—which he may well have given unexceptionable ideological justification if he had thought the time was right for the reactivation of Marx's own thinly veiled anti-semitic tract, *The Jewish Question.*

You have, Mr Bazhanov, given me a character-portrait of Stalin as an unsophisticated and in some ways even unintelligent man. I cannot quite make this square with the manner in which he outwitted all his opponents, many of them men of outstanding ability and sophistication. But (sticking to the period in hand) I cannot even square it with Stalin's famous lectures, *Foundations of Leninism.* Stalin delivered these in 1924 to students of Sverdlov University, and although they are plodding and pedestrian in tone, they nevertheless display a good grasp of Leninism and even a certain originality of mind in harnessing Leninism to Stalin's purpose.

Bazhanov—I very much doubt that Stalin wrote those lectures. In my experience Stalin was incapable of expressing any thought requiring

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more than a five-minute attention span. What I observed time and again in his presence was: Stalin would come up with snippets of tentative ideas; these would be dutifully jotted down by Mehklis or Tovstukha (another of his assistants) and turned into often well-reasoned arguments. But the master himself was unable to produce an orderly train of thought in speech or writing. Of course, once an argument had been pre-digested for him he could, and did, deliver it. All of Stalin's public utterances and written work came about in this way. I am convinced that his lectures at the Sverdlov University, too, were only minimally his own.

Urban—Roy Medvedev's researches (extensively quoted by Robert Tucker in his biography of Stalin) seem to endorse your view, though Medvedev thinks that Stalin cribbed his lectures from a then unpublished study of a young Party worker, F. A. Ksenofontov, who had sent up his manuscript to Stalin for ideological approval. Stalin's plagiarism is given substance by the fact that in his preface to his book (which could not appear until after Stalin had published his lectures), Ksenofontov implicitly asserts that his work was written before Stalin's. Medvedev, who compared the two texts, discovered remarkable similarities. He relates that in a private letter in July 1924 Stalin thanked Ksenofontov for assisting him in the preparation of the Sverdlov lectures, but when Ksenofontov asked Stalin's permission to quote the letter, Stalin refused. Some years later Stalin paid off his debt: "Ksenofontov was arrested . . . and killed during interrogation," Medvedev reports.

I have to add in fairness that most of Stalin's biographers do not question Stalin's authorship—some because they simply had no access to the information Medvedev has now brought to light. In Milovan Djilas's assumption Stalin was certainly the *bona fide* author of the lectures.

Bazhanov—I cannot comment on Ksenofontov, but having been close to Stalin for several years, I can tell you with absolute certainty that he was neither a theoretician nor a writer. Stalin's *modus operandi* was very rudimentary: he would state his target in a few simple sentences and then instruct his secretaries: demonstrate, endorse, and argue with appropriate quotations. Mehklis and Tovstukha would then scour Marx and Lenin for the right evidence and make out a case to fit Stalin's conclusions. That's how the Georgian operated.

Urban—Trotsky observes in one of his writings that of Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin, the Soviet dictator was the most objectionable because, while both Mussolini and Hitler fought their way from the grass-roots to the top through innumerable encounters with ordinary people, Stalin alone got there by the contemptible skill of manipulating the machine and without any popular mandate. Would you allow that?

Bazhanov—Without wanting to make excuses for Mussolini or Hitler—Trotsky is right. Lenin and Trotsky were in touch with the people:

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they may have harangued, propagandized, inspired, taught, abused, or misled the people—but they were in touch. But after Lenin's death and Trotsky's exile the string-pullers in the apparat began to take over. Stalin of course is our prime example of a leader who rose to despotic power entirely through the medium of intrigue and infighting—no genuine contact with the masses, no mandate from the people, not even the kind Mussolini and Hitler enjoyed.

With that tradition established, Malenkov inherited Stalin's mantle, Khrushchev that of Malenkov, and now Brezhnev straddles the stage as our latest exemplar of a leader whose links with the people are nil and whose title to leadership resides solely in his mastery of the machine. Since Lenin's death the Soviet Union has been ruled by a self-perpetuating priesthood which has not once summoned up the courage to test the legitimacy of its rule against the will of the people.

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Trotsky and the Peasants

James G. Nutsch

IN the crucial, early years considered here—from the assumption of power to the NEP—Lenin was the dominant figure in major agrarian decisions, just as he was in so many other areas and in policy overall. Nevertheless, great contributions in peasant affairs were made by other leading Bolsheviks. The man whose activities and influence have been most overlooked is Leon Trotsky.

As will be shown, it is certainly not true that Trotsky commonly failed to take notice of peasant affairs, nor that he often failed to appreciate the full significance of them. On the contrary, he was in the front-rank of the Bolshevik leaders in being aware of Bolshevik-peasant problems, in comprehending their crucial importance to the Party, and in being cognizant of the practical alternatives and their most likely consequences. This can be shown most vividly by noting his ideas and activities after the commencement of the Civil War on a grand scale, but it is also obvious during the latter part of 1917 and early 1918.

Both before and after the October Revolution Trotsky was keenly aware of the revolutionary impetus being given to the peasants by industrial workers and soldiers agitating in the villages. He was among the leading Bolsheviks who made efforts to further this process and who were attempting to establish closer relations with the peasantry in general. One result of this was the publication of the peasant newspaper, *Bednota*. Even so, as Trotsky himself acknowledged, the purely Party work among the peasants remained small.[1] Having few technical resources and being relatively small in size, the Bolshevik Party placed its reliance on what was considered to be "a correct policy."[2]

Certainly the most "correct" policy of the Bolsheviks to the peasant mind was their advocacy of taking the land. This was formalized into law with the passage of the Land Decree on 8 November, which was actually the land programme of the SRs with some introductory passages by Lenin. Trotsky first saw and agreed to the proposal when it was still in Lenin's original pencil-written form.[3] The biggest problem of the Bolsheviks at the time was simply to stay in power, and as far as the peasantry were concerned, there was no greater act they could have performed to warrant receiving their support.

At the meeting of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on

[1] Leon Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution*, III (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1932), pp. 19–24.

[2] Ibid. p. 24.

[3] Leon Trotsky, *The Real Situation in Russia* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1928, pp. 251–2.

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7 November, Trotsky was a leading defender of a Bolshevik monopoly in government as opposed to one based on a socialist coalition. He contended that victory went to the political party that understood and satisfied the fundamental interests of the main classes. This meant the Bolsheviks, naturally, and he stated that the only coalition they were interested in was one with the workers and poorest peasants, and that in their name the Party refused a coalition with the kulaks [4]—meaning, of course, as far as the government was concerned, the Mensheviks and SRs.

AS early as the spring of 1917 Trotsky had been accusing the Mensheviks and SRs, especially through their control of the Petrograd Soviet, of giving support to the Provisional Government and its foreign policy. According to him, the two parties were attempting to advance the patriotism of the peasantry in order to justify their own support of the war. However, Trotsky prophesied, it was not this alleged patriotism on the part of the peasants that was of real importance, but their hunger for land. All the propertied groups, he said, had sought to channel the peasantry into an imperialist war and thus to distract them from class warfare at home. It was the duty of true socialists to lead the peasants away from the international war and into an agrarian revolution of their own. Later, when dealing with Russia's involvement in this international war at the Brest-Litovsk peace talks, he continued to make direct reference to the needs and interests of the peasantry, and particularly in relation to the land.[5]

Trotsky was also among those who were active in furthering the agrarian revolution, in supplanting the old institutions with the newer Soviets, and in getting peasants sympathetic to the Bolshevik cause installed in positions of authority in these Soviets. He noted that the villages changed their attitude towards the Soviets in the autumn and winter when the Soviets themselves changed their political course. Whereas the Soviets had attempted to hold the peasants back in their land desires, they now pushed them forward.[6]

In March 1918 Trotsky was appointed Commissar of War and President of the Supreme War Council. For some time thereafter he was primarily involved in organizing and directing the Red Army, which soon was composed mostly of peasants. Yet he also found time for other leading Bolshevik activities, among them being the huge problem of adjusting general peasant policies to fit the changing circumstances.

[4] James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1918: Documents and Materials* (Stanford University Press, 1934), pp. 135–6.

[5] Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed* (Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 241–5, 380.

[6] Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution*, III, p. 30.

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WITH the foreign intervention and deepening of the Civil War that came soon after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks adopted policies more attuned to all-out military conflict. With regard to the peasantry these War Communism policies were mainly concerned with the activities of the *Kombedi*, or Committees of the Poor, with requisitioning of food products and other agricultural materials, and with military activities *per se*. Trotsky was intimately involved in all of these.

Behind the organization of the *Kombedi* by the Bolsheviks was the latter's practice of treating peasant affairs from the perspective of a three-fold division in their ranks, even though leading Bolsheviks differed in their respective definitions of each division or group. Trotsky's distinction between the lower and upper levels of the peasantry placed emphasis upon "labour-power," which to a Marxist implied exploitation:

> In the Russian peasantry as it entered the Soviet order there were 3 elements: the poor, living to a considerable extent by the sale of their labour-power, and forced to buy additional food for their requirements; the middle peasants, whose requirements were covered by the products of their farms and who were able to a limited extent to sell their surplus; and the upper layer—i.e., the rich peasants, the vulture (kulak) class, which systematically bought labour-power and sold their agricultural produce on a large scale.[7]

He noted that it was "quite unnecessary to point out that these groups are not distinguished by definite symptoms or by homogeneousness throughout the country."[8] But he, like the other Bolsheviks, was not interested in fine distinctions or subtleties. The point of importance was this: "Still, on the whole, and generally speaking, the peasant poor represented the natural and undeniable allies of the town proletariat, whilst the vulture class represented its just as undeniable and irreconcilable enemies."[9]

Nevertheless, it was the Bolsheviks who were the impetus behind the *Kombedi*. As Trotsky said, it "was necessary to awaken in the lower ranks of the peasantry suspicion and hostility towards the speculating upper strata."[10] So, regardless of the lack of tidy definitions, regardless of the difficulties in distinguishing between peasant groups, and regardless of mistakes, the Bolsheviks pressed forward with their programme in the countryside. It was primarily armed detachments of workers, but also Cheka members and Trotsky's Red Army soldiers when they were available, who went to the villages to establish and work in concert with the *Kombedi*. They forcibly requi-

[7] L. Trotsky, *The Defence of Terrorism* (*Terrorism and Communism*) (The Labour Publishing Co. Ltd., London, 1921), p. 103.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid. p. 104.

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sitioned grain surpluses and other food items, carried out a redistribution of land, and transferred horses, machinery, buildings, and inventory of all types in a vast levelling process.[11] During the period of their existence it was also largely through the *Kombedi* that Trotsky's Red Army cadres were enlisted from among the peasant population.[12]

THE *Kombedi* existed only from June to November 1918. Their dissolution was formalized on 9 November when the Sixth All-Russian Congress of Soviets passed a resolution which praised the past activities of the *Kombedi* but specified that the dictatorship of the workers and poorest peasants could be embodied only in organs of Soviet power in both the cities and countryside. The disbanding was directly related to the attempt to establish better relations with the middle peasants, with Trotsky being instrumental in the whole process. In March 1919 the Eighth Party Congress even adopted a special resolution relating to " a more correct execution of the Party policy in regard to the middleclass peasantry." [13] Nevertheless, the Party had very limited benefits of a concrete nature which it could give to the middle group of peasants. A sort of moral consolation for them was that Michael Kalinin, a " middle " peasant, was elected Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee after the death of Sverdlov. The idea and the candidacy were proposed by Trotsky, as was the title " All-Russian Starosta." [14]

As organizer and director of military activities, Trotsky's crucial importance to the regime in its overall peasant relations is difficult to overestimate. In addition to its relationships with peasants who were still tillers of the soil, the Red Army's composition itself was an important aspect of peasant affairs. Millions of men were put under arms by the Bolsheviks in the course of the Civil War struggles. The mass of the soldiers, of course, were young peasants.

Broad and severe mobilization procedures were instituted in order to obtain the required numbers of men. Army organization was based on principles of strict military authority and discipline. But even as the peasants were being forcibly recruited into a harsh and dangerous way of life they were afforded an opportunity to take pleasure in how

[11] Yu. Larin i L. Kritsman, *Ocherk khozyaistvennoi zhizni i organizatsiya narodnogo khozyaistva Sovetskoi Rossii* (*Gosizdat*, 1920), pp. 13–14 as quoted in James Bunyan, *Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia, April–December 1918; Documents and Materials* (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1936), pp. 481–2; G. V. Sharapov, *Razreshenie agrarnogo voprosa v Rossii posle pobedi oktyabrskoi revolyutsii (1917–1920 gg.)* (Izdatelstvo VPShi i AON pri TsK KPSS, Moscow, 1961), p. 299; V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, XXXVIII (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965), p. 493 (editor's notes).

[12] Nadezhda K. Krupskaya, *Reminiscences of Lenin* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1959), p. 472 (editor's notes); Lenin; *Collected Works*, XXVIII, p. 494 (editor's notes).

[13] Frederick Rodkey, ed., *Russian Historical Sources: Rossiiskaya Kommunisticheskaya partiya, Eighth Congress, 1919; Stenographic Records* (*Moscow*, 1919), 370–2.

[14] Trotsky, *The Real Situation in Russia*, p. 252.

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the bourgeoisie were being treated. The spirit in which policies against these groups were executed is shown by remarks made by Trotsky:

> What we need, on the one hand, is to make clear the class character of our army as a weapon in the struggle for the supremacy of the working class and the poor peasants, and, on the other, to take the bourgeoisie in our clutches. . . . This report says that along with compulsory conscription of workers and peasants . . . there are necessary a compulsory conscription of bourgeois youth of the same ages and formation of these into rear detachments . . . to clean the barracks and camps. For centuries the workers and peasants have been cleaning and washing up the dirt of the ruling classes . . . Let every bourgeois house be marked as one in which seven or eight families live—as parasites, and we shall post yellow tickets on the gates of those houses! [15]

Mountains of words were not the least effective means in establishing better rapport with the peasantry. And establishing better rapport with the peasantry was a definite policy during the turmoil of the Civil War. Trotsky later remarked on it in a somewhat garnished fashion:

> It suffices to examine our military political literature to see how permeated it was with the thought that the Civil War is politically the struggle of the proletariat with the counter-revolution for influence over the peasants and that the victory cannot be assured save by the establishment of rational relationships between the workers and the peasants, in an individual regiment, in the district of military operations, and in the state as a whole.[16]

Nevertheless, there was a natural reluctance on the part of the peasants to be once again taken from the land and forced into battle. The result was many evasions of conscription and many desertions from the army. Since it was absolutely indispensable that recruitment and military activities be carried on, such actions, if not reversed voluntarily, brought severe punishments. Trotsky believed that the sentences must have an agitational character; that is, their purpose was to frighten some and raise the faith and cheerfulness of others. According to his order of 7 October 1918, he fixed the responsibility upon the village Soviets and Committees of the Poor. If deserters were found in a village the chairman of both these bodies were to be arrested. Any deserters who surrendered and promised loyal service were to be pardoned; those who resisted were to be shot immediately.[17]

A LARGE organization called the Central Committee for Deserters was established in the spring of 1919. Its branch offices were spread throughout the provinces and districts. The general principle

[15] Bunyan, 268–9.
[16] Leon Trotsky, *The New Course* (New International Publishing Company, New York, 1943), p. 62.
[17] David Footman, *Civil War in Russia* (Faber and Faber, London, 1961), p. 150.

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remained the same: free pardon to those who presented themselves voluntarily and severe punishment to those who did not. In general, the whole atmosphere in which mobilization of the peasantry occurred was one of coercion which was backed by violence. It was not an easy task. Neither was the following step—that of organization.

Speaking of the formation of the army, Trotsky referred to it as being " recruited from among the peasants and organized with the aid of the advanced workers."[18] Basically, then, it was largely a matter of workers organizing the peasant recruits. As Trotsky said: " Nine tenths of all our military policy and organization reduced itself to the question of the relation of the worker to the peasant." [19]

A basic reason behind the difficulty which Bolsheviks and workers in the Red Army experienced in mobilizing and organizing peasant recruits was the " petty-bourgeois mentality " of so many of the latter. This also affected the peasants' reliability in battle. It was therefore considered important to strengthen all the fronts with " proletarian elements." If the difficulty of making them fight persisted, then once again coercive measures and terror tactics were the answers of last resort. Trotsky stated the policy bluntly:

> I hereby give warning that if any part of the army retreats of its own will the first to be shot will be the commissar and the second, the commander. The soldiers who show courage will be rewarded and promoted to positions of command. Cowards and traitors will not escape the bullets. . . .[20]

The peasants selected for military duty were not the only ones to be affected by regimentation and brutalities. The civilian peasantry also suffered. In their case, too, Trotsky and his subordinates throughout the Red Army chain of command coldly calculated the results to be expected from any acts of violence, coercion, or even pressure. For example, they commonly practised a system of " mass terror " whereby they arrested members of the upper elements of the peasantry and held them as hostages to be shot in the event of an uprising against them in that area. In general, swift and drastic reprisals were the answer to overt actions of hostility.[21]

But all these actions of force and violence, whether in the army or among civilians, were effected in order to accomplish military victory. Trotsky and other leading Bolsheviks regarded these policies as absolutely indispensable to their cause. They were aware that forceful activities often brought on peasant hostility. Yet, they reasoned (and quite correctly) that without such policies their slim hold on power woud slip from their grasp. Thus, to them, it was a matter of choosing the lesser of two evils.

[18] Trotsky, *The New Course*, p. 62.
[19] Trotsky, *The Real Situation in Russia*, p. 252.
[20] Bunyan, p. 301.
[21] Bunyan, pp. 226–50.

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THIS did not mean that the Bolsheviks (Trotsky as much as any of them) were not intent on strengthening their relations with the peasantry whenever possible. This, too, was a primary aim, for without it victory was not possible either. They were so cognizant of this that the goodwill of the masses in an area was sometimes considered more important than the immediate military retention or loss of a town there. In addition, badly-needed units of the Red Army were sometimes used to liquidate bands who claimed to be fighting the Whites but were merely raiding and looting the larger villages.[22] Another aspect of Bolshevik-peasant relations is shown by Trotsky's remark that many peasants were strongly for the "Bolsheviks," who had given them the land, but were increasingly cool to the "Communists," who took their surplus products without giving manufactured goods in return.[23] In the end this was the most troublesome problem of War Communism—how to maintain satisfactory relations with the peasantry while meeting the economic needs of the regime. And it was Trotsky, one who has commonly been overlooked as important in Bolshevik-peasant relations, who showed amazing insight at such an early stage and proposed measures similar to those the NEP adopted a year later.

The background to his proposals is important for understanding their full significance. The ever-present problem was that of food scarcity. Even before the Bolshevik take-over the situation was so bad the Provisional Government had instituted a grain monopoly. In the areas under their control the White forces commonly found that requisitioning of food products was a necessity. The Bolsheviks' general policy in response to the problem was noted by Krupskaya to be as follows:

> The Soviet Government's food policy at the time consisted in the organization of a grain monopoly, that is, prohibition of all private trade in grain, compulsory delivery of surplus grain to the state at fixed prices, the prohibition of hoarding, strict stock-taking of all surpluses of grain, the proper transportation of grain from places where there was a surplus to places where there was a shortage, and the laying in of stocks for consumption and sowing. . . .[24]

As noted previously, since hoarding often occurred rather than delivery, numerous forays from the cities proceeded to take foodstuffs by force. Additionally, Trotsky's Red Army units often found it necessary to live off the land entirely, or at least to obtain many of their supplies locally. Consequently, what was taken was not nearly always limited to surpluses. Neither was money always offered in exchange, even in the early stages of War Communism, and, even so, it soon

[22] Footman, pp. 179 and 152.
[23] Max Shachtman, *The Struggle for the New Course* (New International Publishing Company, New York, 1943), p. 134.
[24] Krupskaya, p. 530.

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became unacceptable to many peasants because of the horribly excessive inflation. Finding a solution via a moneyless economy and barter did not work either, as there simply were not anywhere near sufficient products from urban industry to offer in exchange. The result politically was the increased alienation of the peasantry. Economically the first result was decreased agricultural production as many peasants resisted passively by reducing their sown acreage to only what was needed for their own consumption or slightly more. Industrial production suffered next, as the increasing scarcity of agrarian products caused many workers to leave their factories for rural areas in search of food. As they did so, the industrial products available to barter for food became even fewer in number. Thus, a vicious circle was built up in which matters continued to get worse.

THEN, as the fortunes of war more and more favoured the Bolsheviks, there was also the problem created by the removal of the threat to the peasants from the Whites. As the Whites became increasingly eliminated from contention the peasants could better afford to resist the Soviet regime openly. Since by the beginning of 1920 the Bolsheviks had been successful in winning the most difficult battles of the Civil War, it seemed an appropriate time to effect a major change of policy.

Trotsky advanced his proposals in February. It is not surprising that he was the one to make such recommendations at this time. Even a year prior to this, in March 1919, he had gone beyond the resolutions of the Eighth Party Congress in a report which he sent to the Central Committee:

> The temporary political situation—which may even last a long time—is nevertheless a much more profound social economic reality, for even if the proletarian rev. triumphs in the West, *we shall have to base ourselves in large measure, in the construction of socialism, upon the middle peasant and to draw him into the socialist economy.*[25]

Later, referring to the actions of the Eighth Congress, he wrote that "the orientation upon the middle peasants in its first form ('show solicitude toward the peasants,' 'do not give them orders,' etc.), proved inadequate."[26] Then, he wrote that "there was a growing feeling *of the necessity of changing the economic policy.*"[27] He stated that as a result of his observations on the state of mind of the army, an economic inspection trip in the Urals, and an analysis of the condition of the peasant economy he wrote to the Central Committee in February 1920.[28] The basic part of this document is as follows:

[25] Trotsky, *The New Course*, p. 62.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid. p. 63.
[28] Trotsky, *The Real Situation in Russia*, p. 252.

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> . . . Our whole policy is directed against the peasants possessing a large area of land and a large number of horses (kulaks). On the other hand, our food policy is based upon the requisitioning of the surpluses of agricultural production (above consumer norms). This prompts the peasant not to cultivate his land except for his family needs. In particular, the decree on the requisitioning of every third cow (regarded as superfluous) leads in reality to the clandestine slaughter of cows, the secret sale of the meat at high prices and the disorganization of the dairy-products industry. At the same time, the semi-proletarian and even proletarian elements of the towns are settling in the villages, where they are starting their own farms. Industry is losing its hands, and in agriculture the number of self-sufficient farms tends to increase constantly. By that very fact, the basis of our food policy, established on the requisitioning of surpluses, is undermined. If in the current year the requisitioning yields a greater quantity of products, it must be attributed to the extension of Soviet territory and to a certain improvement in the provisioning apparatus. But in general, the food resources of the country are threatened with exhaustion and no improvement in the requisitioning apparatus will be able to remedy this fact.[29]

The detailed knowledge and insight displayed in the communication make it obvious that Trotsky was interested in peasant affairs, was a keen observer of them, and was one who appreciated their full significance. He also was capable of providing solutions to the problems found there. In this case he suggested the following:

1. Replace the requisitioning of surpluses with a levy proportionate to the quantity of production (a sort of progressive tax on agricultural income), set up in such a way that it is nevertheless more profitable to increase the acreage sown or to cultivate it better;
2. Institute a more rigorous correlation between the delivery to the peasants of industrial products and the quantity of grain furnished by them, not only by cantons and towns, but also by rural farms. Have the local industrial enterprises participate in this task. Pay the peasants for the raw materials, the fuel and the food products supplied by them, in part in products of industrial enterprises.[30]

The importance of Trotsky's proposal lies primarily in the fact that there was recognition of the need to do something in regard to agricultural *production.* The policies so far had been oriented completely towards the *procurement* and *distribution* of food, fuel, and raw materials. Production was left to take care of itself insofar as government policies were concerned. For short periods this would work satisfactorily. For longer ones, however, it was rapidly becoming obvious that it would not. As Trotsky pointed out, the food resources

[29] Trotsky, *The New Course*, p. 69.
[30] Ibid. p. 70.

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of the country were threatened with exhaustion, and this circumstance could not be remedied by improving the requisitioning apparatus.

TROTSKY's proposals were strikingly similar to what would be contained in the first provisions of the NEP. Most significant of all, he favoured a tax rather than requisitioning. By implication his plan would operate in a money economy since only a part of the peasants' surpluses was to be paid for by direct exchange for industrial products. An improvement would be made over existing procedures by giving more individual consideration both in the amount of products taken and the amount supplied. A built-in stimulus for increased production was provided in both instances. Along with provision for individualized rewards, his recommendations struck a blow at the prevailing practice of joint responsibility for delivery of products.

Linked with Trotsky's agricultural proposal was another one dealing with a new organization of industry. It was more circumspect, but nonetheless was directed " against the regime of the ' Centres ' which was destroying all contact between industry and agriculture." [31]

Despite the large element of rationality in Trotsky's proposals, they were rejected by the Central Committee. Later, Lenin acknowledged the mistake in his typically candid fashion. " We committed the error," he wrote, " of deciding to carry out a direct transition to communist production and distribution." [32] The majority of Party leaders had become exhilarated with the War Communism policies. So, the year 1920 represented a continuation, and even intensification, of those policies.

BEFORE the year was out it could be seen that this had been a mistake. Therefore, by March of the succeeding year, Lenin had led the way to the acceptance of the first acts of the NEP. It was mainly his creation at that time, for after the rejection of his proposals Trotsky endeavoured to bring about economic recovery by working within the system of War Communism.

Trotsky reasoned that if War Communism were to be maintained the only way out of the growing economic crisis was to apply " shock methods " to all aspects of economic life. One instrument for accomplishing this was the so-called " labour armies." Being simply components of the Red Army which were not demobilized when they were no longer needed at the fronts, they were reorganized to fit them for new purposes. They were used for repairing railways and railroad cars, clearing snow from the railways, felling and moving timber, cutting peat, transporting fuel, cultivating fields, collecting grain, etc.[33]

[31] Ibid. p. 63.
[32] Shachtman, *The Struggle for the New Course*, p. 135.
[33] Good comments on the foregoing and related material may be found in Shachtman, *The Struggle for the New Course*, pp. 135–6; Lancelot Lawton, *An Economic*

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Not only were army units used for labour purposes; there was also a concerted effort to militarize the civilian labour force. Trotsky was the leader of this endeavour too. When he became Commissar of Ways and Communications in March, he immediately proceeded to administer the railroads in semi-military fashion. Soon he was advocating the militarization of labour more ardently than ever. He proposed that compulsory labour be made continuous and all-embracing—that the whole adult population be registered and mobilized. To accomplish this purpose he suggested that the trade unions should be militarized.[34] This added a great deal of fuel to the long-standing controversy over the relationship of the trade unions to the socialist state, and the Party was nearly rent asunder over the issue until it was finally "solved" by the majority at the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921. The importance of all this to the topic under discussion is that the whole undesirable affair was linked to the rejection of Trotsky's new economic proposals in February 1920.

If these proposals had been adopted at that time, Trotsky would undoubtedly be pictured in Western historiography as quite an agrarian expert. As it is, amost all the emphasis in this period has been placed on his activities relating to militarized labour, the trade unions, and the general use of force and shock methods in dealing with the problems of War Communism.

IT is thus doubly interesting to note that when Lenin, who has received almost all the credit for the ideas and implementation of the NEP, formulated and proposed to Party leaders the first, very guarded theses on the change, Trotsky subscribed to them at once. For him, he said, they were "a renewal of the proposals which I had introduced a year before."[35] It is therefore not as though Trotsky's perceptiveness regarding economic and political affairs in general, and those affecting the peasantry in particular, had lapsed. Rather, he simply was forced to wait until his plan was politically feasible. That occurred only when Lenin had come to accept basically the same type of change.

Furthermore, it is obvious that Trotsky did not neglect the peasantry in his larger concepts regarding the continuing ways and means of achieving socialism. He assigned them a subsidiary role, perhaps, but he did not neglect or overlook them. The significant point in this respect, for appraising his role in Bolshevik-peasant affairs more accurately, is that all other leading Bolsheviks—Lenin included—also placed the rural inhabitants in a secondary position to

History of Soviet Russia, I (Macmillan, London, n.d.), p. 166; Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography* (Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 219; Boris Souvarine, *Stalin: A Critical Survey of Bolshevism* (Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1939), p. 275.

[34] Lawton, pp. 166–7.

[35] L. Trotskii, *Moya Zhizn: Opyt Avtobiografii*, II (Iz-vo "Granit," Berlin, 1930), pp. 201–2.

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the industrial labourers. In convincing Party members that they had nothing to fear from the implementation of the NEP, Lenin assured them that " political power will remain in the hands of the working class and of the workers' state." [36] The Bolsheviks thought of themselves as the " vanguard of the proletariat " and believed that socialism would be achieved by the " dictatorship of the proletariat." It was the proletariat or industrial workers that came first in the scheme of things—not only with Trotsky, but all other leading Bolsheviks as well. Thus, to each of them, the entire peasant question was always a derivative question. At all times and in all aspects it was considered within the context of how the proletarian or communist cause could best be advanced. The interests and welfare of the peasants were never thought of as being ends in themselves. Thus, communist ideology allowed Trotsky, Lenin and the others to be opportunistic in relations with the peasants, while at the same time giving due consideration to their great importance. The NEP with its concessions was opportunistic, and was intended to serve as a transition stage in reaching a socialist economy. As Trotsky wrote, " the proletariat cannot create a new society without bringing the peasant to socialism through a series of transitional stages." [37] He might look with disapproval, and condescension even, at some of the peasants' characteristics, but he never failed to take fully into account their importance to the Bolshevik cause.

Leon Trotsky was important to his party in a number of ways during these first turbulent years in power. Among other activities he led the armed uprising which brought them to power, their diplomacy until they made arrangements to end their part in the World War, their military efforts until they achieved success in the Civil War, and their attempts to intensify War Communism until a majority realized its futility and adopted a major change of course quite alike in its essence to what he had proposed a year earlier. These are his endeavours which are best known and for which he has received the most credit (or discredit) in this period. This seems quite natural, for these matters are eye-catching and of very obvious importance. Looking below the surface of things a little more, though, does it not also seem proper to accord him an important place in Bolshevik-peasant affairs?

[36] V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, IX (International Publishers, New York, 1943), p. 162.

[37] Trotsky, *This History of the Russian Revolution*, III, p. 401.

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The Cheka and a Crisis of Communist Conscience

George Leggett

FOR all its intensity, the eruption of the Red Terror in September 1918 marked no radical break with the pattern of the past. The thread of terror had run through Russian history for centuries. Its deliberate exercise by central authority could claim a precedent in the reign of fear imposed by that primitive prototype of the Soviet political police, Ivan the Terrible's Oprichnina. Terror had raged in the insurrections of Stenka Razin and Emelyan Pugachev, put down in turn with memorable brutality. The political oppression of tsarist autocracy in the nineteenth century had provoked a series of assassinations mounted by revolutionary terrorists; remarkably few executions resulted, but the explosion of violence released by the revolution of 1905, involving several thousand assassinations of government officials, had been savagely repressed. A minor degree of spontaneous terror followed in the wake of the February and October revolutions, but organized, systematic, physical terror—as opposed to general political repression—did not begin to manifest itself under Lenin's regime until after mid-1918; its start can be dated from the suppression, in early July, of the abortive uprising staged by the Left Socialist Revolutionaries (Left SRs), whose co-operation in coalition government until mid-March and continued presence thereafter in the Soviets and in the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Speculation and Sabotage (known as the Vecheka or Cheka), had hitherto restrained Bolshevik violence. Paradoxically, whilst the Left SRs opposed capital punishment under the law (reintroduced by decree on 16 June 1918) [1] and the summary execution of political opponents, they voted in the Vecheka for the summary execution of criminals, and approved of political assassination; their attitude on terror was ambivalent.

At this juncture Lenin, who had long been preaching the necessity of terror, began to practise it in earnest. Steps along the way had been his incitements to mob rule in December 1917,[2] his "Socialist Fatherland in Danger" decree of 21 February 1918,[3] authorizing the application of summary justice, and, in late June, his eloquent letter to Zinoviev, Chairman of the Communist Party's Petrograd Committee, pres-

[1] *Sobranie Uzakonenii i Rasporyazhenii Rabochego i Krestyanskogo Pravitelstva* (hereafter *SUR*) 1918, No. 44: 533, *Izvestiya*, 16 June 1918.

[2] Bertram Wolfe, *The Bridge and the Abyss: The Troubled Friendship of Maxim Gorky and V. I. Lenin* (New York, Washington, London, 1967), pp. 80–1.

[3] *Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti*, Vol. 1, pp. 490–1, *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, 22 Feb. 1918.

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sing for the use of mass terror to avenge the murder of Commissar Volodarsky.[4] The Communist Party unquestioningly accepted Lenin's fundamental doctrine of employing terror against the bourgeoisie as an essential means for securing the dictatorship of the proletariat. Nor did the Party oppose Lenin's policy of forcibly requisitioning "surplus" grain from the peasants and of bloodily crushing their desperate resistance in the hungry summer of 1918.

The Red Terror

The Draconian measures taken in reprisal for the attempt on Lenin's life and Uritsky's assassination on 30 August 1918, stemmed from Party and government decisions, arrived at in the wounded Lenin's absence. By the evening of 30 August the Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets (VTsIK) had issued a proclamation to all Soviets, blaming the assassination bids on the Right Socialist Revolutionaries and declaring that the working class would respond to such acts by merciless mass terror.[5] On 4 September, *Izvestiya* carried an instruction from G. I. Petrovsky, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, directing the Soviets to arrest all Right SRs, to take large numbers of hostages from among the bourgeoisie, and to apply mass executions "upon the least attempt at resistance, or the least stir among the White Guards. . . . Not the slightest wavering, not the least indecision in the application of mass terror." And on 5 September, the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) passed the Decree on the Red Terror,[6] signed by the Commissars for Justice and Internal Affairs: having heard a report from the Vecheka Chairman (Feliks Dzerzhinsky), the Sovnarkom found it absolutely essential "to safeguard the rear by means of terror . . . to increase the activity of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission and to instill into it a more systematic approach [by reinforcing it] with as many responsible Party comrades as possible . . . [and] to protect the Soviet Republic against its class enemies by isolating these in concentration camps." All persons involved in White Guard organizations, plots and insurrections were to be shot.

This decree publicly legitimized the Vecheka's recourse to summary justice. The Chekas now went to work with a vengeance, indulging in a holocaust of executions throughout Soviet territory, running into many thousands of victims. Indeed, the Petrograd Cheka jumped the official gun, anticipating the Red Terror decree by a mass killing of over 500 hostages, reported in *Izvestiya* on 3 September. This instant carnage resulted from panic reaction by Zinoviev, Petrograd's Party and Soviet boss, who in the opinion of many communists had lost his head following the murders of his close Petrograd colleagues Volodar-

[4] Lenin (5th edition), Vol. 50, p. 106 (letter dated 26 June 1918).
[5] *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, 31 Aug. 1918.
[6] *SUR* 1918, No. 65: 710, 5 Sept. 1918, *Izvestiya*, 10 Sept. 1918.

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sky and Uritsky (Commissar for Internal Affairs in the Northern Workers' Commune and Petrograd Cheka Chairman), and the attack on Lenin;[7] the Old Bolshevik, Elena Stasova, secretary of the Petrograd Bureau of the Communist Party's Central Committee, and herself a full Central Committee member, claimed to have averted an even worse bloodbath by opposing Zinoviev's proposal, made on 30 August, that the workers should be encouraged to indulge in lynch law against the intelligentsia. Stasova was thereupon appointed to the Petrograd Cheka's Presidium,[8] whose Chairman in September was Varvara Yakovleva, an ex-Central Committee candidate-member; these two formidable women presided over the Red Terror in Petrograd, notorious for its severity.

In implementing the terror, the Chekas acted as executants of Party policy. However the Party as an entity preferred to remain in the background at this time, leaving it to the Council of People's Commissars and to the Central Executive Committee to make the principal public pronouncements and decisions on the terror. Individual members of the Party's Central Committee of course expressed themselves forcefully on the subject; *Izvestiya* of 3 September published Stalin's telegram calling for "open, mass, systematic terror against the bourgeoisie and its agents"; Zinoviev, addressing a Cheka conference in Petrograd in late October, said of the Red Terror: "It is a radical remedy which we have applied correctly, but that is not the end of it; in this matter we are entering upon the most critical phase. There cannot be any relaxation of 'pressure'."[9] Lenin himself, within ten days of being wounded, signalled to Trotsky: "Thank you, convalescence is going splendidly. I am confident that the suppression of the Kazan Czechs and White Guards, and likewise of the blood-sucking kulaks who support them, will be a model of mercilessness."[10]

Criticism of the Chekas

Despite official encouragement and endorsement of the terror, the wholesale, indiscriminate manner of its application by the Chekas provoked considerable communist protest; criticism was also levelled at the Chekas by government departments with vested interests to defend. The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), for its part, deeply resented the local Chekas' independence of the territorial Soviets, by which they had been created in the first place, and to which they stood formally attached. Like all other local government agencies, the Provincial and District Chekas were incorporated in the

[7] Arthur Ransome, *Six Weeks in Russia in 1919* (London, 1919), p. 12. Ransome, a newspaper correspondent (later a celebrated author of children's books), had an entrée to Lenin and his entourage. He married Trotsky's secretary, Evgeniya Shelepina.

[8] E. D. Stasova, *Stranitsy zhizni i borby* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 100–3.

[9] *Ezhenedelnik VChK*, No. 6, 27 Oct. 1918, p. 21.

[10] Lenin (5), Vol. 50, p. 178, item 321, dated 7 Sept. 1918.

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Executive Committees of their respective Soviets, but whereas all other such agencies constituted separate departments of the Executive Committees, the Chekas along with the Militia were relegated to the status of sub-departments of the Executive Committees' Departments of Administration, which represented the NKVD itself—the organ responsible for administration of local government.[11] From the start, however, the Vecheka had been determined to impose its own absolute control upon local Chekas, without interference from any other government department; at the First Conference of Chekas, convened in June 1918, the Vecheka, whilst accepting that local Chekas should be formed, and their chairmen appointed, by the appropriate Soviets—to which the Chekas should report on their activities—nevertheless stipulated that all Chekas should be strictly and exclusively subordinated to the next superior Cheka in a hierarchical chain of command ascending to the summit of the Vecheka.[12] Dzerzhinsky's instruction of 29 August to local Chekas, copied to Soviets, emphasized the principle

> that the Chekas are indisputably autonomous as regards their work, and must carry out implicitly all instructions issuing from the Vecheka, as being the highest organ to which they are subordinate. The Chekas merely render an account to the Soviets but neither the Soviets nor any of their departments may under any circumstances countermand or suspend the Vecheka's instructions.[13]

The Vecheka had been established, on 7 (20) December 1917, by an unpublished decision of the Sovnarkom, to which it was formally attached, though no evidence is available of any Sovnarkom machinery for its direction, or of systematic Sovnarkom control over it. By virtue of this direct attachment to the cabinet of Soviet government, over which Lenin presided as Chairman, the Vecheka enjoyed exceptional standing and independence vis-à-vis other departments of state. Admittedly, a Sovnarkom resolution of 21 December 1917 had prescribed that the Vecheka should be supervised by the People's Commissariats of Internal Affairs and of Justice (NKIu),[14] but this provision was ignored in practice. Although an authoritative Vecheka announcement, published in *Izvestiya* on 3 October 1918, paid lip service to NKVD and NKIu supervision over the Vecheka, it went on to assert that the Vecheka was "entirely independent in its activities, carrying out searches, arrests and executions, and reporting subsequently to the Sovnarkom and to VTsIK"; locally "the departments of Justice and Internal Affairs exercise supervision over the Chekas but do not interfere in their activities."[15]

[11] *Vestnik Narodnogo Komissariata vnutrennikh del*, No. 20, 25 Aug. 1918, pp. 9–12.
[12] *Iz istorii Vserossiiskoi Chrezvychainoi komissii 1917–1921 gg. Sbornik dokumentov*, G. A. Belov *et al.* eds. (Moscow, 1958), pp. 137–8—hereafter cited as Belov.
[13] *Ezhenedelnik VChK*, No. 1, 22 Sept. 1918, p. 10.
[14] *Leninskii Sbornik*, Vol. 21, pp. 113–14.
[15] *Izvestiya*, 3 Oct. 1918.

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The Vecheka's encroachment upon the territory of the NKVD led to considerable friction between local Chekas and Soviets, a feud referred to in Dzerzhinsky's instruction of 29 August. The controversy intensified after the introduction of the Red Terror. Prominent NKVD officials such as S. I. Dukhovsky, V. A. Tikhomirnov, and People's Commissar Petrovsky himself, writing in October in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*,[16] crossed swords with Yakov Peters, Deputy Chairman of the Vecheka, criticizing the Chekas for usurping the powers of the Soviets, the constitutionally elected organs of local government, thereby disrupting the apparatus of administration; Petrovsky proposed a double subordination of the Chekas: to their parent body, the Vecheka, and to Soviet executive committees, following the normal procedure adopted by all Commissariats.

So much for this particular inter-departmental dispute. Another issue was raised by the Vecheka's wholesale imprisonment of members of the bourgeoisie as hostages, including many professional "specialists" who were indispensable to the efficient functioning of the economy and the administration of government. On this battleground the Vecheka was faced by irate People's Commissariats demanding the release of key personnel, against most of whom no specific charge had been brought. A third, again basically inter-departmental conflict developed between the Vecheka and the Commissariat for Justice, guardian of Soviet law; the NKIu strongly disputed the Vecheka's right to dispense summary justice and so bypass the Revolutionary Tribunals. The battle in defence of NKIu interests and of the principle of legality against Vecheka encroachments had been joined already in December 1917 by the Left Socialist Revolutionary Commissar for Justice, I. Z. Steinberg, and was fought stubbornly by him until Left SR withdrawal from coalition government in mid-March 1918. We shall revert presently to this Vecheka-NKIu dispute.

Whereas these several contests revolved largely round issues of departmental interest or constitutional principle, another confrontation was enacted on an ethical plane: a number of idealistic communists, moved to moral indignation by the cruel and arbitrary character of the Red Terror and by the spectacle of its wanton application by Chekists, quite a few of whom turned out to be convicted criminals or rogues (as the Vecheka freely admitted),[17] indicted the Chekas of crimes against common humanity. Prominent among these critics was the Old Boshevik, M. S. Olminsky,[18] a veteran journalist now on the editorial staff of *Pravda*, with a reputation for

[16] *Pravda*, 18 Oct., *Izvestiya*, 20 Oct., 22 Oct. 1918.

[17] e.g. Peters in *Izvestiya*, 17 Oct., 29 Oct. 1918; Vecheka resolution in *Izvestiya*, 28 Nov. 1918; Kosyrev case reported in *Pravda*, 14–18 Feb. 1919.

[18] Mikhail Stepanovich Olminsky (Aleksandrov), 1863–1933, Bolshevik since 1904; 1920–4, headed department of Party history attached to Central Committee.

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rectitude and Party loyalty;[19] he took the Chekas sternly to task in the columns of *Pravda*.[20] Another was the ex-Menshevik, D. B. Ryazanov,[21] who during the Red Terror frequently interceded on behalf of imprisoned opposition socialists, and protested at Party meetings against Cheka executions.[22] As Peters granted, a ground swell of criticism of the Vecheka manifested itself at Party meetings and in the official communist press.[23] The fact that such bitter hostility to, and even persecution of, the Vecheka stemmed from within the Party, complained the leading Chekist Moroz, rendered this the most testing time in the Vecheka's history[24]—a time when, as the celebrated Chekist, Martyn Latsis, conceded, "the majority of Party members had ill-conceived notions about the Vecheka, and some of them even campaigned against us."[25] In some cases Cheka excesses provoked disciplinary action: in Nizhnii Novgorod the Chairman of the Provincial Cheka, Yakov Vorobev, and his assistants—including N. A. Bulganin, future Soviet Marshal and Politburo member—were forced to resign in January 1919, though they were soon reinstated by order of the Party's Central Committee.[26]

Party and State Intervention

The Party and government eventually resolved to tackle the Vecheka problem. Their first expedient was to devise a suitable statute for the organization; one of the principal criticisms levelled at the Vecheka was the absence of any legislation defining its status, functions and powers. On 2 October 1918, by Central Committee decision, Dzerzhinsky was commissioned to draft a statute for the Vecheka;[27] however the statute was drafted in his absence, since he left Moscow incognito on 4 October for Switzerland where, utterly exhausted, he spent the rest of the month visiting his wife and child.[28] Meanwhile, on 25 October, the Central Committee approved the draft statute, referring it to VTsIK whose Presidium the same day appointed a commission, chaired by Sverdlov (Chairman of VTsIK) and consisting of representatives of the NKIu, NKVD, Vecheka and Moscow Soviet, charging

[19] E. D. Stasova, *Vospominaniya* (Moscow, 1969), pp. 224, 270–1.
[20] *Pravda*, 8 Oct., 25 Dec. 1918.
[21] David Borisovich Ryazanov (Goldendakh), 1870–1938, directed the Marx-Engels Institute, exiled in 1931, perished in purges.
[22] Rafail Abramovich, *In tsvei Revoliutsies*, Vol. 2 (New York, 1944), pp. 246–7; B. Nikolaevsky, "Iz istorii mashiny sovetskogo terrora" in *Sotsialisticheskii vestnik*, No. 8–9 (732–733), Aug.–Sept. 1959, p. 171.
[23] Peters, "Vospominaniya o rabote v VChK v pervyi god revolyutsii" in *Proletarskaya revolyutsiya*, No. 10 (33), 1924, p. 32.
[24] G. Moroz, "V.Ch.K. i Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya" in *Vlast Sovetov*, No. 11, Oct. 1919, p. 6.
[25] M. Ya. Latsis, *Chrezvychainye komissii po borbe s kontrrevolyutsiei* (Moscow, 1921), p. 5.
[26] Boris I. Nicolaevsky, *Power and the Soviet Elite* (New York, Washington, London, 1965), p. 232, footnote.
[27] Belov, p. 480.
[28] S. Dzerzhinskaya, *V gody velikikh boev* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 267–71.

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it to work out a statute "with the object of regularizing the activity of the central and local Extraordinary Commissions and their relations with other Soviet institutions." [29] On 28 October, VTsIK enacted the statute.[30] Under this charter the Vecheka was declared to be the central organ co-ordinating the activities of local Chekas; it was an agency of the Sovnarkom, and co-operated closely with the NKVD and NKIu, whose representatives were now to sit on the Vecheka Collegium, whilst the Vecheka Chairman sat on that of the NKVD. However the statute did nothing to resolve the relationship of Chekas to Soviets; drafted as it was by the Vecheka, and endorsed by the Central Committee, the statute largely maintained the status quo in favour of the Extraordinary Commission, which, although theoretically supervised by the NKVD and NKIu, in practice suffered no such constraint. Nor did the statute attempt to define the authorized powers and sanctions of the Vecheka, or the limitations set thereon. As Krylenko, Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal, scathingly commented: "Call that a law!" [31] Indeed, in Krylenko's opinion, "up to November 1918 it [the Vecheka] existed without any statutes or laws . . . nor was any other law passed concerning the Vecheka throughout its existence." [32]

Simultaneously, however, the Central Committee, conscious of the widespread criticism attracted by the Vecheka, took steps to subject the latter to some form of political supervision; on 25 October it created a commission, consisting of Kamenev (ex-Central Committee member and probably by now Chairman of the Moscow Soviet), Stalin (Central Committee member and People's Commissar for Nationalities) and Kursky (People's Commissar for Justice), instructing it to inquire into the activities of the Chekas without impairing their effectiveness in combating counter-revolution.[33] The same day the VTsIK Presidium went through the ritual of publicly appointing the Kamenev-Stalin-Kursky commission as its own emanation, "so as to enable the VTsIK Presidium to acquaint itself in detail with the activity of the Vecheka and of the latter's departments." [34] Nothing further has been revealed about this select VTsIK commission. However, we learn from a brief entry in an appendix to the collection of documents on the Vecheka, published in 1958, that on 2 November a Supervision and Inspection Commission was formed and attached to the Vecheka, consisting of representatives of VTsIK, the Central Committee of the Party, the Moscow Region Party Committee, the NKVD

[29] *Dekrety Svoetskoi Vlasti*, Vol. 3, pp. 450–1.

[30] *SUR* 1918, No. 80: 842, *Izvestiya*, 2 Nov. 1918.

[31] N. V. Krylenko, *Sudoustroistvo RSFSR: Lektsii po teorii i istorii sudoustroistva* (Moscow, 1924), p. 100.

[32] Ibid. pp. 97, 100.

[33] *V. I. Lenin i VChK: Sbornik dokumentov (1917–1922 gg.)*, S. K. Tsvigun *et al.* (eds.) (Moscow, 1975), p. 112.

[34] *Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti*, Vol. 3, pp. 450–1; *Izvestiya*, 26 Oct. 1918.

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and NKIu;[35] it seems likely that the Kamenev-Stalin-Kursky commission had swiftly developed into this Party-State Supervision and Inspection Commission. It would appear that the latter did not survive long, for soon afterwards Krylenko stated in *Izvestiya* that a commission appointed by the Party to go into the question of reforming the Vecheka had disagreed so violently that it had simply ceased to function.[36] Its rapid demise is also indicated by the appointment, just one month later, of an even more imposing—if seemingly equally short-lived—commission for supervision of the Vecheka, created this time by the Defence Council.

The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence was established by VTsIK resolution of 30 November 1918 for the purpose of co-ordinating the Russian Soviet Republic's overall war effort in the Civil War;[37] its designated members included Lenin, Trotsky, Nevsky and Stalin. It is indicative of the sense of urgency surrounding the Cheka issue that, at its very first meeting on 1 December, the Defence Council appointed a commission, consisting of Lenin, Nevsky (People's Commissar for Communications) and Stalin, to review the organization and activities of the Vecheka. This high level commission met already on 3 December, under Lenin's chairmanship; decisions were taken limiting top posts in local Chekas to Party members of not less than two years' standing, providing for the freeing of Cheka prisoners vouched for by Party, state or trade union officials, for advance Cheka notification (where possible) to employers regarding arrest of engineers and technicians, and for the internal Supervision and Inspection Department of the Vecheka to be expanded.[38] There is no record available of further meetings of this Defence Council watchdog commission on the Vecheka; it is reasonable to suppose that, having dealt with some immediate practical difficulties and abuses arising out of the Cheka system, but accepting the continuing need for ruthless suppression of all opposition to the regime by an efficient and unfettered political police, the Defence Council turned its attention to other pressing matters.

MEANWHILE, at a meeting held on 14 November, an accommodation of sorts had been reached between the Vecheka and NKVD; in a spirit of conciliation, Dzerzhinsky agreed to NKVD representatives sitting on a number of important Vecheka bodies, including its Territorial Liaison Department which co-ordinated the work of local Chekas.[39] However, the critical problem of the relationship of local Chekas to Soviets remained unresolved.

All this time there persisted a parallel conflict with the People's

[35] Belov, p. 480.
[36] *Izvestiya*, 4 Feb. 1919.
[37] *SUR* 1918, No. 91–2: 924.
[38] *Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti*, Vol. 4, pp. 569–71.
[39] Belov, pp. 214–16.

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Commissariat for Justice and its Revolutionary Tribunals. Already in early July, the Second All-Russian Congress of Regional and Provincial Commissars of Justice, held in Moscow, criticized the Chekas for appropriating the functions of the Justice Commissariat, whose system of Revolutionary Tribunals they seemed bent on duplicating. The Justice Commissar for Saratov Province remarked that unless the Chekas turned over most of their cases to the Revolutionary Tribunals, there would arise "a sort of state within the state which will increasingly extend its powers." Other delegates objected to the Chekas imprisoning people indefinitely and arbitrarily resorting to executions without trial. Only the Justice Commissar for the Northern Commune, none other than N. N. Krestinsky—already in the Central Committee and soon to be a founder-member of the Politburo—argued that at a time when the Chekas were waging war against counter-revolution, "the work of justice must take second place, its sphere of activity undoubtedly being restricted."[40] The NKIu's conflict with the Vecheka came to a head in December, when the NKIu representative sitting on the Vecheka Collegium, M. Yu. Kozlovsky, accused the Vecheka of being responsible for unjustifiable repression. Dzerzhinsky's consequent complaint against Kozlovsky was heard on 19 December by the Central Committee, which directed that Kozlovsky be replaced on the Vecheka Collegium by another representative.[41] However, according to Krylenko, no NKIu representative ever reentered the Vecheka Collegium, and the two departments remained in a state of "open warfare and ruptured diplomatic relations."[42]

Yet another government initiative to bring the Chekas under control was apparently essayed in late December, in view of mounting public and inter-departmental criticism. A propagandistic comment on this development figures in an editorial footnote of the 1958 collection of documents on the Vecheka:

> The enemies of Soviet power, sustaining defeat after defeat, howled in bitter spite about the "atrocities" of the Cheka. Particularly zealous in this were the Mensheviks and SRs, supported by Trotskyists and Bukharinites. In December 1918 a campaign of lies and calumny was mounted against the Vecheka. Its enemies demanded its liquidation. The Party, the Soviet Government, and V. I. Lenin personally, thoroughly investigated all indications of deficiencies in the work of the Vecheka. Apart from the commission attached to the Council of Defence, this problem was looked into by the VTsIK Presidium which, at its meeting on 26 December 1918, appointed a special inspection commission for scrutiny of the activities of the Vecheka. The

[40] *Materialy Narodnogo Kommissariata Yustitsii, Vypusk 3, Vtoroi Vserossiiskii sezd oblastnykh i gubernskikh komissarov yustitsii: Zhurnal plenarnykh zasedanii . . . 2–6 iyulya 1918*, Moscow, pp. 13–17.

[41] A. F. Khatskevich, *Soldat velikikh boev: Zhizn i deyatelnost F. E. Dzerzhinskogo* (second edition) (Minsk, 1965), pp. 252–3.

[42] N. V. Krylenko, *Sudoustroistvo RSFSR* (Moscow, 1924), pp. 100–1.

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> Vecheka's work was scrupulously examined, and was acknowledged to be correct.[43]

This is the only information afforded concerning the inspection commission appointed at this stage by the VTsIK Presidium; we know nothing about its composition, its precise terms of reference, its findings. That it did *not* acknowledge the Vecheka's work to be correct can be deduced from subsequent Party and state action taken to clip the Vecheka's wings, as also, perhaps, from another tantalizingly laconic and more recent Soviet revelation: it appears that on 8 January 1919, Kamenev put to Lenin a draft resolution proposing the immediate abolition of the Vecheka and all its organs, and the transfer of its functions to the Revolutionary Tribunals, which should be supervised centrally by a special department attached to VTsIK.[44] It is logical to assume that the VTsIK Presidium was responsible for this proposal, which presumably resulted from the conclusions of the VTsIK Presidium's commission of inquiry on the Vecheka. The fact that the resolution was presented by Kamenev lends substance to this assumption, for Kamenev had figured prominently in the proceedings of the Sixth Congress of Soviets, held in early November, and was in all probability now (as he certainly was by January 1920,[45] after the Seventh Congress of Soviets) a member of the VTsIK Presidium. Other evidence, derived from Bukharin's confidences to Boris Nicolaevsky during his visit to Paris in 1936, indicates that " an influential group in the Sovnarkom " mounted pressure during this period for the abolition of the Vecheka and the transfer of its functions to a reorganized Commissariat for Justice.[46] Whether this was a separate, parallel Sovnarkom initiative (in which case it would be most interesting to know who were its Sovnarkom sponsors), or whether this is a case of confusion of Sovnarkom with VTsIK, must remain an open question for the present. At all events the accumulating pressure proved effective, for it achieved the abolition, if not of the Vecheka, at least of its huge second-tier territorial network of District Chekas (which, according to the historian W. H. Chamberlin, had committed some of the worst atrocities of the Red Terror),[47] by VTsIK Presidium decree of 20 January 1919.[48]

This was a notable victory for the Vecheka's opponents, and especially for the NKVD and its administrative apparatus of Soviets. However this organizational retrenchment was not absolute: not only did the Provincial Chekas remain in being, but a number of District

[43] Belov, p. 232, footnote.
[44] *V. I. Lenin i VChK*, op. cit. p. 145.
[45] *Spravochnik tsentralnykh i mestnykh uchrezhdenii RSFSR, partiinykh organizatsii i professionalnykh soyuzov* (Moscow, 22 Jan. 1920), p. 1.
[46] B. Nikolaevsky, " Pervaya popytka istorii mashiny sovetskogo terrora " in *Sotsialisticheskii vestnik*, No. 2–3 (714–715), Feb.–Mar. 1958, p. 55.
[47] W. H. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution 1917–1921* (London, 1935), Vol. 2, p. 73.
[48] *S.U.R.* 1919, No. 1: 14, *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, 24 Jan. 1919.

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Chekas continued to function "on the decision of local Party organs." Soon enough, in any event, the District Chekas were replaced by political bureaux attached to the Militia, these bureaux being required to fulfil tasks set by the Provincial Chekas and to report on political conditions in each district.[49]

This sop to the NKVD did not pacify the NKIu, which continued to apply pressure to the Vecheka. On 23 January, at a meeting of the Moscow branch of the Communist Party, Krylenko and Dyakonov, Chairman of the Moscow Revolutionary Tribunal, strongly criticized the Chekas for the general distrust they inspired, the ill repute they brought by their many misdeeds upon Party and government, and for their non-accountability; the Tribunalists proposed that the Chekas should be deprived of their power to pass sentence by administrative process, and should be transformed into investigative departments of the Revolutionary Tribunals.[50] On 30 January, Dzerzhinsky clashed with Krylenko at another Moscow Party branch meeting, arguing that so long as the Civil War continued, the Chekas remained indispensable, and their special powers a necessity.[51]

The Party Underwrites the Vecheka

At this point the Vecheka, wilting under the persistent barrage of censure, appealed to the Communist Party for support; on 28 January, *Izvestiya* published a letter from the Party fraction in the Vecheka, admitting that the Chekas had indeed committed mistakes, but asserting that in implementing the Red Terror they had acted on Communist Party directives, and hardly deserved the abuse aimed by a certain stratum of the Party at loyal, hard-working, unflinching Chekists.[52] There followed a prolonged discussion of the Vecheka issue within the Central Committee, evidently spanning three days (3–5 February).[53] We can only speculate upon the course of the debate. Attacking the Vecheka were almost certainly such critics as Bukharin, editor of *Pravda*—in whose columns the Chekas had suffered many strictures—and Petrovsky, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs; ranged against them would have been, first and foremost, the Vecheka's patrons, Lenin and Dzerzhinsky, and such hard-liners on terror as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Stalin, Elena Stasova, and maybe Krestinsky—assuming that they were all available in Moscow to attend the meetings. How the remaining ten or so Central Committee members divided on the issue is less easy to conjecture, but the Vecheka's critics may have predominated. As it subsequently transpired, the outcome

[49] P. G. Sofinov, *Ocherki istorii vserossiiskoi chrezvychainoi komissii (1917–1922 gg.)* (Moscow, 1960), p. 138.
[50] *Izvestiya*, 25 Jan. 1919.
[51] *Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky: Biografiya*, S. K. Tsvigun *et al.* (Moscow, 1977), p. 170.
[52] *Izvestiya*, 28 Jan. 1919.
[53] Belov, p. 232, footnote; Lenin (5), Vol. 37, p. 729.

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of the debate was a compromise: the Vecheka was to stay, with diminished powers but with its existing apparatus and personnel intact; it remained formally attached to the Sovnarkom, but now received public affirmation of the Central Committee's support and control. There was no further question of NKVD and NKIu supervision.

On 8 February there appeared in *Izvestiya* a highly significant letter signed by the Central Committee and addressed to the Communist workers of the Extraordinary Commissions. The letter declared that, since the task of combating counter-revolution could not be accomplished by Soviet judicial institutions, that task had been entrusted by the Party to "a special organ of merciless summary justice," the Vecheka, which was equipped with extraordinary plenary powers and stood in direct contact with the Party centre. Despite deficiencies and mistakes, the Vecheka had carried out this task successfully, "fulfilling the will of the Party and proletariat when they tirelessly hunted down the enemies of the working class." Whilst the recent widespread discussion of the Chekas in Party circles, at Party meetings and in the Party press was legitimate, much of the criticism had been out of place; such critics should remember "that the Chekas were founded, exist and work solely as the direct organs of the Party, under its direction and supervision." Nevertheless the Central Committee served notice in its letter that it proposed to introduce new regulations, restricting certain of the Chekas' powers.

And indeed, on 4 February, the Central Committee appointed a commission, consisting of Dzerzhinsky, Kamenev and Stalin, to work out a statute along specified groundlines for the reform of the Chekas and the Revolutionary Tribunals.[54] The statute, introduced by Dzerzhinsky at a plenary session of VTsIK on 17 February, and adopted the same day,[55] transferred the Vecheka's functions of passing sentence to reorganized, streamlined and more effective Revolutionary Tribunals, but still permitted the Chekas to exercise summary justice in cases of armed rebellion and banditry and in areas under martial law; furthermore, the Chekas were authorized to confine persons arbitrarily in concentration camps run entirely under Cheka control. In practice, these reservations afforded the Vecheka considerable latitude, especially as the resurgence of Civil War in mid-1919 resulted in wide application of martial law, and in the extension of the Chekas' prerogative of summary justice to cover a broad range of offences.[56] Cheka executions continued on a massive scale throughout the Civil War, and even beyond, as peasant insurrection persisted. Moreover, in March 1920, a VTsIK decree[57] provided for the inclusion of a Chekist as a member of the three-man Revolutionary Tribunals, who would naturally act to promote Cheka interests. Consequently the

[54] *Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti*, Vol. 4, p. 402, footnote.
[55] *S.U.R.* 1919, No. 12; 130, *Izvestiya*, 21 Feb. 1919.
[56] Belov, pp. 299-301.
[57] *S.U.R.* 1920, No. 22-23; 115, 18 Mar. 1920, *Izvestiya*, 27 Mar. 1920.

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advantages secured by the NKIu over the Vecheka in February 1919 soon proved illusory. The NKVD's gains at the Vecheka's expense were even more short-lived, for, following a Central Committee and Sovnarkom decision of 16 March 1919,[58] Dzerzhinsky was appointed People's Commissar for Internal Affairs on 30 March,[59] whilst remaining Chairman of the Vecheka.

Thus the Party had resolved the Vecheka crisis by yielding considerable short-term concessions in favour of the Commissariats of Internal Affairs and Justice, whilst retaining the substance of the political police; very soon these concessions were in practice largely compensated for, cancelled or eroded, and meanwhile the Vecheka's organization expanded and its power increased. The start of 1919 saw the introduction of the Vecheka's extensive network of Special Departments, responsible for counter-espionage and counter-subversion in the armed forces. And in his new capacity as NKVD Commissar, Dzerzhinsky immediately transformed the Corps of Vecheka Troops into the Troops of Internal Security of the Republic (VOKhR),[60] which absorbed various departmental ancillary troops and constituted an impressive military force standing under the operational command of the Vecheka.

Party Control over the Political Police

Ever since the creation of the Vecheka, Dzerzhinsky had himself been its direct link with the Central Committee, of which he was a member continuously from 1917 until his death in 1926; he had constant dealings with Lenin, who personally superintended the political police in his dual capacity as Sovnarkom Chairman and as Party leader. Now, in early 1919, the Party took steps to impose a tighter grip on the Vecheka, for which it had publicly accepted full and sole responsibility. When, at the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919, the Politburo was formed (Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Kamenev and Krestinsky, with Zinoviev, Bukharin and Kalinin as candidate-members), the Vecheka was subordinated directly to the Politburo, and Bukharin was deputed by Lenin to sit on the Vecheka Collegium as the Politburo's representative, with the right of veto, an arrangement that received no publicity.[61] When nominating Bukharin, who had been campaigning for the restriction of the Vecheka's right to execute, Lenin commented: "Let him go there himself, and let him try to keep the terror within limits, if it is possible."[62]

Bukharin's attachment to the Vecheka lasted until 1920 (he was succeeded by Stalin), and he saved a number of individuals from exe-

[58] A. F. Khatskevich, *Soldat velikikh boev*, op. cit. p. 260.
[59] *Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky: Biografiya*, op. cit. pp. 207–8.
[60] *Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti*, Vol. 5, pp. 508–10, decree signed 28 May 1919.
[61] B. Nikolaevsky, "Pervaya popytka istorii mashiny sovetskogo terrora," op. cit. p. 55.
[62] Boris I. Nicolaevsky, *Power and the Soviet Elite*, op. cit. p. 18.

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cution. That Bukharin ultimately developed a warm regard for Dzerzhinsky and for the Vecheka, emerges from the eulogies penned by him on the fifth anniversary of Dzerzhinsky's death.[63] Indeed, Robert Conquest comments that Bukharin's " enthusiasm for the terror machine was always extravagant " and cites, by way of example, his *Pravda* article on the tenth anniversary of the Vecheka's foundation.[64] To Bukharin, as to nearly all other Party leaders, even the most arbitrary and oppressive conduct of the political police was acceptable in the last resort, so long as it was seen to be an indispensable means for the preservation of the Revolution and of its self-appointed guardian, the Communist Party.

The Role of Kamenev

If anyone, it is perhaps Lev Borisovich Kamenev who qualifies as an honourable exception to this general proposition. He played a significant role in relation to the Vecheka and, as we have seen, at one point urged its abolition. From the first, he acted as an advocate of moderation. After the October coup, he introduced the decree repealing Kerensky's death penalty measure, thereby incurring Lenin's wrath.[65] At the Sixth Congress of Soviets (6–9 November 1918), whilst paying a token tribute to the Vecheka, he introduced an amnesty proposing the release of all Cheka prisoners against whom no concrete accusations were brought within a fortnight of arrest, and of all hostages except whose continued detention was considered essential to safeguard Soviet lives.[66] Having sat on several commissions designed to bring the Vecheka under control, during the period October 1918–February 1919, Kamenev thereafter continued to be involved in Vecheka affairs. Together with Dzerzhinsky and Bukharin, he was commissioned by the Politburo in September 1919 to review cases of detained members of the bourgeois intelligentsia.[67] Two years later, at Lenin's bidding, Kamenev would play an important part in the preparation of a statute for the reform of the Vecheka,[68] his endeavour then, as before, being to restrict the powers of the political police.

Although Kamenev has been described as lacking in independence of character and political resolution, in fact he demonstrated considerable courage, initiative and integrity in opposing Lenin, first at the Seventh Party Conference in April 1917, again over the proposed

[63] See Bukharin's four articles in *Feliks Dzerzhinsky 1926–1931: Sbornik Statei*, R. A. Abikh ed. (Moscow, 1931).

[64] Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror* (Pelican edition, Harmondsworth, 1971), pp. 724, 812, citing *Pravda*, 18 Dec. 1927. For a discussion of Bukharin's ambivalent attitude to terror, see Sidney Hook, " The Case of Comrade Bukharin " in *Encounter*, London, Dec. 1974, pp. 88–90.

[65] *S.U.R.* 1917, No. 1: 10, published 28 Oct. 1917; L. D. Trotsky, *O Lenine* (Moscow, 1924), p. 101.

[66] *Shestoi vserossiiskii chrezvychainyi Sezd Sovetov. . . . Stenograficheskii otchet. 6–9 noyabrya 1918* (Moscow, 1919), pp. 7–8, 37.

[67] Lenin (5), Vol. 51, pp. 47 (item 80), 385 (note 42).

[68] Ibid. Vol. 54, pp. 39, 569, note.

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seizure of power in October, and in the Vikzhel crisis of early November, when he was prepared to jettison Lenin and Trotsky, if that was the price of achieving a coalition of all the socialist parties. On this last issue, as previously on the October coup issue, he resigned (on 4 November) from the Central Committee and, unlike Zinoviev who promptly recanted, he and three other Central Committee defectors did not seek readmission until the participation of Left Socialist Revolutionaries in coalition government with the Bolsheviks was virtually assured; however, the rebels' application for reinstatement was rejected by the Central Committee on 29 November,[69] and Kamenev, having missed the Seventh Party Congress because he was abroad (being imprisoned in Finland *circa* March–August 1918),[70] did not re-enter the Central Committee until March 1919.

The Third Crisis of Conscience

The Vikzhel confrontation was the first major crisis within the ruling Bolshevik Party, a crisis of political conscience concerned with participation in a representative, widely based socialist coalition as opposed to the alternative of "the preservation of a purely Bolshevik government by means of political terror"—as the protesting Bolshevik People's Commissars prophetically put it when resigning from the Sovnarkom on 4 November 1917.[71] Such Bolshevik scruples were not in evidence, however, when on 5 January 1918 Lenin ordered the dispersal of the democratically elected Constituent Assembly, in which the Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary alliance had been decisively outvoted. The next internal Party crisis, over the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty negotiations, developed between the romantic advocates of a revolutionary war against imperialist Germany—a war threatening extinction to the Bolshevik regime—and the realists grouped round Lenin, who were intent on preserving that regime at any price. That particular controversy once resolved, the Communist Party closed its ranks in the face of the escalating Civil War, which it concentrated all its energies on winning, by whatever means. But when those means took the form of the Red Terror and of "the state within the state" presented by the Chekas, the Party was again rent by dissension.

Here, arguably, there now emerged a third significant crisis of communist conscience, and one which transcended the inter-departmental rivalries which divided the administration. These rivalries, of course, revolved around deeper issues—issues of constitutional principle (the Chekas' challenge to the Soviets' responsibility for local government) and of observance of law (the Chekas' challenge to the Justice Com-

[69] E. H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country 1924–1926* (Pelican edition, Harmondsworth, Vol. 1, 1970), p. 175.

[70] *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar russkogo bibliograficheskogo instituta Granat*, seventh edition, Vol. 41, Part I, col. 167; *The Times*, 26 March 1918.

[71] Robert Vincent Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 65–6.

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missariat by their exercise of extra-judicial powers). But beyond even these important conflicts of formal principle, many communists must have seen the matter as a moral and humanitarian issue, as the perennial dilemma of ends and means. The Chekas came to be regarded as the unacceptable face of communism. They were inescapably identified with and tainted by the terror, which, although never repudiated by the Party as a whole, must have appalled many individual Party members. The cumulative effect of this widespread moral revulsion and departmental opposition was such that, for a while, the fate of the Vecheka hung in the balance. The whole concept of the political police, operating beyond the law and outside the framework of the regular state, was in question, and the outcome of the Central Committee debate which decided the issue, carried incalculable implications for the evolution of the Soviet dictatorship. In the end, Lenin and the hard-liners on terror and compulsion had their way. For them there was no dilemma of ends and means; Lenin reduced such problems to questions of expediency, and for him communist morality was "wholly subordinated to the interests of the class war waged by the proletariat." [72] With the survival of the Vecheka as an institution, and the defeat of the advocates of legality (albeit of the revolutionary variety) and of police accountability, another step had been taken on the road that led to the totalitarian police state of the post-Lenin era.

[72] Lenin (5), Vol. 41, pp. 309, 311. Speech on 2 Oct. 1920.

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The Powers of the Soviet KGB

Amy W. Knight

DURING the past decade or so, increasing numbers of Western scholars have rejected the so-called "totalitarian model" of the Soviet Union as simplistic and inaccurate. They claim that the Soviet system has changed significantly since the Stalin era, and has become a pluralistic, bureaucratic, authoritarian state which formulates policy rationally, on the basis of input from various interest groups and advice from experts. The main reason cited for this "revisionist" interpretation of the Soviet system is that the power of the Soviet secret police has allegedly been greatly curbed. As the Sovietologist Jerry Hough expressed it in a recent book: "Nikita Khrushchev's limitations on the arbitrary power of the secret police eliminated one of the main features of totalitarianism as we have seen it."[1] Another Kremlin expert, Seweryn Bialer, writes that "the still massive Soviet police state was reduced to the political functions of a traditional authoritarian polity."[2]

The revisionist approach to the Soviet Union is undoubtedly appealing to Western policy makers, for it is far less difficult to deal with an adversary who runs his affairs on a rational basis, however unenlightened, than with an unstable totalitarian government, operating by means of police terror. In other words, it is comforting to assume that our enemy, particularly in a nuclear age, is to some extent like us. To think of someone like Stalin in control of the Russian's vast nuclear arsenal is indeed disquieting. But what grounds do we have for claiming that the power of the Soviet police, the KGB in particular, has diminished so significantly? How certain can we be that it will not turn into the instrument of terror and oppression that it was under Stalin?

Partly as a result of the unpopularity of the totalitarian model of the USSR, Western scholars have devoted scant attention to the KGB in recent years. As far back as 1973, Robert Slusser noted that "the secret police continues to be the neglected stepchild of Soviet studies" and stressed the need for a full-scale examination of the subject.[3] Since then, despite considerable interest in the KGB's foreign espionage and paramilitary activities, there have been no serious attempts to assess its impact on the Soviet political process or to examine its role in society.[4] This is a significant omission on

[1] Jerry F. Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition* (Washington D.C., 1980), p. 4.

[2] Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union* (*Cambridge University Press*, 1980), p. 51.

[3] Robert Slusser, review article in the *Slavic Review*, Dec. 1973, p. 825.

[4] The most comprehensive study of the KGB in recent years, John Barron's *The KGB, The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents* (Readers Digest Press, 1974) concentrates primarily on the activities of KGB agents abroad.

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the part of Western Sovietology, for, in a system such as the Soviet one, the power and influence of the police in relation to other institutions is not necessarily static, but rather is subject to change over time. It has been said before, but it is worth repeating, that there are no institutional guarantees against a reversion to the kind of police terror that prevailed under Stalin. As long as the pattern of decision-making is unstable, we cannot assume that the Soviet system has changed so fundamentally that this could not occur, however unlikely it may seem. Furthermore, as this article will point out, recent trends and developments raise the possibility that the role of the police in the Soviet regime may actually be expanding.

IT is well known that, after their almost total dominance over all aspects of society (including the Party) during the Stalin era, the security police suffered considerable setbacks under Krushchev's leadership. He discredited their image of infallibility by openly criticizing their previous excesses; he ousted top police officials and he greatly circumscribed their vast powers. In his efforts to bring the police back under Party control, Khrushchev appears to have had the support of most of his colleagues, who were as anxious as he to eliminate a threat to the Party and to their own security. Yet Khrushchev was careful not to do permanent damage to the prestige and morale of the police. For, as with all those who govern without popular mandate, he depended on the police to ensure the stability of the regime.

Few Western analysts have noted the significance of the fact that, even before Khrushchev's removal, a gradual effort to improve the image of the KGB had begun (accompanied, not coincidentally, by a partial rehabilitation of Stalin and his place in history). This effort was even more noticeable after Khrushchev left the scene, perhaps because, as some have speculated, the KGB had a role in his ousting.[5]

The Soviet leadership launched a vast publicity campaign designed to raise the prestige of the KGB and the militia. In contrast to their low profile in the early post-Stalin years, the *Chekisty,* as KGB personnel are called, were given increased attention in the press. The 50th anniversary of the Cheka was celebrated in 1967 throughout the USSR with the police hailed as one of the pillars of the state. A flood of literature glorifying them and their exploits began to appear in the form of memoirs, biographies, documentaries and semi-fictional adventure stories. In 1972, the Soviets published a bibliography of over 50 pages devoted entirely to literature on the

[5] This speculation was aroused by important police promotions at the November 1964 plenum, following Khrushchev's ousting: Semichastny, KGB chief, was co-opted into full membership of the Central Committee, while the former KGB chief, Shelepin, climbed straight to full membership in the Presidium. See M. Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin* (New York, 1967), p. 420.

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Chekisty,[6] and in 1976 a special commission of the RSFSR Union of Writers was created for the purpose of promoting the police adventure story as a fully-fledged genre.

The image of the police that this literature and publicity conveyed was one of respectability and legitimacy. As if to dispel the picture of brutality and terror that most citizens had, the *Chekisty* were presented as honest, high-minded people with humane qualities. Thus, in one book, entitled *Chekists About Their Work*, the proceedings of a round-table discussion between journalists and KGB employees were reported. The KGB men stressed how much their organization had changed since the Stalin era and how they were operating completely legally. They portrayed themselves as very ordinary men, who played sports, chess, and even engaged in creative writing.[7] A Soviet film director who emigrated to the West in the early 1970s told of his experience directing a full-length documentary about the struggle against foreign spies in Russia. An officer from the KGB had the final say over all details of the film. According to the director, "his chief concern was to see that the main character—a *Chekist*—was presented in a positive and sympathetic light."[8]

The campaign to rehabilitate the security police has continued unabated to this day, with the active participation of top Party leaders, particularly Brezhnev, who has bestowed numerous awards and honours upon KGB personnel in unexpected circumstances. In 1977, two of Andropov's deputies, S. K. Tsvigun and G. K. Tsinev, were awarded the title "Hero of Socialist Labour" on the occasion of their 60th and 70th birthdays, respectively. These honours were unprecedented, since they are rarely given to non-Politburo members, and these officials were not even at the ministerial level. In December 1978, these same deputies, Tsvigun and Tsinev, were promoted to the rank of army general, along with KGB Border Guards Chief, V. A. Matrosov. (Before this, Andropov was the only KGB official to hold this rank.) More recently, in August 1979, G. A. Aliev, a former KGB chief in Azerbaidzhan, was awarded the title "Hero of Socialist Labour," even though it was not his birthday and he is only a candidate member of the Politburo. That same month, Brezhnev presented Andropov with the award of Order of the October Revolution at a ceremony in the Kremlin. In making the presentation, Brezhnev gave an exceptionally warm speech, citing Andropov's weighty contributions to the communist cause and ending by saying "we love and value you."[9]

[6] N. S. Aksenov and M. V. Vasil'ev, *Soldaty Dzerzhinskogo soyuza beregut. Rekomendatel'nyi ukazatel' literatury o chekistakh.* (The Soldiers of Dzerzhinsky's Union are Guarding. A list of Recommended Literature on the Chekists) (Moscow, 1972).

[7] *Chekisti o svoem trude* (Moscow, 1965).

[8] The film was entitled *Nezvanye gosti* (Uninvited Guests). See M. Dewhirst and R. Farrel, eds., *The Soviet Censorship* (Metuchen, N. J., 1973), pp. 111–13.

[9] See *FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union*, 31 Aug. 1979.

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What are the reasons for this campaign to glorify the security police in the eyes of the public? To the extent that it is designed to boost police morale and give them more credibility so that they can function effectively, it is understandable. But clearly the current efforts go beyond this. They seem to be aimed, first of all, at making society forget about past police crimes. The publication of historical writings on the security police has been very selective, carefully excluding any mention of how they became an instrument of terror against the Party itself, and instead idealizing their history. (It is significant that Andropov did not mention past police excesses under Stalin in his speech marking the 60th anniversary of the Cheka in 1977, though he did in his 1967 speech.) This "cover-up," as it were, removes what might be an effective barrier to any recurrence of police terror—public acknowledgement of the potential dangers of the powers of the police. Furthermore, the fact that this campaign appears to be inspired, or at least condoned, by Brezhnev, raises the possibility that he is attempting to strengthen the police in order to enhance his own position.

ANOTHER development that is just as significant and yet equally unheeded by Western scholars is the KGB's growing representation on Party and state organizations. While Khrushchev removed KGB officials from Party bureaux at all levels and kept the KGB chief from full membership in the Central Committee, Brezhnev has given the police growing numbers of positions in both the Party and government apparatus. In 1973, for the first time since the Stalin era, the security chief, Andropov, was given full membership on the Politburo. At that time, a former KGB chief, Aleksander Shelepin, was still a full member as well (he was not dismissed until 1975). In 1976, Azerbaidzhan Party Chief G. A. Aliev, who had served with the security police from 1941 to 1969, was made a Politburo candidate member.

KGB representation in the Central Committee has increased steadily since 1961, while by contrast that of the military has shown a slight decline in terms of percentage weight (see Table 1). Though its membership is still small in comparison to the military, the KGB has gone from one candidate member in 1961 to four full members in 1981. (If we include the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the police have five full and one candidate member today, as compared with two candidate members in 1961.) Since 1961 the percentage weight of KGB full membership in the Central Committee has risen by 1·2 per cent and that of the military full membership has declined by 0·8 per cent. Because representation on the Central Committee is thought to be apportioned to institutions rather than to individuals, most scholars consider membership to be an indicator of the relative

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importance of the institution in question.[10] It might thus be inferred from these trends that the KGB's political influence is increasing relative to other groups. This inference is supported by the fact that the KGB has made considerable gains in representation on republic Party bureaux. As the table shows, the number of KGB chairmen serving as full or candidate members on these bureaux, which are the highest policy-making bodies at the republic level, has doubled since 1961. As of 1981, the KGB was represented on Party bureaux in all republics, while the military had officers serving on bureaux in only six of the 14 republics.

TABLE 1 [11]

Representation of KGB and Military in Leading Party Organs

Central Committee

	1961		*1966*		*1971*		*1976*		*1981*	
	Full	Cand.	Full	Cand.	Full	Cand.	Full	Cand.	Full	Cand.
KGB members	0	1	1	0	1	2	1	3	4	0
Percentage of total members	0	0·6	0·5	0	0·4	1·3	0·3	2·2	1·3	0
Military	14	17	14	18	20	13	20	10	23	12
Percentage of total members	8·0	11·0	7·2	10·9	8·3	8·4	7·0	7·2	7·2	7·9

Union Republic Party Bureaux (14)

	1961		*1971*		*1976*		*1981*	
	KGB	Military	KGB	Military	KGB	Military	KGB	Military
Full members	4	4	3	7	5	5	7	6
Candidates	2	3	3	1	7	1	7	0
Total	6	7	6	8	12	6	14	6

[10] For example, according to J. Hough and M. Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union* is *Governed* (Harvard University Press, 1979): " The principle of representation of institutions rather than individuals has been observed with sufficient rigor in recent decades that western scholars have normally been able to rely upon Central Committee membership or nonmembership for an institution's or region's top official as an indicator of the relative importance of the institution or region " (p. 458).

[11] *XXII s"ezd kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskogo soyuza, stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1961) etc.; Grey Hodnett and Val Ogareff, *Leaders of the Soviet Republics 1955–72* (Canberra, Australia, 1973); *C.I.A. Directory of Soviet Officials*, Vol. I: National Organizations, March 1979; and, for 1981, *Pravda* 4 Mar. 1981, and the Party republic newspapers such as *Sovetskaya Belorussiya*, 30 Jan. 1981, etc.

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TABLE 2 [12]

Representation of KGB and Military on Supreme Soviet

USSR Supreme Soviet Deputies

	1962	*1970*	*1974*	*1979*
KGB deputies	8	10	13	15
Percentage of total	0·7	0·7	0·9	1·0
Military	55	58	56	56
Percentage of total	3·8	3·8	3·7	3·7

RSFSR Supreme Soviet Deputies

	1963	*1975*	*1980*
KGB deputies	5	6	9
Percentage of total	0·6	0·7	0·9
Military	18	20	18
Percentage of total	2·0	2·2	1·8

Turning to the government, Table 2 reveals that the number of KGB delegates to both the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets has increased markedly since the Khrushchev era. By contrast, the military's membership has remained almost the same in the USSR Supreme Soviet and has declined in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Although the Supreme Soviet has no real decision-making power and is basically a " rubber-stamp " organization, its elections and activities are highly publicized and considerable prestige is accorded to the deputies. Moreover, it is believed that the deputies are decided upon before the elections by a higher Party body, with representation from various interest groups and posts within the party, government and army carefully allocated, as it is with the Central Committee. Thus this significant increase in KGB deputies is probably a result of a deliberate policy on the part of the Soviet leadership.

ANOTHER development that appears to have strengthened the KGB's position within the government might also be mentioned. This was the change in its status effected in July 1978. Whereas formerly it was the Committee of State Security (KGB) attached to (*pri*) the USSR Council of Ministers, it has been renamed the KGB of the USSR. This seemingly insignificant change had the effect of upgrading the KGB: according to the 1977 constitution, chairmen of state committees attached to the Council of

[12] *Deputaty verkhovnogo soveta SSSR*. Shestoi sozyv, 1962; Sedmoi sozyv, 1966; vosmoi sozyv 1970; devyatyi sozyv, 1974; desyatyi sozvy, 1979; *Izvestiya* 7 Mar. 1963; *C.I.A. Directory of Soviet Officials, Vol. II: RSFSR Organizations;* and *Izvestiya*, 28 Feb. 1980.

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Ministers are not necessarily included in this body, while chairmen of state committees of the USSR are automatically members of the Council of Ministers.

The political influence of the KGB is probably enhanced by the close personal and career ties that Brezhnev appears to have with members of the police apparatus. The First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, S. K. Tsvigun, who is rumoured to be married to Brezhnev's sister, was a top official in the security organs of Moldavia when Brezhnev was serving as First Secretary there (1951–52). G. K. Tsinev, a Deputy KGB Chairman, was a fellow student of Brezhnev at the Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute in the early 1930s. Another KGB Deputy Chairman, V. M. Chebrikov, also attended the Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute (though somewhat later than Brezhnev) and was active in the Party organization in Dnepropetrovsk during Brezhnev's tenure as *Obkom* First Secretary there. Chebrikov served in the Party apparatus in Dnepropetrovsk until 1967, when he was suddenly transferred to Moscow to become head of the KGB Department of Cadres—a powerful position indeed for someone who had had no previous work in the security services.[13] Though Brezhnev has no past career ties with Andropov, the relationship between the two men appears warm, and Andropov is frequently pictured standing close to Brezhnev on official occasions. Some Western observers have even speculated that Andropov is a candidate to succeed Brezhnev, but this is unlikely.

The two top men in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) are also closely connected with Brezhnev. Shchekolov, the Minister of Internal Affairs, was another classmate of Brezhnev at the Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute and worked under him both in Dnepropetrovsk (in the late 1930s) and in Moldavia (in the early 1950s).[14] In 1966, when Brezhnev's ascendancy in the leadership was well established, Shchekolov was brought to Moscow to head the Ministry of Preservation of Public Order (MOOP), later called the MVD. The New First Deputy of the MVD, appointed after the death of V. S. Paputin in December 1979, is Brezhnev's son-in-law, Yu. M. Churbanov. Churbanov was promoted over the heads of other deputy ministers more senior to him.[15]

These close personal and career connexions have created a potentially powerful network at the top. On the one hand, the special

[13] Biographies of these officials appear in *Deputaty verkhovnogo soveta SSSR, desyatyi sozyv* and *Ezhegodnik* (Yearbook) of the *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (Moscow, 1976).

[14] This network of personnel ties extends to other Politburo members. The careers of Shcherbitsky and Tikhonov also include work in Dnepropetrovsk when these police officials were there.

[15] Churbanov recently had a book published about the militia and the *Komsomol*, with a dedication by Brezhnev: *Tovarishch militsiya* (Comrade Militia) (Moscow, 1980).

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relationship that the police have with the General Secretary probably places them in a position to exert considerable influence on decision-making. On the other hand, the presence of protégés in the top police organs is a source of strength Brezhnev can depend upon to counter opposition from within the leadership. The fact that several of these senior police officials came to Moscow in 1966–67, a time when he had emerged as *primus inter pares* in the Politburo, is an indication that they were selected by Brezhnev personally, in order to ensure the loyalty of the police organs. In addition, it appears as if Brezhnev's close ally Chernenko may have some responsibility for KGB activities in his job as Central Committee Secretary—a situation which further reinforces the ties between the General Secretary and the police.[16]

ACCORDING to most sources, the KGB is an elite, privileged organization, whose personnel have a strong *esprit de corps*. Its recruitment process is apparently highly selective, stressing ideological credentials, as well as education. The *Komsomol* is said to be one of the main KGB suppliers. Prospective employees are sent to one of the many special training institutes run by the KGB, where they undergo a rigorous programme of preparation for their work. The pay for KGB personnel is reportedly much higher than it is in other institutions and they apparently enjoy a variety of special privileges. According to the late Andrei Amalrik, whose impression is confirmed by others, their "caste-like seclusion from society is powerful. It breeds not only a feeling of superiority, but also a more subconscious feeling of alienation and resentment." [17]

The relationship between the KGB and the MVD is not altogether clear. Despite their separate institutional status, the two organizations appear to have close ties, which might be getting closer. Biographies of KGB and MVD officials, for example, show that it is not uncommon for them to have served in each organization at different points in their careers, and signatures on obituaries of police officials often include both KGB and MVD personnel, another sign of connexions. Though their functions are generally thought of as separate (the MVD deals with ordinary domestic crimes, while the KGB concentrates on "crimes against the state" and foreign espionage) there appears to be some

[16] Chernenko oversees the work of the Central Committee's General Department, which, according to Leonard Schapiro, has close contact with the KGB on security matters. (See L. Schapiro, "The General Department of the CC of the CPSU," *Survey, No. 96, Summer 1975, pp. 53–65*). Moreover, it is possible that Chernenko also oversees the Administrative Organs Department, which has direct responsibility for the KGB. The secretary in charge of this department has never been openly mentioned, and, by process of elimination, a good case can be made that it is Chernenko.

[17] Andrei Amalrik, "The KGB in Asia," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 31 Dec. 1976, pp. 20–21. See also a book by a former KGB official, Aleksei Myagkov, *Inside the KGB* (New Rochelle, N.T., 1976).

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overlap. Soviet dissidents mention MVD assistance to the KGB in prosecuting citizens, and there is also evidence of MVD involvement in KGB ventures abroad.[18] Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that there is a formal connexion between these organizations, or to speak of a "KGB/MVD axis," as one recent article does.[19] The MVD and KGB were made separate and distinct institutions almost 30 years ago for the specific purpose of enabling the Party leadership to play off one against the other should the need arise. As Frederick Barghoorn once expressed it: "Particularly significant is the fact that the MVD-MOOP, or internal public order agency has always been available to counterbalance the Cheka-MGB-KGB, or political police."[20] If this situation were to change, which is of course possible, and the functions of these organizations were to merge, this would make the police a considerably more powerful institution.

What kind of people are the men who run the KGB? Biographical and career information on 14 officials currently holding the top positions in this organization reveal some interesting facts about their backgrounds (see Table 3).

Unlike the early *Chekisty,* who generally had peasant origins and low educational levels, all but one of the top 14 KGB officials in 1981 have higher education. What is most striking about their backgrounds is the long time that most of them have worked for the state security agencies. Though their average age (62) is considerably less than that of Politburo members (70), 10 out of the 14 KGB officials began their careers in the security organs during the Stalin era. Their long periods of service have undoubtedly fostered a strong identification with the police, as well as a sense of cohesiveness among them. More important, these men started out at a time when the police were dominating the whole society, including the Party, by means of terror. Since these were the formative and most impressionable years of their careers, it might be expected that they were, to some extent at least, inculcated with the values and mores of this era of violence.

This may be the case with some lower-ranking officials as well. Though Khrushchev dismantled the top ranks of the police after Beria was shot in 1953 and reduced the overall number of police personnel, he, presumably for practical reasons, left the middle and lower ranks partially intact. There is also evidence that some police who were forced out with Beria were later reinstated. The dissident Anatolii Marchenko tells in his book, *My Testimony,* of police officials running

[18] Among this evidence is the report that MVD First Deputy Paputin was killed in Afghanistan at the time of the Russian invasion in December 1979. See the *Washington Post,* 14 Mar. 1980.

[19] See John J. Dziak, "Soviet Intelligence and Security Services in the Eighties: The Paramilitary Dimension," *Orbis,* Winter 1981, p. 776.

[20] F. Barghoorn, "The Security Police," in G. Skilling and F. Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1971), pp. 116–17.

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TABLE 3 [21]

Profiles of Top KGB Officials

Name	*Position*	*Date of Birth*	*Education*	*Nationality*	*Career Background*
Yu. Andropov	Chm., USSR KGB	1914	Higher	Russian	Komsomol, Party, Sec. Police since 1967
S. K. Tsvigun	First Dep. Chm., USSR KGB	1917	Higher	Ukrainian	Sec. police since 1939
G. K. Tsinev	Dep. Chm., USSR KGB	1907	Higher	Ukrainian	Party, military, police since 1953
V. M. Chebrikov	Dep. Chm., USSR KGB	1923	Higher	Russian	Party, sec. police since 1967
A. S. Boiko	Chm., Turkmen KGB	1925	Higher	Russian	Sec. police since 1943
V. V. Fedorchuk	Chm., Ukrainian KGB	1918	Higher	Ukrainian	Sec. police since 1939
A. N. Inauri	Chm., Georgian KGB	1908	Higher	Georgian	Sec. police since 1953
A. Yuzbashian	Chm., Armenian KGB	1924	Higher	Armenian	Sec. police since 1943
N. P. Lomov	Chm., Kirghiz KGB	1925	Higher	Russian	Komsomol, Party, since 1964 Sec. police
L. N. Melkumov	Chm., Uzbek KGB	1924	Higher	Armenian	Komsomol, Sec. police since 1950
E. I. Perventsev	Chm., Tadzhik KGB	1926	Higher	Russian	Komsomol, Sec. police since 1950
Yu. Yu. Petkiavichius	Chm., Lithuanian KGB	1924	Higher	Lithuanian	Komsomol, Party, Sec. police since 1960
A. P. Pork	Chm., Estonian KGB	1917	Middle	Estonian	Sec. police since 1948
V. T. Shevchenko	Chm., Kazakh KGB	1921	Higher	Ukrainian	Sec. police since 1943

[21] Sources for these profiles are cited in note 13.

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the camps under Stalin who were dismissed in 1953–54, "bided their time," and were eventually rehired.[22]

The current Soviet leadership may consider police personnel who began their careers under Stalin to be more effective in dealing with internal problems. Interestingly, the former Chairman of the KGB in Ukraine, V. F. Nikitchenko, who did not join the police until 1954, was replaced in 1970 by V. V. Fedorchuk, a police official since the 1930s. Nikitchenko was allegedly too mild in his treatment of dissidents, and the regime wanted a harder line. His successor promptly replaced all provincial KGB heads in Ukraine with his own men.[23]

THIS brings us to the question of the domestic tactics of the KGB and how much they have changed since the days of Stalin. Has the KGB accepted for itself a lesser internal role, circumscribed by the rules of "socialist legality?" Or are its personnel striving to regain some of the powers they enjoyed in the past? It is certainly true that the police's ability to investigate and prosecute Soviet citizens was curtailed considerably under Khrushchev. In particular, the new RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, adopted in 1960, set down specific rules according to which the KGB was to conduct its cases. Certain procedures, such as night interrogations, were prohibited, and investigators were placed under the general supervision of the Soviet Procuracy. Yet, despite these legal changes and the fact that there was a brief liberalizing trend in the early 1960s, the police have managed to wield considerable control over society. They have accomplished this largely by the use of "extra-judicial" repression, which can be carried out without adhering to legal formalities—forced exile, various forms of harassment, and, most important, confinement of dissidents in psychiatric hospitals. As was the case recently with worker-rights advocate Alexei Nikitin, hospital authorities often inject their dissident patients with harmful drugs.[24]

Along with the increasing use of psychiatric hospitals, "psychological persuasion" is being adopted by KGB interrogators. Much of the recent dissident literature mentions how sophisticated the KGB has become in the use of psychological tactics with those under arrest. The Ukrainian dissident Mikhailo Osadchy, for example, writes of "seasoned police officials who expertly applied . . . the classical Pavlovian approach of alternating humiliation and decency."[25] In his *Prison Diary,* Eduard Kuznetsov describes a carefully co-ordinated campaign of psychological torture employed against him by the KGB.[26]

[22] Anatolii Marchenko, *My Testimony*, translated by Michael Scammell (New York, 1969), pp. 265–6. Marchenko was arrested in March 1981 for the sixth time.

[23] See Mikhailo Osadchy, *Cataract,* translated and edited by Marco Carynnyk (New York and London, 1976), p. 204.

[24] See the *Washington Post*, 22 Apr. 1981.

[25] Osadchy, *Cataract*, introduction.

[26] Eduard Kuznetsov, *Prison Diaries*, translated by Howard Spier (London, 1975).

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These impressions are supported by Soviet legal writings on the use of psychological techniques during the investigatory process. The sheer volume of such legal literature that has appeared in the past few years is significant in itself. Numerous handbooks and textbooks for investigators (often designated for KGB use) stress the necessity of using strong psychological pressure in order to get "correct" testimony. A book entitled *Forensic Psychology for Investigators,* for example, recommends that the interrogator give the suspect false information and act in a purposely irrational manner in order to confuse him. Another book suggests setting psychological traps in order to obtain confessions.[27]

Equally ominous are the claims by several Soviet dissidents that KGB interrogators have begun to resort to physical violence. The writer Vladimir Voinovich, for example, stated that in 1975 the KGB tried to kill him with poison in a Moscow hotel.[28] General Pyotr Grigorenko has told of a special KGB decree sanctioning physical coercion of those being questioned in certain cases and has asked whether "the rebirth of Stalinism in the propaganda of the newspapers and in other propaganda" might be a "signal for the rebirth of Stalinist methods in interrogations as well."[29]

As leading Soviet human rights activists have pointed out, the KGB is successfully continuing its repressions under the guise of legality. Andrei Amalrik summed up the situation:

> Back in 1970 Boris Shragin remarked that to the extent that the Soviet civil rights movement began to emerge from the underground and openly declare itself, so into the underground began to retreat the KGB, and its methods started to assume an ever more criminal character, even from the point of view of that state whose security it was called upon to protect.[30]

The effectiveness of KGB methods and the extent of their control over society is attested to by the fact that, towards the end of 1980, Western observers were pronouncing the dissident movement in the USSR crushed and demoralized.

WHEN discussing Soviet interest groups that contribute to foreign policy, Western analysts often place the security forces together with the regular military, on the assumption that both represent a "hard-line" element. The paramilitary status of the KGB—and the MVD as well—reinforces this assumption. Not only do security officials

[27] A. R. Ratinov, *Sudebnaya psikhologiya dlya sledovatelei* (Moscow, 1967); A. V. Dulov, *Osnovy psikhologicheskogo analiza na predvaritel'nom sledstvii* (Principles of Psychological Analysis During Preliminary Investigation) (Moscow, 1973). See also A. N. Vasil'ev, *Sledstvennaya taktika* (Investigatory Tactics) (Moscow, 1976).

[28] Vladimir Voinovich, "Proisshestvie v 'Metropole'," (Incident in the Metropol), *Kontinent*, No. 5, 1975, pp. 51–97.

[29] *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, No. 269/77, 1977, p. 3.

[30] Andrei Amalrik, "Arrest On Suspicion of Courage," *Harpers*, Nov. 1976, p. 56.

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have military designations, but also, for purposes of the twice yearly call-up of military forces, the regular army, KGB border troops and MVD internal troops are lumped together in the Ministry of Defence announcements. It should be stressed, however, that both the KGB and the MVD have chains of command that are entirely separate from that of the regular armed forces. Moreover, the KGB and the military have been played off against one another by Party leaders in the past. Stalin used the police to prevent military leaders from coalescing into a group that might challenge his authority, while Khrushchev, in his initial bid for power, relied on the military to curb the strength of the police and bring it back under Party control. Today the Party ensures the loyalty of the military through an extensive system of KGB surveillance. By means of its Armed Forces Directorate, which has departments for all branches of the services, the KGB places its officers at every echelon of the armed forces. This arrangement undoubtedly creates friction and rivalry between the military and the KGB.[31]

In addition to internal competition, it appears that the KGB and the military might have differences over foreign policy. There is evidence that the KGB does not always go along with those elements in the armed forces that advocate military instead of political means of achieving Soviet global objectives. A consideration of Andropov's speeches during the 1970s, for example, shows that his attitude towards foreign policy and relations with the West appears considerably more moderate than those of some Politburo colleagues. Thus, in a March 1976 speech to KGB Party activists, Andropov voiced strong enthusiasm for *détente* and hailed the relaxation of international tensions. A month later, in a speech celebrating the 106th anniversary of Lenin's birth, Andropov affirmed his strong support for peaceful coexistence and was optimistic about prospects for a long and durable peace.[32] Meanwhile, Ustinov, who had recently been appointed Minister of Defence, was much more cautious about *détente,* noting that its success was limited and continuing to talk about the threat of war.[33]

Andropov's foreign policy views have also differed from those of Ukrainian Party chief Shcherbitsky. In a July 1978 speech in Kiev, Shcherbitsky warned that *détente* was not irreversible and criticized Western striving for military superiority and attempts to distort the Helsinki accords. Less than a month later Andropov gave a speech in Petrozavodsk, where his tone was markedly different. He was optimistic about the future of relations with the West and positive about the results of the Helsinki accords, noting that " the road ahead is clear "

[31] See John Barron, *The KGB*, pp. 19–21, for a more detailed discussion of KGB surveillance of the military.

[32] Andropov's speeches have recently been published: Yu. V. Andropov, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i* (Moscow, 1979).

[33] See D. F. Ustinov, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i* (Moscow, 1979), pp. 280–91.

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—a road of "patient, constructive settlement of conflicts and divergencies; of new steps toward containment of the arms race; of the expansion and intensification of relations between countries with differing social systems, between all states." [34]

Andropov has continued to manifest a positive attitude towards relations with the West, showing himself to be a strong supporter of Brezhnev's *détente* policies. His remarks in his 1980 Supreme Soviet election speech indicate that he may even have disagreed with the Soviet decision to send a large-scale military force into Afghanistan, or at least was unhappy with the outcome. He was the only Politburo member to be pessimistic about the world situation after the invasion, noting that "it must be said frankly that anxiety for the future and the destiny of *détente* and peace has real foundations." [35] By contrast, Ponomarev stated explicitly that "Soviet people have no grounds for alarm or uncertainty." [36] Ustinov, too, was much more positive than Andropov and noted: "imperialism's opportunities for disposing of peoples' destinies as it sees fit have shrunk considerably . . . the relaxation of tension has become the determining trend of world development." [37]

THIS raises the question of why the KGB chief would have a moderate outlook and oppose "military solutions" to Soviet foreign policy problems. It has been suggested that Andropov may not be as liberal as he pretends to be, but that he adopts this stance in order to overcome his "policeman image" so that he might be considered a viable candidate for the succession.[38] This hypothesis is consistent with the view expressed by others that the KGB has resisted extensive ties with the West, since, being responsible for the internal security of the Soviet state, the KGB sees contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners as a considerable political danger not outweighed by the concommitant economic and technological benefits.[39] Clearly, the economic, technological and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and the West present problems for the security police, and, though their statements have been toned down considerably since the early 1970s, KGB officials still discuss the grave dangers of ideological subversion.

[34] See Andropov, *Izbrannye rechi*, pp. 277–87 and *FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union*, Vol. III, No. 146, 28 July 1978.

[35] *Pravda*, 12 Feb. 1980.

[36] Ibid. 5 Feb. 1980.

[37] Ibid. 14 Feb. 1980. It is noteworthy that Andropov suddenly disappeared from public view right after his speech and did not re-emerge again until early April. It is doubtful that he was ill, since the press reported that he voted from his constituency in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet elections on 25 February. Usually such unexplained absences are an indication of internal policy disagreements. Right after Andropov re-emerged, Ustinov disappeared from view for over two-and-a-half months.

[38] *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, No. 187/77, Aug. 1977.

[39] Bruce Parrot, "Technological Progress and Soviet Politics," *Survey*, No. 103, Spring 1977–78, pp. 39–60.

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It does not necessarily follow, however, that the KGB opposes *détente per se* and that it would prefer the USSR to pursue a hard-line stance towards the West, especially if this line is accompanied by military interventionism and a stepped-up arms race. Such policies also present problems for the KGB. Not only does increased defence spending enhance the domestic influence of the military, it also places greater strains on the economy, draining more resources away from the already weak consumer sector. In view of what has occurred in Poland, the security police might have good reason to be nervous about the possibility of food shortages and other failures to meet consumer needs. Moreover, as the police may see it, interventionist Soviet military moves, such as the Afghanistan invasion, have the potential of creating political dissatisfaction among the Soviet population.

If one considers how the KGB appears to perceive its own international role, it is possible to see how the application of military power to Soviet foreign policy might be viewed as a threat to the KGB's own interests. According to their statements, KGB officials see their primary function as an ideological one—the promotion of the interests of the Soviet state by means of the class struggle. This struggle does not focus on military forces, but rather on ideas and social systems. It is a form of "ideological competition" that takes place even under conditions of peaceful coexistence. As KGB First Deputy Tsvigun has pointed out, "however great the positive changes in international relations may be, the current development stage is characterized by the intensified class struggle in the world arena."[40] The struggle is portrayed as both a defensive and offensive one. Thus, KGB officials speak of the need to protect the Soviet Union from "subversive activity by imperialist forces," and "ideological sabotage." KGB border troops play an important role in this regard, by preventing unwanted foreigners from entering the Soviet Union. At the same time, the KGB is on the offensive when it "lends support" to the national liberation movements and "revolutions of oppressed peoples" in all parts of the world.

There is a definite theoretical basis for this type of KGB activity. In a recent article on Soviet global policy, Vernon Aspaturian explained how the Soviets distinguish between the concepts of "correlation of forces" and "balance of power." As Aspaturian pointed out, the Soviets define "correlation of forces" as a conglomeration of "various 'exotic' non-military elements"—social, economic, political and revolutionary processes that give one social system an advantage over another, whereas the "balance of power" refers primarily to the state of the military balance. These non-military elements are important factors in the international power equation:

> Soviet leaders, in short, have long recognized that social conflicts, tensions, frustrations and resentments, particularly between classes,

[40] *Znamya*, No. 12, 1977, p. 205.

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> conceal tremendous reserves of pent-up social power, which can be detected by dialectical analysis and then tapped, mobilized and transmuted into concrete political power subject to the manipulation of Soviet policy.[41]

It is in this realm of the international arena that the KGB operates, striving for a more favourable " correlation of forces," by means of a wide range of covert activities, including propaganda and disinformation, subversion and sabotage.

Of course, as Aspaturian makes clear, the dichotomy between " balance of power " and " correlation of forces " is in some sense a false one, since the two are very much interrelated. Furthermore, it is difficult to accept the Soviet insistence that its class struggle against imperialism has no relation to the sphere of inter-state relations and is compatible with peaceful coexistence. But the point here is that the Soviets do differentiate, in theory at least, between military and " ideological " struggles, and the KGB's activity lies in the latter area.

THIS is not to say that the KGB engages in no military activities. Its border guards force, which numbers around 200,000 men, is trained and equipped for combat, and has in fact engaged in fighting along the Sino-Soviet border in recent years. The KGB also has other forces subordinate to its control, such as the troops of the Ninth Directorate, which guard Party and state leaders. In a wartime situation these troops, particularly the Border Guards, would be called upon to assist the military, as they were in the second world war. But these military functions are secondary to the KGB's political role.[42]

It thus seems reasonable to assume that the security police would prefer non-military solutions in situations where there are opportunities for exploiting social and political factors to the benefit of the Soviet Union. This enables them to have a greater influence over Soviet global strategy. Furthermore, overt military moves on the part of the Soviet Union probably make the ideological struggle more difficult. When the Soviet Union has the image of an aggressor it is not easy for the KGB to exploit social and political upheavals (such as in Iran, for example) and influence the course of " liberation movements." Of course, when political stability in Eastern European countries is threatened, the KGB doubtless favours military intervention, since the " correlation of non-military elements " is to their disadvantage and a possible threat to Soviet internal stability. But in general the KGB probably advocates a more cautious stance, and Afghanistan is a case in point.

[41] Vernon Aspaturin, " Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," *Problems of Communism*, May–June 1980, p. 7.

[42] It was suggested in a recent article by John Dziak (see note 19) that the KGB engages in quasi-military missions of a highly specialized nature. Dziak claims that the KGB has large numbers of troops at its disposal for such missions, including 260,000 MVD troops, which " would remand to KGB authority at Andropov's will " (p. 775). Unfortunately, no sources are offered to substantiate this rather dubious claim.

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Before its military intervention in December 1979, the Soviet Union had been "lending support" to Afghanistan's national liberation movement and "encouraging positive political and social processes" that were taking place in Afghanistan. Though they had military personnel there, the type of activities the Soviets were engaged in was mainly in the realm of the KGB and apparently the MVD, whose involvement in Afghanistan is attested to by the death of MVD First Deputy Paputin there in December 1979, right after the Soviet invasion began. Allegations that Paputin committed suicide because he was blamed for the unplanned death of Amin raise the possibility that Paputin may have been a victim of lack of coordination between the security forces and the military in Afghanistan. In any case, the arrival of large-scale Soviet forces there must have put an end to most of the political activity of the KGB and MVD and changed significantly any plans they might have had for non-military solutions to political problems in Afghanistan.[43]

Despite the blatant Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, many experts argue that the development of thermonuclear weapons has led the Soviet Union to modify its approach to foreign policy during the past decade or so. Although they have by no means excluded the possibility of war with the USA or its allies and continue to prepare for it, the Soviets do appear anxious to avoid confrontational military moves that might increase the danger of nuclear war. As a result, they seem to favour non-confrontational tactics to achieve their global objectives: the use of surrogate military forces and various clandestine operations, including the support of international terrorism, that subvert and destabilize governments. Since these covert activities, which are arousing increasing concern in the non-communist world, are directly in the realm of the KGB, it might be expected that its role in formulating and executing Soviet foreign policy will continue to grow.

MOST Western observers place their strongest hopes for long-term peace with the USSR on a gradual change within the Soviet system—a slow process of internal liberalization which would eventually lead Soviet leaders to abandon their expansionist and destabilizing policies abroad. These hopes have rested to a certain extent at least, on the assumption that the role of the police in the Soviet system was diminishing. Yet, as this article has pointed out, there are signs that just the opposite may be happening. The honours and publicity the KGB has received, the steady increase in KGB representation on Party and government bodies, the success it has

[43] Paputin has been mistakenly labelled a close "crony" of Brezhnev and a member of the "Dnepropetrovsk mafia" (see Dziak, p. 781). In fact he has no career ties with Brezhnev and, judging from the scant attention given to his death in the Soviet press, he died in disgrace. Indeed, his death was fortuitous for Brezhnev, since it enabled him to give his son-in-law Churbanov Paputin's post. (See Paputin's obituary in *Pravda*, 3 Jan. 1980.)

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enjoyed in repressing internal dissent, and the growing use of KGB clandestine strategies abroad all support this conclusion. The possibility that the MVD might be drawing closer to the KGB offers additional grounds for concern, since the institutions were separated as a means of ensuring that neither becomes too powerful.

What is perhaps most significant about the expansion of the KGB's influence is that it appears to have been furthered by Brezhnev himself, with the possible co-operation of some close allies, such as Chernenko. By filling the top police positions with his own protégés, Brezhnev may be attempting to reinforce his personnel power base. Control over a powerful police organization would give him the potential to eliminate opposition among the Party leadership and also to counter attempts by the military to challenge Party authority.[44]

If history serves as a precedent, the KGB will not stand idly by during the future succession crisis, but will actively attempt to ensure that Brezhnev's successor is favourable to its interests. Though it is possible that the KGB's influence will diminish after Brezhnev goes, just the opposite might happen if its powers are employed to determine the outcome of the succession. Of course, a return to the police terror of the 1930s would probably require another Stalin to emerge in the leadership, which is unlikely. But until the Party ceases to draw a curtain over the past and openly discusses the way in which the police under Stalin became an instrument against the Party, the possibility will always be there. In the meantime, Western scholars should focus closer attention on the role of the KGB, with a view to reinstating the discredited totalitarian model of the Soviet Union.

[44] The sudden deaths of two Party colleagues in puzzling circumstances makes one wonder whether Brezhnev has not already employed the KGB to eliminate opposition. F. Kulakov, thought to be a prime contender for Brezhnev's post, suffered some clear setbacks right before his unexpected death on 17 July 1978: he stood last in the leadership line-up on May Day and was absent from a crucial CC Plenum on agriculture in early July, though he was Party secretary responsible for this sector and seen at other functions. Surprisingly, Brezhnev, Kosygin and Suslov were all absent from his funeral. P. Masherov, Belorussian Party leader and candidate Politburo member, was reported to have died in a car crash in the countryside on 6 October 1980. Just a month before, while Masherov was away from Minsk, the KGB chairman in Belorussia was replaced after 10 years in that post and other personnel shakeups followed. No Politburo members attended Masherov's funeral—an unprecedented slight—but K. Mazurov, the former Politburo member ousted by Brezhnev in 1978 and a close ally of Masherov, emerged from obscurity to attend.

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The Frankfurt Marxists and the Columbia Liberals

Lewis S. Feuer

IN 1934, the only Marxist research institute in the Western world, the Institut für Sozialforschung, was offered a building by Columbia University. For several decades the president of the University had been Nicholas Murray Butler, an austere conservative much disliked and derided for many years by America's Leftists and liberals as Nicholas "Miraculous" Butler.[1] This offer of hospitality was scarcely in keeping with what Marxist theory should have led Marxists to expect; one therefore turns to the standard histories of the Frankfurt School to find their explanation for such unexpected behaviour. The chief account tells:

> Over the years, the Institut had made several contacts with prominent figures in the American academic world, such as Beard, Robert MacIver, Wesley Mitchell, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Robert Lynd, all of whom were at Columbia University. Thus when Horkheimer made his first trip to the United States in May 1934, he was able to gain access to Columbia's patriarchal president, Nicholas Murray Butler. Much to his surprise, Butler offered the Institut affiliation with the University and a home in one of its buildings, at 429 West 117th Street. Horkheimer, fearing he had misunderstood Butler because of his limited command of English, wrote a four-page letter asking him to confirm and clarify his offer. Butler's response was a laconic "You have understood me perfectly." And so the International Institute for Social Research, as revolutionary and Marxist as it had appeared in Frankfurt in the 1920s, came to settle in the centre of the capitalist world, New York City.[2]

There is a pleasant naïveté in this account as it records the "surprise" of the Director of the Marxist Institute; one is left uncomfortable, however, by the knowledge that history has not been made this way by Marxists.[3] What then did take place, and how was it that Butler's administration invited the Institute to Columbia University?

The following account is based solely on the correspondence preserved in the Presidential Archives of Columbia University, to which I

[1] Upton Sinclair, *The Goose Step: A Study of American Education*, Rev. Ed. (Pasadena, 1923), p. 40 ff. Horace Coon, *Columbia: Colossus on the Hudson* (New York, 1947), p. 18. James Wechsler, *Revolt on the Campus* (New York, 1935), pp. 17, 111.

[2] Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950* (Boston, 1973), p. 39.

[3] The account by Mr Jay is based on an interview with Max Horkheimer 35 years later in March 1969.

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was generously granted access by President William J. McGill; I am grateful for the helpful assistance of their Curator, Mrs Sara Vos.

THE story begins on 4 June 1934, when the chairman of the Department of Sociology, Robert M. MacIver,[4] addressed a letter to President Butler:

June 4, 1934

Dear Mr President:

It has come to my notice that a body of scholars, established previously at Frankfurt am Main is in process of locating themselves in this country. Their journal, *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, is a recognized and valuable medium for studies in the social sciences. They are in the fortunate position of having their funds outside Germany—fortunate, in view of the fact that they can no longer continue their studies at Frankfurt. They are anxious to receive some recognition from an American University. They have had offers, I understand, from the University of Chicago and also from Princeton, but they would welcome, more than anything else, a connection with Columbia.

At this late season, it is probably not possible to work out a scheme of affiliation and there are, no doubt, various questions which should be looked into before definite steps are taken in that direction. But I would suggest that in the meantime a very good purpose could be served and the beginnings of a closer relationship established if this body of scholars were offered housing facilities by Columbia.

Faithfully yours,
R. M. MacIver

MacIver himself never seems to have shown any interest in the work of the men who constituted the Institute in 1934. It is doubtful that his mastery of German was sufficient to enable him to read their journal; there is no mention of the Institute or its members in his autobiography. The initiative for inviting the Institute to Columbia University came rather from his colleague, Professor Robert M. Lynd; as the active intermediary, Lynd had evidently persuaded his chairman to make the first formal proposal for its reception. MacIver's letter, however, carried great weight with President Butler and the Columbia administration. Butler greatly respected MacIver's judgment, having turned to him a few years earlier when "the department of sociology was in a parlous state." At that time influential members of the University had proposed that the department of sociology be abolished; helped by the plea of the philosopher John Dewey that it be retained, a majority voted "in favour of retention. The department of sociology was saved."[5] Soon afterwards, MacIver, a political scientist, and not a member of

[4] Cf. *The Autobiography of R. M. MacIver, As a Tale That Is Told* (Chicago, 1968), pp. 99, 114.

[5] Ibid. pp. 98, 99, 105. Cf. however, R. M. MacIver, *Social Causation* (Boston, 1942), p. 400.

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Columbia's department of sociology, was asked to become its chairman.[6] Shortly the first bewildering impact of the Great Depression was being experienced; the University and its social scientists, observing at first hand the miseries of New York's people, were stirred to enquire into the causes of and possible solutions for the problems of the times. A commission was set up under Columbia's auspices, and President Butler personally appointed Robert MacIver as its chairman. He had complete confidence in MacIver's judgment and probity.

That same day, 4 June 1934, a conversation concerning the Institute took place between Professor MacIver and President Butler. The President, at once moved by the idea of coming to the aid of a group of German liberal scholars in distress, wrote the next day:

June 5, 1934

My dear Professor MacIver:

Following our conversation of yesterday, I have received and read your letter of the 4th and have examined the accompanying paper.

We shall be very glad to offer accommodation at Columbia, so far as we can do so without cost to ourselves, to the body of scholars which you describe. Whether there will be sufficient space available on Morningside Heights I do not know, but Secretary Fackenthal will be very glad to take this matter up with you.

There certainly will be plenty of space at the Old Medical School buildings on 59th Street. Unfortunately, that is some distance from our Library but it may be the best that we can do at the moment. Mr Fackenthal will discuss and arrange details with you as you may suggest.

This group of scholars, having funds at their disposal, may wish to make certain expenditures in the space assigned for rearrangement and equipment. This can all be arranged through our Department of Buildings and Grounds or through the Office of our Treasurer.

Faithfully yours,
Nicholas Murray Butler

The ensuing negotiations were conducted on behalf of the Institute not by the Director, Max Horkheimer, but by Dr Julian Gumperz, so much so that the Institute was referred to by the Secretary of Columbia University, Frank D. Fackenthal, as "the Gumperz group." Who was Julian Gumperz? Gumperz, a Marxist of long standing, had been active in Germany during most of his adult life in a variety of communist activities. He was most well known as the head of the "fellow traveller publishing house," Malik Verlag. The firm, however, also "was responsible for the fame of Upton Sinclair in Europe."[7] In 1925, he was

[6] Ibid. p. 106.

[7] Hede Massing, *This Deception* (New York, 1951), p. 44. G. L. Ulmen, *The Science of Society: Toward an Understanding of the Life and Work of Karl August Wittfogel* (The Hague, 1978), p. 25.

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asked to supervise all of the German Communist Party publishing." [8] According to Hedda Korsch, the wealthy Felix Weil endowed the Verlag as he also did the Institut für Sozialforschung.[9] Gumperz, actually American-born (1898), had grown up in Germany as the child of a wealthy paper manufacturer, studied economics at the University of Halle, and at the age of 20 began publishing an anti-war magazine, *Der Gegner* (The Adversary), that included among its contributors such men as the later famed Left-wing painter, George Grosz. For two-and-a-half years, from 1920 to 1923, Gumperz's journal "supported the struggle of the proletariat" with drawings by Grosz, articles "about and for the Soviet Union," and an advocacy of Piscator's methods in "the proletarian theatre." [10] A visit that Gumperz made to the Soviet Union in the early spring of 1923 filled him with tremendous enthusiasm. Hede Massing (who became for a time his wife) recalled in 1951 how he brought the good tidings:

> His white shirt open at the throat, his blond hair ruffled by the wind, his open, smiling face bent towards me, he spoke eagerly. He was a picture of the good life. The good life that was going to be shared by the whole world and had started in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, the wonderful land that had so struggled and that was still in the midst of upheaval; the people we must help with all that we could muster, with all that was in us. I will never forget how Julian described a demonstration on the Red Square. . . . He had stood for hours, he said, watching Trotzky stand with fist raised, the soldiers and marines passing in review; "Hours and hours Trotzky stood there like an iron giant," Julian said. "Not any more the little Jew, but an iron giant. That is what the revolution does to people, it elevates them even physically." . . . Julian was known at the time, in Communist circles, as an "easy touch"; today he is known as "the mother of all old refugees." [11]

Gumperz's publishing activities had their risks. In 1924, together with his partner, Herzfelde, and the artist, Grosz, Gumperz was found guilty of having published obscene material in Grosz's grim book of drawings, *Ecce Homo*. The argument of the defence, that these artistic works were intended as a moral critique of contemporary society, failed to persuade the court; Gumperz paid a fine.[12]

In later years, Julian Gumperz collaborated with a "Comintern" functionary in writing a personal and interpretative history of the Communist International. Essentially finished in the winter of 1943, it was published in 1947 under the pseudonym "Ypsilon," and entitled *Pattern for World Revolution*. Its description of the "fellow-traveller"

[8] Hede Massing, op. cit. p. 55.
[9] Hedda Korsch, "Memories of Karl Korsch," *New Left Review*, No. 76, Nov.–Dec. 1972, p. 43.
[10] Beth Irwin Lewis, *George Grosz: Art and Politics in the Weimar Republic* (Madison, 1931), p. 82.
[11] Hede Massing, op. cit. pp. 45–46.
[12] Beth Irwin Lewis, *George Grosz: Art and Politics in the Weimar Republic*, p. 219.

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as a social-intellectual type was doubtless also applicable to Gumperz's colleagues in publishing enterprises and the Institut für Sozialforschung:

> In becoming a fellow traveller one says goodbye to common sense, one must look down upon logic and eliminate all genuine thinking within oneself. But in exchange one receives something bordering on the miraculous. One can live in opposition to the world and its terrors without incurring the risks of opposition. In a world in collapse, engaged in reappraising all its value, one can go to sleep in the bed of opposition dreaming oneself to be a hero. One becomes an emissary of the socialist empire in the clouds. One can carry the inflammatory power of the revolution in one's pocket like a box of matches. One can save the world and be saved oneself. One can go to sleep in peace in a world at war with itself.[13]

Whether Julian Gumperz, for all his multifarious communist activities was formally a member of the Communist Party is shrouded with uncertainties arising from (what we might call) " the principle of communist indeterminacy." The sympathetic historian of the Frankfurt School writes unequivocally that Gumperz like Karl Wittfogel was (or had been) a member of the Communist Party.[14] According to Professor Wittfogel's recollection, Gumperz later became identified with the faction in the German Communist Party led by Heinrich Brandler, a former leader of the party, who was finally expelled in 1929.[15] Gumperz's former wife, Hede Massing, seemed to be of one-and-a-half minds in this regard. In her book *This Deception,* she wrote that " Julian Gumperz was probably never a regular Party member." [16] On the other hand, in her testimony before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee that same year, she noted that while " it is never discussed among communists whether you are a communist," [17] she took it for granted that if a person was a friend of Julian Gumperz, that person was " one of us." According to her usage, a person could be " an outstanding communist " without having ever taken out " a Party membership." [18] In this murky

[13] Ypsilon, *Pattern for World Revolution* (Chicago, 1947), p. 280. Ulmen, op. cit. p. 216. The historian Bertram D. Wolfe, author of the classic *Three Who Made a Revolution,* regarded the book *Pattern for World Revolution* as " an amazing, colourful, incredible and deeply moving story," " the inside story of the rise and fall of the Communist International." He judged from the personal references by the two authors that when the Communist International was born, " they joined immediately in the formation of their respective Communist Parties," held posts of responsibility, and " formed part of the camaraderie of Moscow agents . . ." Bertram D. Wolfe, " The Rise and Fall of the Comintern," *The American Mercury,* Vol. LXIV, Mar. 1947, pp. 367–68.

[14] Jay, op. cit. p. 13.

[15] Discussion with Professor Karl August Wittfogel, 29 Apr. 1980, New York City. Cf. Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism; a study in the origins of the state party* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), p. 224.

[16] Hede Massing, op. cit. p. 43.

[17] *Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,* op. cit. p. 256.

[18] Ibid. p. 258.

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area, a man's own wife could be puzzled as to whether her own husband held a Communist Party card, though convinced that any good friend of his was a communist. Not to mention the additional fact that there were Communist Party members who never possessed cards of membership. Dr Julian Gumperz, a communist according to one of these elusive categories of the underground, "one of us" as both Hede Massing and Joseph Conrad would say, represented the Institut für Sozialforschung in its negotiations with Columbia University.

A MEETING was shortly proposed between the Secretary of the University, Frank D. Fackenthal, and both Julian Gumperz and Max Horkheimer. A handwritten note on 18 June 1934 from Lynd to Fackenthal invited him to a Thursday lunch with Gumperz and "Dr Hochheimer [sic] of the Institute." Lynd queried whether Fackenthal still preferred to remain in the background, and "how definite we can be about the 117th St. house." So little familiar was Lynd with Horkheimer that he made two mistakes in spelling his name.

Unable to attend the luncheon, Fackenthal relied almost wholly on Lynd's assurance and description of the character of the Institute. As Secretary Fackenthal wrote to Lynd on 20 June 1934:

> The main point at issue is, I think, whether or not we wish to tie up with the Frankfurt Institute. If you are clear on that point, I see no reason why you should not talk to them of the possibility of space on 117th Street not, of course, going so far as to say it can be assigned. Before he sailed, I talked to the President and I think he would be willing to assign 429 to them. I am not certain, however, that we could find very much money to use for rehabilitation.

Persuaded by Robert Lynd's endorsement of the Institute, Secretary Fackenthal was without further ado prepared that "a reasonably quick decision should be made" by "early next week" so that "the Institute could be installed there surely by the opening of the University in the fall." The luncheon was eminently successful for the Institute; Julian Gumperz was a man of unusual charm, culture, and acumen. The day afterward, 22 June 1934, he wrote to Robert Lynd:

> I wish to express . . . our feeling of gratitude for your efforts and to tell you that we will be glad to accept such an offer as was discussed yesterday.

Thereupon, Professor Lynd in a pencilled note reported to the University Secretary, Fackenthal, on the happy outcome of the negotiations. The Société Internationale de Recherches Sociales, he wrote,

> are entirely ready to use their funds to make the bldg. on 117th St. ready for them, but asked whether if they did that it would be a one-year arrangement. I said that my understanding was that under those circumstances it would be a three- or four-year arrangement. They are very pleasant people to deal with.

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Lynd now deemed the time was proper for him to relinquish his role as intermediary, and that Fackenthal " should take over the matter now as it seems to have arrived at a stage for official action."

Responding that same day to Lynd's pencilled note, Fackenthal answered with a first manifestation of administrative circumspection on 25 June 1934:

> Has there been a definite exchange of letters between the Gumperz group and our Sociology group in regard to the relationship between the two that will give the University such guarantees as may be desirable in regard to the activities of the Institute? Is it proposed that we have any official connexion with them, advisory or other, or are we simply offering that space and letting them go their own way?

Fackenthal was indeed ready to accede to the Institute's wish for " a three- or four-year arrangement." Reiterating that " I think the matter could be closed very quickly," he asked to see the " exchange of letters between your Department and Dr Gumperz with the request for the assignment of space."

At this point, Robert Lynd began evidently to feel misgivings about his whole role in persuading the University to invite the Institute to its grounds. He had never told the University that the Institute was a Marxist one, never mentioned that apart from Gumperz, its most well-known scientific figure, Karl August Wittfogel, also had an impressive record of many years' public activity in the German Communist Party. The University was rushing ahead, in its generosity, and even thinking of conferring teaching responsibilities and Faculty status on the Institute. Professor Lynd thereupon felt it incumbent to interject some qualifications and reservations, and to play down prudently his own role in the affair. He wrote twice to the University Secretary on 25 June 1934. The first letter was typewritten:

> Dear Mr Fackenthal:
>
> The enclosed copy of President Butler's letter, with MacIver's accompanying letter to Gumperz is the only documentary material I know of. There may be something else in writing of which I do not know. I assume that you know that Professor MacIver called together the Committee on Instruction—I think just before he saw the President—and they are reported by MacIver to have been heartily in favour of the move. McCrea and Austen [sic] Evans have both talked with Gumperz and you may want to get in touch with them.
>
> My own part in this whole matter has been simply that of a contact person since I first called the possibility to the attention of MacIver and McBain. Gumperz sent a large packet of their publications to MacIver which I have not seen. MacIver expressed himself to me as very much interested in them. Austen Evans also has a copy of one of their books in which he also expressed great interest.

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The only possible entanglement in this whole affair lies in the fact that the Institute is on the liberal-radical side. I have called this to MacIver's attention and think he is pretty well aware of it. From what little I have seen of their work and from my conversation with Gumperz I think it is fair to conclude that they are a research agency with high standards and not interested in propaganda.

There is one loose thread that can perhaps be ignored now: MacIver spoke to Gumperz of the possibility of giving the Director of the Institute a seat on the Faculty of Political Science. I suspect that he first mentioned this possibility to McBain, though I have no positive knowledge of this. This step has not come up since in any of my conversations with Gumperz and it may be well to leave it to one side for the present and let MacIver handle it if and when the matter comes up again.

To return to your question as to whether there is anywhere a letter from Gumperz requesting an assignment of space. I suspect that there is no such letter for the following reason: I was told through another person that Gumperz was very anxious not to appear in the light of making a request of Columbia which might be turned down, and that he wanted the move to come from Columbia. I think this is readily understandable in view of the fact that the whole tenor of the conversations has been in terms of a very loose affiliation with the University with the possible appointment of one or two members of our Faculty of Political Science to their governing board and complete autonomy for them.

Evidently a telephone conversation between Lynd and Gumperz took place that same day, 25 June. Gumperz in his letter to Lynd on 22 June, after stating that "I tried to get you on the telephone this morning," and had "failed to do so," added: "I will be very much obliged if you will get in touch with me as soon as possible, because I intend to go down to Washington next Wednesday and would like to have this affair settled before leaving."

Lynd scrawled a pencilled, second note to Secretary Fackenthal:

June 25

Dear Mr Fackenthal:

I shall be glad if you can take over this matter now as it seems to have arrived at a stage for official action.

They are entirely ready to make the bldg. on 117th St. ready for them, but asked whether if they did that it would be a one-year arrangement. I said that my understanding was that under those circumstances it would be a three- or four-year arrangement. They are very pleasant people to deal with.

Truly yours,
Robert S. Lynd

One key phrase in Lynd's first letter indicates how he succeeded as "contact" between his Columbia colleagues and the Frankfurt Institute —"the Institute is on the liberal-radical side." Nicholas Murray Butler

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was attached to the word "liberal," having always described himself as such. "The liberal," wrote Butler, "treasures the historic associations of his faith. He finds them in John Milton and John Hampden. . . . He finds them in Thomas Jefferson and in Abraham Lincoln. He finds them in William Ewart Gladstone and in John Morley.[19] Morley, above all, "was a born liberal." And Butler declared:

> Nothing is more pathetic than the spectacle of the collectivist endeavouring to seize for himself the name liberal. He is the reactionary of reactionaries, while the liberal is consistently progressive and a builder. In the eyes of the liberal, liberty is as Lord Acton described it, an end in itself, the highest political end, and not merely a means to some end.[20]

The antithesis to liberalism, according to Butler, is that "doctrine which makes for uniformity and conformity. . . . It sometimes takes the form of socialism, sometimes that of communism, . . ." The word "radical" was more ambiguous in Butler's view. "Occasionally there is to be found a radical who is really a liberal, but most radicals wage war upon liberty. . . ." When Lynd, therefore, used the description "liberal-radical," it conveyed the assurance that the Institute's researchers were men similar in their standpoint to John Stuart Mill's "philosophic radicalism," the kind that was compatible with, and even corollary to, liberalism.

Robert MacIver had the same attachment to the liberal philosophy. He wrote in his credo: "I am a liberal in the literal sense of the word. I believe in a society where all men are free to go their own ways, to enjoy their own styles and customs, to find their own salvation. . . ." Those who were dominated by the notion of equalizing power were ineluctably led towards despotism: "That is why communism in any strict sense must mean absolute rule, not the meaningless dictatorship of a proletariat but the sheer control of a potentate and his clique."[21]

THE next day, 26 June 1934, barely three weeks since the time Robert MacIver had first broached the subject to the Columbia University authorities, its Secretary, Frank D. Fackenthal, drafted a formal offer to Dr Julian Gumperz, of 610 Fifth Avenue, New York City. He asked Professor Lynd to review the letter, and if Lynd found it satisfactory in tone, to deliver it in person to Gumperz:

June 26, 1934

Memorandum for Professor Lynd:

If the attached letter is in accordance with your understanding and is not lacking in cordiality, will you kindly deliver it to Dr Gumperz? If, however, you would like to have some changes made

[19] Nicholas Murray Butler, *The Faith of a Liberal: Essays and Addresses on Political Principles and Public Policies* (New York, 1924), pp. 15–16.

[20] Ibid. p. 7.

[21] *The Autobiography of R. M. MacIver*, pp 213, 226.

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in it, let me have it back with your suggestions. I am returning the letters which accompanied your letter of the 25th.

Evidently Lynd was not available for transmitting the letter in person; it was therefore dispatched to Dr Gumperz by special delivery:

Dear Dr Gumperz:

In continuation of the conversations which Professor MacIver and Professor Lynd have had with you in regard to the location of the work of the Société Internationale de Recherches Sociales in the neighbourhood of Columbia University, I am very glad on behalf of the President to offer you, as office space, the house at 429 West 117th Street. The house will need rehabilitation and unfortunately the University is at the moment without funds that it could use in this way. I understand from Professor MacIver, however, that your Society, on the assurance that occupancy might be had for three or four years, is prepared to put the house in shape for occupancy. I know of no reason why you should not look forward to at least that period. It is our assumption that your Society will take care of the maintenance and service of the building and reimburse the University for the cost of heating. The cost of heating has been conventionalized at $200 a year in the case of those houses occupied by non-University organizations. If this proposal commends itself to you, we will at once find other quarters for the present occupants of the building and you can then arrange with the University's Department of Buildings and Grounds for the rehabilitation of the building. Please be assured that we are all looking forward with great pleasure to association with the research work conducted by your group.

Very truly yours,
Frank D. Fackenthal

Julian Gumperz was a great admirer of the ill-fated picaresque Willi Münzenberg, a man who has been described as " a genius without rival in the creation and manipulation of front-organizations."[22] Münzenberg could enlist Albert Einstein, Romain Rolland, Bernard Shaw, Anatole France, and subtend a numerous company of distinguished German writers and artists to adorn the letterheads of fellow-travelling societies as sponsors and honorary officers, and even to attend their congresses; he conjured them as a magician to make dramatic appearances. He organized them with such finesse that many of them scarcely realized they were acting out parts written by a communist political dramatist. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, for instance, evidently continued to believe that the First Congress of the League against Imperialism that he attended " was not a communist-controlled thing. This was really a tribute to Mr Münzenberg," observed Karl Wittfogel.[23] In the words

[22] David Caute, *The Fellow-Travellers: A Postscript to the Enlightenment* (New York, 1973), p. 55.

[23] *Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings of the Committee on the Judiciary*, op. cit. p. 312. Also cf. Babette Gross, *Willi Münzenberg: A Political Biography*, tr. Marian Jackson (East Lansing, 1974), pp. 185, 180.

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of Julian Gumperz and his co-author, Münzenberg "was the discoverer of the fellow-traveller. With his fine instinct, he could always ferret out intellectuals, first in Germany and later on in France and England who had fallen into despair over the failure of democracy, and who admired the achievements of the Soviet Union without having become communists. He organized the fellow-travellers without their knowing it. He gave them space in his newspapers and books. . . ."[24] Münzenberg became "a party with the Party. He directed his affairs by sound business methods and principles." Moreover, his financial ability could draw on immense reserves. As Gumperz and his collaborator wrote: "The generosity of the Comintern was at his disposal, and he knew how to utilize it."[25] Münzenberg's delight as mentor to fellow-travellers was to make their organizations self-sustaining. "'It isn't difficult to accept money from Moscow and publish newspapers with it, he would say.' Any idiot can do that. But it's a hard job to get communist propaganda financed by the bourgeoisie. And that I am doing." Lenin himself had written a letter of personal thanks and admiration to Münzenberg.[26] Direct Soviet support enabled him to build up what was called Münzenberg's "Trust" in relative independence from the interference of the changing sets of German Communist Party officials.[27] Julian Gumperz evidently took Münzenberg as his model as far as his dealings with fellow-travellers and the German Communist Party apparatus were concerned. Though he was the publisher for both and "employed many communists," his aim had been to make his firm "financially and politically independent of the Party."[28] He was the ideal man to deal at Columbia University with the fellow-traveller Robert S. Lynd. He employed the well-tried methods with the naïve Americans. The letterhead of the Institute of Social Research was to grow with the years announcing such advising names as Charles A. Beard, Morris R. Cohen, Stephen Duggan, Philip C. Jessup, Charles H. McIlwain, Wesley Mitchell, George H. Sabine. Münzenberg had taught that the vanity of the letterhead was a potent agent for conjuring forth fellow-travellers; his pupil Gumperz learned the art.

Was the Institut für Sozialforschung at its inception one of Willi Münzenberg's many ventures in the organization of fellow-travellers? If that were so, the millionaire Felix J. Weil, its financier and benefactor, was possibly a collaborative pioneer in the "conduit" form of organization later much used by intelligence and propagandist organizations in their benefaction to various educational and intellectual ventures. The

[24] Ypsilon, op. cit. p. 198.

[25] Ibid. pp. 196–97. The authors writing under the pseudonym "Ypsilon," Julian Gumperz and Johann Rindl, are identified in *A Catalog of Books Represented by Library of Congress Printed Cards, Supplement, 1942–1947*, Vol. 42 (Ann Arbor, 1948), p. 460.

[26] Babette Gross, *Willi Münzenberg: A Political Biography*, tr. Marian Jackson (East Lansing, 1974), p. 124.

[27] Ibid. pp. 144–45. Cf. Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism*, p. 613.

[28] Hede Massing, op. cit. p. 44.

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first man appointed Director of the Institute, an economist, Kurt Albert Gerlach, was evidently "at this time a member of the Communist Party."[29] Weil, the helpful and generous millionaire, had been converted to Marxism partially under the influence of the leading communist philosopher and future deputy in the Reichstag, Kark Korsch.[30] When in 1922 he organized a Marxist Work Week, its participants were mainly communists such as Korsch, Lukacs, Sorge, Julian Gumperz, Karl Wittfogel, Klara Zetkin's son, Hede Eisler, then wife of the later famed spy, Gerhart Eisler, who was editing the communist journal *Rote Fahne*[31] (Hede became the wife of Julian Gumperz the following year), and the recent Hungarian Commissar of Education, Georg Lukacs. Weil had wished to call his organizational creation the "Institut für Marxismus"; this notion was jettisoned, however, as too provocative or unseemly for a group that was seeking to affiliate with the University of Frankfurt; consequently, the society was christened with the more "Aesopian" but probably less accurate name "Institute for Social Research." Weil, however, retained control of the financial resources.[32]

The Institute moreover evidently became a recruiting ground for the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow and indeed for the Soviet espionage service. Among its small squad of doctoral students, for instance, was the "dear friend" of Hede Gumperz, Richard Sorge; later probably the most celebrated individual spy of the second world war, he was executed by the Japanese Imperial Government.[33] "[A] great exodus of German communists with academic training to the Marx-Engels Institute" in Moscow was taking place, recalled Hede Massing, saying it would "read like a detective story. . . . How much tragedy, disillusionment, heartache, and pain it has seen within its walls!"[34]

Richard Sorge, when he enrolled as a student with the Institute, had already been for several years an active communist agitator and organizer; a member of its forerunner political groups, he joined the German Communist Party a few months after it was founded. In

[29] Cf. Jay, p. 9. F. W. Deakin and G. R. Storry, *The Case of Richard Sorge* (New York, 1966), p. 32. The latter authors surmise that Sorge's connexion with the Institute must have been a "cover." Professor Wittfogel, on the other hand, recalls that Gerlach was an "anarchist" in his philosophy, much interested in Marxism, but not a communist. Discussion, 29 Apr. 1980.

[30] Karl Korsch was, as Professor Wittfogel recalls, the man whom Felix Weil would have preferred to have had as the first Director of the Institute. This idea was, however, opposed among others by Friedrich Pollock who felt that Korsch was too unpredictable, too much the "cavalry officer," given to sudden enthusiasms and charges. Discussion with Karl August Wittfogel, 29 Apr. 1980. George Grosz, in his autobiography, depicts Felix Weil speaking "with great enthusiasm of a project he was planning: the establishment of a university for social science in his native city, Frankfurt-am-Main." Grosz's paintings and drawings at that time, with their savage satire of Weimar society, transcribed, we might say, the standpoint of "Critical Theory" into art. *A Little Yes and a Big No: The Autobiography of George Grosz*, tr. Lola Sachs Dorin (New York, 1946), p. 210.

[31] Jay, op. cit. p. 5. Hede Massing, op. cit. pp. 37–40. Ulmen, op. cit. p. 47.

[32] Jay, op. cit. pp. 8–9.

[33] Hede Massing, ibid. pp. 67–71.

[34] Ibid. p. 72.

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March 1925, Sorge's membership was transferred to the Soviet Communist Party, which assigned him to work in the Communist International Intelligence Division.[35] Sorge had already received a Ph.D. degree at the University of Hamburg in 1920, yet it was deemed time well spent for him to become a graduate assistant at the Institute. Sorge, moreover, " was a close friend of Felix Weil and had been Gerlach's assistant." [36] Sorge and Gerlach had known each other as fellow-revolutionists when they served together as members of the Workers and Soldiers' Council (Soviet) at Kiel in 1918.[37] Sorge two years later became an assistant to Gerlach at Aachen; moreover, in 1920, he married Christiane, the divorced wife of Gerlach.[38] And when Karl August Wittfogel moved to Frankfurt, becoming a permanent member of the Institute, he and Sorge also became good friends. Sorge, in his capacity as the Director's assistant, served in effect as the secretary of the Institute.[39] Julian Gumperz too was among those who took his Ph.D. degree at the Institute.[40]

It should, moreover, be borne in mind that during its first years in Germany, the men who constituted the Institute were far more politically involved and active than the later group that became well known in the United States.[41] Karl August Wittfogel, the one member of the Institute who was consistently active politically through the decade of the twenties, was to continue such activity even after the advent of the Nazis to power. Wittfogel's studies of Chinese society were recognized

[35] Cf. " Richard Sorge's Own Story," in Major General Charles A. Willoughby, *Shanghai Conspiracy: The Sorge Spy Ring* (New York, 1952), pp. 146–47. Chalmers Johnson, *An Instance of Treason: Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge Spy Ring* (Stanford, 1964), pp. 71–72. Deakin and Storry, p. 27.

[36] Ulmen, p. 63.

[37] Nicole Chatel et Elain Guérin, *Camarade Sorge (avec la collaboration de Keiko Kishi)* (Paris, 1965), p. 41.

[38] Ibid. p. 10. Also, Ulmen, p. 63. Deakin and Storry, p. 30.

[39] Sorge told people that he was the grandson of Karl Marx's comrade of 1848, Friedrich A. Sorge, who had then emigrated to the United States. Professor Wittfogel tells me that Christiane Sorge, Richard's former wife, informed him that the story was without foundation, that Sorge had concocted it entirely and that he was no relative of Marx's friend. Researchers subsequently became aware of discrepancies in Sorge's purported ancestry. Communist scholars, perhaps in homage to the Soviet cult of Sorge, have tried to salvage a status for Richard Sorge as the grandnephew of Marx's comrade. Cf. Chatel et Guérin, *Camarade Sorge*, pp. 56–58. Also, cf. Deakin and Storry, p. 36. The text of Sorge's " own story " in Chatel and Guérin refers to " my grandfather Adolf Sorge." That description does not appear in the text from which it was translated. Cf., Chatel et Guérin, op. cit. p. 222. Willoughby, *Shanghai Conspiracy*, p. 146. Aso, p. 143. Cf. Massing, p. 68.

[40] Ibid. pp. 60, 65.

[41] The second director of the Institute, Karl Grünberg, called himself one of the " partisans of Marxism." The third director, Max Horkheimer, although he spoke, according to Peter Gay, in " more Aesopian " language, still left no doubt " that the Frankfurt Institute would not surrender the Marxism that Grünberg had proclaimed." Peter Gay, " Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider," in Fleming and Bailyn, eds., op. cit. pp. 46, 47. The Marxist theory of history, as Herbert Marcuse wrote, provided " certain notions common to all members of the staff." Herbert Marcuse, " Preface," Franz Neumann, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State* (New York, 1957), p. viii. Also cf. Sidney Lipshires, *Herbert Marcuse: From Marx to Freud and Beyond* (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), p. 12.

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as the most original contribution that any Marxist sociologist had made to the macro-understanding of a particular society. Having joined the German Communist Party in 1920, he remained a member until the end of 1932 or the beginning of 1933. During the latter year he was imprisoned in several concentration camps for about nine months.[42] Wittfogel, notes his biographer, "was the only one of the Institute's members to abandon his scholarly work in order to fight Hitler."[43] He contributed a series of anti-Nazi articles in late 1931 to Willi Münzenberg's *Rote Aufbau.* Then, declining an invitation to visit China, "he asked the Institute to permit him to continue writing full time on the political crisis in Germany. This the Institute agreed to do."[44] Curiously, Wittfogel was the only member of the Institute to write articles on the subject of anti-semitism; "one can look in vain for an article dealing with anti-semitism or indeed anything concerned with Hitler and Nazism in the pages of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* for the years 1932 and 1933."[45] The Institute's standpoint was not inconsistent with the communist policy of playing down any formulations that singled out the Jewish people rather than the proletariat in general. Nor did any page or paragraph in critique of Soviet society or Stalin's policies ever find its way into their Marxist books or articles. Whatever the circumstances of their foundation, the Institut für Sozialforschung in its later years became more tepid in its communist leaning, preferring a more amorphous variety of fellow-travelling. As undefined fellow-travellers, they criticized bourgeois culture and society, while preserving at least a common denominator of silence with regard to all such phenomena as the purges, "trials," labour camps, and "liquidation" of Old Bolsheviks and Trotskyists, geneticists, and the more productive peasants.[46]

DURING its years at Columbia University, the Institute had little desire to engage in any teaching, or work with graduate students.[47] It was not solely that they wished to devote themselves to their writing of books and research. Rather they found it easier to remain academic fellow-travellers if they avoided interchanges with graduate students. For among Columbia University's Leftists, unlike Harvard's Left wing, not

[42] *Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings of the Committee on the Judiciary,* op. cit. p. 274.
[43] Ulmen, op. cit. p. 146.
[44] Loc. cit.
[45] Ibid. p. 146.
[46] Slater, p. 55.
[47] The account of the Department of Sociology by Seymour M. Lipset in R. Gordon Hoxie, et al., *A History of the Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University* (New York, 1955) contains no mention of the Institute for Social Research. The brief association of Paul F. Lazarsfeld with the Institute is, perhaps correctly, ignored. The appointment of Franz L. Neumann, a later member of the Institute, as Professor of Government, is recorded in the account of the Department of Public Law and Government, p. 281. A seminar on the problems of authoritarianism was sponsored by the Institute. Ulmen, op. cit. p. 209.

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only were there aggressive critics of Stalin, but also a contingent of Trotskyist students and even, it was said, Trotskyist professors.[48] To leave the protective seclusion of one's Institute involved the chance of being confronted with embarrassing questions about the Moscow trials, the purges, and the Soviet social structure, directed against them from rather blunt-speaking children of Polish and Russian Jews, graduates of the City College.

A change too was taking place in the composition of the Institute; its outlook continued to change gradually during the latter 1930s and 1940s.[49] Before the second world war, the Institute was known as the "Café Marx"; after the war, German students were to call it the "Café Max," thereby emphasizing the predilection for Hegelian metaphysics of its Director as well as its "Linkssnobismus" (Left-snobbism).[50] Students in New York City had had much the same feeling about the Institute.

Without any overt indication, the two principal politically-involved persons in the Institute circle were during the thirties increasingly estranged from Stalinism and Soviet Communism. Although the Institute as a whole held on to its fellow-travelling perch, the basic doubts of Karl Wittfogel and Julian Gumperz both concerning the Marxist political movement became insurmountable. It is difficult to chronicle Gumperz's intellectual evolution precisely, as he was a man of the background. The preface of his book stated that "for the first 15 years of the Comintern the authors could fall back upon personal notes, memories, notes of participants, biographies, reports of important officials of the general staff of the 'world revolution'." Evidently then by the mid-1930s, Gumperz's ties with the communist movement were slowly dissolving; yet he shielded them with anonymity. As for Wittfogel, romantic militant of 1921, whose play *Red Soldiers* had been produced in Berlin by Piscator himself, then the daring communist innovator of the stage,[51] he had finally concluded that Stalin's Communist Party had helped bring Hitler to power in Germany; his traumatic experience helped Wittfogel to fashion his original theory of Oriental Despotism

[48] According to Friedrich Pollock in an interview in 1969, "the Moscow trials were very, very shocking to himself and members of the Frankfurt group." If so, this shock on their part was a well-kept political secret, divulged neither in writing nor public discussion during the thirties. Sidney Lipshires, *Herbert Marcuse: From Marx to Freud and Beyond* (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), p. 27. According to another writer, "It is to the credit of the Frankfurt School that their criticisms of Stalinist Russia were more than a horrified reaction to the 'Purge Trials'." But the author bases this judgment not on any statement published during the 1930s but on one in 1955. Wherein the credit? Cf. Phil Slater, *Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School: A Marxist Perspective* (London, 1977), p. 62.

[49] Neumann joined the Institute in 1936, and Adorno in 1938. H. Stuart Hughes, "Franz Neumann: Between Marxism and Liberal Democracy"; Theodor W. Adorno, "Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America," in D. Fleming and B. Bailyn, eds., *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960* (Cambridge, Mass.), pp. 341, 448.

[50] Ulmen, op. cit. p. 478.

[51] Caute, *The Fellow Travellers*, p. 48.

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according to which a socialized technology and economy might provide the groundwork for an inherently stable totalitarian society. By 1939, Wittfogel (in his words) broke "connexions with people whom I considered communist." [52] Not so, however, the fellow-travelling Institute. In the spring of 1942, they sought a rapprochement with the communist-guided editorial board of the journal *Science and Society*; several of them, including Marcuse and Neumann, met at the home of the senior editor, Bernhard J. Stern, a Columbia Lecturer in Sociology, to discuss their community of approach.

WHAT may we conclude from this record of facts?

The Frankfurt Marxists engaged in a subtle sort of misrepresentation to the Columbia authorities. They never stated straightforwardly what their second Director, Karl Grünberg, had declared, that the "research method of Marxism" determined the "scientific task" of the Institute, that it aimed thereby to contribute to the transition from capitalism to socialism.[53] To be sure, under Max Horkheimer's direction, the Institute entered a new phase, beginning after 1931 to philosophize Marxism, to polemicize against empiricism, and to convert philosophy into a "critical theory" designed to "transfigure reality." But their aim was not conceived in opposition to Soviet Marxism but rather for its elaboration along more congenial German philosophical lines.[54] They allowed Robert Lynd to present them as "liberal-radicals," despite the fact that if any doctrine was ugly in their sight, it was "liberalism." For years, the Institute's researchers had derided and would continue to deride liberalism, "bourgeois liberalism," as the social soil which nourished fascism, to which indeed, discounting its purportedly meaningless liberties, it was culturally and economically equivalent.[55] Julian Gumperz neither mentioned his activities as a communist publisher nor alluded to Wittfogel's years as a communist playwright, his status as the German Communist Party's "foremost authority on China," and his last brave communist addresses to the working class and intellectuals to halt the Nazi power. Robert S. Lynd, principally responsible as "contact man" for actively misleading the Columbia authorities, shared at this time the fellow-traveller standpoint of the Instituteers except that unlike some of them, he was not evolving from communism but from liberalism to fellow-travellerism. Lynd shared with the Instituteers the same gloomy view as to the weakness of American liberal democracy. The following year in June 1935, Lynd and a staff

[52] *Institute of Pacific Relations: Hearings of the Committee on the Judiciary*, p. 276.
[53] Ulmen, p. 64.
[54] Ibid. pp. 47, 134. Slater, p. 55.
[55] Cf. Ulmen, pp. 144, 125. Zoltan Tar, *The Frankfurt School: The Critical Theories of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno* (New York, 1977), pp. 75–76. Slater, pp. 19–20. "In the USA, the Frankfurt School were confronted with an advanced monopoly capitalist state, with an equally advanced network of non-fascist, but nonetheless manipulative, popular culture." Ibid. p. 117.

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of assistants returned to Muncie, Indiana, to re-study how "Middletown" was changing after the 10 years since Lynd's pioneer book. Underlying all their conclusions, wrote their reviewer in *The New Republic*, was their fear that in Muncie too, class conflicts might lead (in Lynd's words) through "explosive action" to "an eventual coercive control which in Europe today goes under the name of fascism." [56] The subsequent year in 1938, Lynd excoriated the liberals in his review of Thurman Arnold's book *The Folklore of Capitalism*, published in a communist-guided journal: "We intellectuals," he wrote, can choose from between "two broad lines of action"; the ambitious person, accommodating to the system will

> afford the luxury of being "liberal," but that is as far as he "sticks his neck out." The alternative course is followed by that curious breed of persons who are not particularly ambitious for money and power . . . This sort of person has a positive philosophy of social changes, . . . and works for them.

That Thurman Arnold was a liberal was, according to Lynd, "probably not unrelated to the fact that he is a very practical lawyer." Lenin was the example Lynd adduced to confute Arnold's view that the "learned theoretical idealists" would fail as practical revolutionaries.[57] The following year, 1939, Lynd published his influential *Knowledge for What?*, a university manifesto for a more "activist" conception of social science. Rendering tribute, as a social scientist, to "the social activism" that the Soviet Communist Party inculcated in its members, and through them to the people, he still however clung to the fellow-traveller privilege: "A social scientist has no place, *qua* scientist, as a party to power politics. When he works within the constricting power curbs of a Republican or of a Communist 'party line,' . . . he is something less than a scientist." The equation of the "lines" of the Republican and Communist Parties was one that lent itself to the fellow-traveller's perspective; it ignored the sociological reality that the Republican Party in all its history in the twentieth century was not reported to have subjected social scientists among its members to a "line," whereas Communist Parties have as a rule done precisely that. The shared ideological standpoint between Lynd and the Frankfurt newcomers, apart from the fact that Hegelian idealism played no part in his cultural formation, was striking.[58] Like them indeed, he regarded the "resolution of the current Marx vs. Freud antinomy" as the central problem for sociological theory. Like them, however, he tended to exempt Soviet reality and the nature of the intellectual class from critical scrutiny.

[56] Malcolm Cowley, "Still Middletown?", *The New Republic*, Vol. LXXXXI, 12 May 1937, p. 24.

[57] Robert S. Lynd, review, "The Folklore of Capitalism," *Science and Society: a Marxian Quarterly*, Vol. II, Summer 1938, p. 399.

[58] Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture* (Princeton, 1939), pp. 86, 178. Also, pp. 1–3, 116, 41.

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Yet all the previous considerations might appear captious when we consider that Gumperz and Horkheimer were speaking for a group of refugees, being driven from one country to another, desperate to find a foothold in the United States where they could resume their creative scholarship. The great medieval Jewish philosopher, Moses Maimonides, it is said, was compelled while in Morocco to dissemble his Judaism in Moslem guise in order to avoid death, and in later years, defended the ethic of such dissembling.[59] Might then not an Academic Marxist seeking an academic affiliation among American liberals don their label and make do with their slogans?

It would be difficult for an onlooker to gainsay this argument. But it does overstate the measure of the Institute's desperation. For the Institute was well-endowed with funds, and its researchers in those years of the depression lived under circumstances of substantial ease. How comfortable they were was set forth plainly in a letter sent by Friedrich Pollock to Nicholas Murray Butler on 25 January 1935:

> Dear President Butler:
>
> When I had the pleasure of meeting you recently, together with Prof MacIver and Prof Horkheimer, I promised you that I would send you the little pamphlet containing some details pertaining to the International Institute of Social Research, and at the same time give you some confidential information as to the financial structure of our Institute. . . .
>
> Our financial situation is as follows: the foundation which has been given to our Corporation for carrying on scientific research work, and especially for the maintenance of the Institute of Social Research, is divided in two groups:
>
> (a) a legal endowment of the Herman Weil'sche Familienstiftung in Basel, to pay us an annual rent of at least the countervalue of 30,000 gold dollars in gold. This represents an amount of about $50,000 according to the actual gold price in USA.
>
> (b) an endowment of a capital given by the Herman Weil'sche Familienstiftung, the value of which in 1934 was not less than S.fr. 5m according to the confirmation of the Rotterdam Branch of Messrs. Price, Waterhouse & Co. Accountants. This capital has been invested partly in the following countries: Holland, Switzerland, France, British Empire, Argentine, USA, and a small part in Germany.
>
> We are not in a position to spend the capital, but a certain amount of the yield, the definite sum being agreed upon between the Herman Weil'sche Familienstiftung and us every year. For 1933 and the following years this amount has been fixed at $50,000 (actual value).
>
> The actual amount of our yearly budget according to our Endowment as explained in positions (a) and (b) is therefore $100,000.

[59] " Maimonides' Letter on Apostasy," in *Letters of Maimonides*, tr. Leon D. Stitskin (New York, 1977), p. 34 ff. Solomon Zeitlin, *Maimonides: A Biography* (New York, 1935), p. 6 ff.

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> In addition to this we receive irregularly smaller amounts from other Institutions and members of our Société. . . .
>
> Before closing this letter, however, I wish to thank you again for the very valuable and generous help Columbia University has offered for the continuation of our studies. . . . The realization of scientific work is not only a question of available funds, but depends to a very great extent upon environment, and a congenial atmosphere. That we are able to accomplish our work in such a friendly atmosphere as of Columbia University Campus, makes us greatly indebted to you.
>
> Yours very sincerely,
> Friedrich Pollock
>
> Dr F. Pollock, President of Société Internationale de Recherches Sociales

$100,000 in 1934, during the era of the depression, was about the equivalent in purchasing power of about a million dollars today. The permanent members of the Institute numbered not more than eight or nine persons. With allowance made for the costs of research and assistance, it is clear that the Instituteers were vouchsafed affluence. The provision of a building with offices at Columbia University, rent-free, made even more congenial their exile in the bourgeois Babylon.

Obviously the Institute of Social Research could have chosen to set up its quarters in independence of any bourgeois, capitalist institution. Given the tenor of their theories concerning the corrupting power of bourgeois institutions on the theoretical reason, and their hostility to American empiricism, positivism, experimentalism, quantitativism, operationalism, pragmatism, and liberalism, one cannot but be surprised that they longed to be affiliated to an American University, especially one governed by President Nicholas Murray Butler. For years American Marxists, socialists, and communists had recited the litany of those martyred under Butler's aegis: Spingarn, Dana, Cattell, Beard, Fraser, Donald Henderson. . . . Nonetheless, it was to Butler that the Institute turned in its masterpiece of academic diplomacy; no matter what they theorized, they felt in practice most secure in the environs of a strong bourgeois institution with a tradition of liberalism. To obtain this niche in the political ecological setting, they were prepared to condone a misrepresentation of their conscious theorizing; probably, however those statements did not misrepresent their unconscious convictions. "Critical theory," as judged by their own practice, was the "false consciousness" of the Frankfurt School.[60]

MORE than a decade later, with Nazism on the edge of collapse as the Allied armies were destroying the last centres of Nazi military strength, Max Horkheimer addressed to President Butler a report on

[60] Lewis S. Feuer, "The Preconceptions of Critical Theory," *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XVI (1974), pp. 75–84.

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the work of the Institute during " its first 10 years in the United States." He wrote:

April 17, 1945

> When, as virtually exiled scholars, we came to this country in the darkest hours of our existence, you extended to my colleagues and to myself the hospitality of Columbia University. The conditions under which we were to enjoy that hospitality were generous and have remained so throughout. On the one hand the University's abundant facilities were made fully available for our work, and on the other hand the independence of our own academic group was left untouched so that our work could develop freely in a new intellectual atmosphere. The brief review of our labours, transmitted here, should, we hope, reflect in part at least our gratitude.
>
> May I add that your attitude towards the solidarity of all scholarship as expressed during that first interview 10 years ago, which in your own memory must be but an insignificant incident, has to this day been for me a source of sustained encouragement.
>
> Sincerely yours,
> Max Horkheimer

That early summer in 1934 the handful of scholars seeking sanctuary at Columbia University was a first grouplet from among the vast numbers that the Nazi wave was beginning to overwhelm, eject or destroy. American liberals and conservatives alike watched almost incredulously the sequence of events that brought irrationality to power in Germany. Hitler appointed Chancellor on 30 January 1933; the burning of the books in front of the Berlin Opera House at midnight of May 10; the murders of political opponents; the destruction of the opposition parties and parliamentary democracy; the " coordination " of the universities; the decrees against the Jews; the concentration camp.[61] The stream of refugees, former businessmen, civil servants, professors, doctors, lawyers, writers, liberals, socialists, communists, was beginning. Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University since 1902, a candidate of the Republican Party for the Vice-Presidency of the United States in 1912, an opponent of the income tax, had also studied Kant, and believed in moral principles that transcended any political regime.[62] He acted swiftly and spontaneously to rescue a group of fellow scholars, reportedly men of liberal intelligence, who were in distress. Would the researchers of the Institute, had fate elevated them as commissars of universities in the Soviet Germany they advocated, have acted similarly? Would they have extended a welcoming hand to refugees from communist tyrannies? Would they have responded to an ethical mandate founded on the rational community of mankind?

[61] Cf. Konrad Heiden, *A History of National Socialism* (New York, 1935), pp. 229, 334, 363. Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (Chicago, 1961), p. 45 ff.

[62] Hugh Hawkins, " Nicholas Murray Butler," *Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement Four, 1946–1950* (New York, 1974), pp. 133–38.

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Curiously, the one generalization that emerges from the consideration of the history of the Institute of Social Research is that an ideological career without commitment has the longest lifetime; that, on the other hand, to the extent that an ideologist submits his beliefs to the test of involvement in a communist political organization, to that degree will his ideological phase be shortened. A Marxist fellow-traveller is more apt to remain a Marxist indefinitely because his theories then enjoy a relative immunity to experiment; whatever the ideology of "praxis," the persistence of "Critical Theory" was proportionate to its attachment to theorizing without practice. For this the Columbia setting provided a unique institutional base. It cannot but strike one's attention, furthermore, that such of the members or associates of the Institute who were active, committed communists all finally rejected the essential tenets of Marxist ideology—Julian Gumperz, Karl Korsch, Franz Borkenau, Paul Massing, Karl August Wittfogel.[63] Two Austrian Marxists, Paul Lazarsfeld and Edgar Zilsel, who had brief associations with the Institute, never found its ideology congenial, and placed their hopes in American liberal democracy. Wittfogel was coldly regarded by his former Institute colleagues after his testimony to the United States Senate Committee in 1951. Years later in 1968, when German New Leftist students demanded an activist role from Critical Theorists, the latter became cordial once more toward Wittfogel; the experience with Marxist practice at the end of their lives set at nought their Marxist theorizing.[64]

[63] A lecture by Korsch was included in Horkheimer's report on the Institute's years at Columbia. Korsch, by the end of 1938, was disillusioned with the Institute, its "impotent philosophy," and metaphysics. Cf. Slater, p. 74. The next year in 1939 he participated in the empiricist Unity of Science Congress at Harvard University. (My observation.) According to Fred Halliday, Korsch "ended by abandoning Marxism." Cf. Karl Korsch, *Marxism and Philosophy*, tr. Fred Halliday (London, 1970), p. 22. His widow, Hedda Korsch, wrote: "In his last years he *was* pessimistic about the fate of the world revolutionary movement and completely so about the Soviet Union." Hedda Korsch, "Memories of Karl Korsch," *New Left Review*, No. 76. Nov.-Dec. 1972, p. 45. According to Professor Wittfogel's recollection, Korsch, living in Boston, received a monthly grant from the Institute of $100. For the circumstances of Korsch's expulsion from the Communist International, cf. Douglas Kellner, "Korsch's Revolutionary Historicism," *Telos*, No. 26, Winter 1975–76, p. 88. Also, Paul Mattick, "The Museum of Karl Korsch," *Survey*, No. 53, Oct. 1964, pp. 88–91.

[64] Ulmen, op. cit. pp. 477–79. Martin Jay, "Permanent Exile of Theodor W. Adorno," *Midstream: A Monthly Jewish Review*, Vol. 15 (1969), pp. 66–67. "The *Institut für Sozialforschung*, with which he [Adorno] had been associated since the late twenties and whose director he had become after the return to Germany, was occupied several times by militant students. With an irony he doubtless appreciated, their criticisms of contemporary society were often grounded in the Critical Theory they had absorbed at the *Institut*. . . . He returned their criticism by remarking in a widely-circulated statement: 'When I made my theoretical model, I couldn't have guessed people would want to realize it with Molotov Cocktails'." Critical theory became self-critical only when the preachers were confronted with their practitioners.

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The Institute for Social Research—Addendum

Sidney Hook

DURING the late 1930s, some time after I published a critical article on "Nature and Dialectics" in *The Marxist Quarterly*, I met Max Horkheimer at Columbia University. He felt that I had not done justice to the principle of dialectics and that my analysis reflected too much the influence of positivism. I proposed that we hold a discussion on the theme. He readily agreed. I got in touch with Ernest Nagel and Meyer Schapiro. Otto Neurath, one of the founders of the Vienna circle, was in New York at the time and in touch with us. We had two meetings with Horkheimer and his group. One was at his Institute. The other was at the New York University Faculty Club, then at 22 Washington Square North. Neurath accompanied Nagel, Schapiro and me to the first meeting. Present at the Institute quarters were Horkheimer, Pollock, Marcuse, and Leo Lowenthal. At the meeting at New York University Neurath was not with us. Horkheimer, Pollock, Marcuse and Paul Lazarsfeld were there. Lazarsfeld spoke in German.

I have a very lively memory of the discussion but not of the detailed arguments. They centred on the nature of the dialectic method. The general position we took was that either the dialectic method was synonymous with what passed ordinarily as scientific methods or that it was a kind of hocus pocus. Neurath was very exuberant and claimed that the so-called dialectic elements in Marxist thought were vestiges of Hegelian metaphysics incompatible, to the extent meaning could be given them, with the empirical discoveries of scientific sociology.

As I recall we kept on demanding clarification of the wordy and vague accounts Horkheimer and Pollack were giving us of the meaning of dialectics. Most of the time Horkheimer carried the ball for the Institute at both meetings. Marcuse said nothing. I kept on asking for an illustration from any field of a statement that was scientifically true but dialectically false or one that was dialectically false but scientifically true. None was ever produced. Horkheimer kept on talking about the development of knowledge in consequence of its contradictions but they turned out to be commonplace cases that required the modification or elimination of hypotheses. He or Pollock talked about the dialectical nature of motion but Nagel showed that there was nothing at all contradictory in the scientific treatment of it. The members of the Institute kept on declaring their opposition to "positivism" but they had no clear or coherent notion of what positivism was. It seemed as if they identified it with "worship of the facts,"

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and opposition to theory. They were nonplussed when we pointed out that facts by themselves were not significant in the process of acquiring knowledge except with reference to some theory and that the real problem was to distinguish between testable theories and speculative fancies. These Peircian and Deweyan commonplaces were received with incomprehension.

Lazarsfeld at the second meeting, I recall, criticized me severely for saying that we could understand another person's feelings or state of mind without necessarily experiencing them ourselves—an issue that seemed peripheral to the main discussion. But he was very vehement about it. Years later at a meeting of the New York University Institute of Philosophy I reminded him of the incident and asked him why he was so excited at the time. He made very slighting references to Horkheimer's Institute, only vaguely recalled the occasion but said that he intervened probably to prevent us from having everything our own way.

At the second meeting at New York University Horkheimer used some illustrations from the history of art, the understanding of which he claimed required the application of dialectical principles. Meyer Schapiro contested his position. I no longer remember the details but the upshot of Schapiro's criticisms was that Horkheimer was unable to indicate what kind of evidence he would accept as invalidating his statements. I do remember, however, Horkheimer's remark to him in the course of the exchange: "When you are older and more mature you will no longer believe that you can settle any important questions in the history of art by using scientific methods."

At these meetings I would occasionally make strongly critical comments about what was happening in the name of dialectical materialism in the Soviet Union. But I did not elicit any word of agreement or disagreement. In interludes when mention was made of current political matters, Horkheimer and especially Pollack were very scornful about the Communist Parties of the United States and Germany. But at no time did they say anything that could be considered as critical of Soviet Russia or of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

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Equivocation in the Study of Totalitarianism

Werner Cohn

WE find the following passage in a scholarly British Journal devoted to the study of China: "Even before Liberation of course, the Communists had worked with law and had established a fledgling legal system. In the border and liberated areas, a series of laws and regulations had been promulgated . . ." [1] The reference to "Liberation" and "liberated areas" may be interpreted in at least two ways: (a) the author wishes to convey that communist government in China brought liberty; or (b) the author has borrowed official communist terminology without supplying any judgment of his own. A careful reading of this passage allows for either of these interpretations. That is the problem of equivocation.

In the present article we examine much of the English-language scholarly periodical literature, appearing around 1970, that was devoted to the study of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Nazi Germany. (See Appendix A for a description of the sample.) Eight of the 17 articles concerning the PRC contained non-trivial instances of equivocation. The same was true of only three of the 18 articles devoted to the Soviet Union. Not much was written on Nazi Germany at the time, but two of the three articles that were examined also contained serious equivocation. (See Appendix B for a résumé of findings.)

The equivocation I am about to describe arises if and only if the reader cannot be certain of how to interpret the writer's meaning because of an unresolved conflict between two implied rules for interpretation.

One such rule, which we may think of as an observer's point of view, is supplied by the Western scholarly tradition under whose auspices all these articles have been published. This tradition provides the ideals of objectivity and an independent critical attitude. It also implies, in particular, that terms like "liberation," "masses," and "elections" be understood in the sense of the ordinary language of the West unless otherwise labelled. The second rule for interpretation is provided by the societies under study, and may be called an "actor's point of view." Under it, "race" would imply racism when the subject-matter is Nazism; "election" would mean appointment by the central authority if the context is Soviet society.

Both observer and actor points of view are valid in scholarly discussion, but the reader must be told which is which. Careful writers on totalitarianism supply the reader with enough information to avoid

[1] Victor H. Li, "The Role of Law in Communist China," *China Quarterly*, No. 44 (Oct.–Dec. 1970), p. 76.

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ambiguity. For instance, a writer may attribute a given set of terminology to official communist sources, in which case, of course, there is no equivocation. Such attribution may be explicit, through quotation marks or phrases such as " according to . . ." etc.; or it may be implicit, the context clearly revealing the sense in which terminology and opinions are to be interpreted. When the attribution is merely implicit, an unsympathetic critic may pounce and charge the writer with equivocation. But such equivocation would clearly be trivial. I have endeavoured, in the present paper, to count as equivocation only those instances in which an earnest, attentive, reasonably educated reader would be at a loss as to how to interpret an important passage.

In the descriptions which follow, I have divided my material into four types of equivocation. These types overlap to some extent, and, in any case, I attach little importance to differences between the types.

(a) Equivocation concerning motive

To attribute aim or purpose or motive to oneself, let alone to another, is notoriously difficult. One may or may not be truthful; one may or may not be aware; motives may be more—or less—mixed. This is obviously not the place to discuss so large a subject; but a small subset of it is relevant.

In reporting the motives of others, we may either simply reproduce what these others say about themselves (i.e. report the actor's viewpoint), or we may use some other method in attributing motive (use an observer's viewpoint). But the reader must be told whose point of view is being reported. If I say that Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in order to safeguard Afghan interests, I am equivocating unless I make it clear whether this is my own assessment or whether, on the contrary, I am merely reporting Soviet assertions.

Equivocation concerning motive is found in at least six of the articles under review.

The paper by Pfeffer,[2] highly favourable in tone toward Mao Tse-tung, has a number of such instances. A particularly puzzling one occurs on page 21: " Mao's vision of the ideal society is a kind of Christian Utopia, collectivist, austere, egalitarian, and without the need for coercive institutions. . . ." This passage gives very conflicting clues to the reader. On the one hand, the language suggests that there is a simple reportage of Mao's views (" Mao's vision . . ."). But since there is talk of " Christian Utopia," hardly consistent with a self-evaluation by Mao, we now assume that here is an evaluation by the author. Then what are we to make of " without the need for coercive institutions "? The equivocation, embedded in the context of this article as a whole, is not merely between author and observer viewpoints but also between an ideal, professed intention on the one hand, and actual practice on

[2] Richard M. Pfeffer, " The Pursuit of Purity: Mao's Cultural Revolution," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XVIII, No. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1969), pp. 12–25.

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the other. In other words, not only do we not know whether it is Pfeffer or Mao who is speaking, but we are also left wondering whether Mao opposed coercive methods in actual practice or only in theory.

Where Pfeffer's attitude is highly favourable toward the regime he describes, that of Murray Feshbach,[3] in his article concerning the 1970 Soviet census, is fairly hostile. This difference in tone makes Feshbach's equivocation less conspicuous but thereby perhaps also more insidious. It occurs at the beginning of his article when he states that " the primary purpose of the census was to collect the data necessary to make a detailed assessment of the population and manpower resources of the USSR. . . ." The author does not tell us how he arrived at this judgment. If he is merely reporting the professed purpose of Soviet officials, the statement is unsurprising and hardly worth making. If, on the other hand, he has himself judged that other possible purposes (social control, propaganda, or whatever) were all less " primary " than the assessment of population and manpower resources, he should at the very least have told us that he has made this judgment.

There are further examples of equivocation concerning motive in Pfeffer,[4] Li,[5] Suttmeier,[6] Roberts,[7] and Fitzgerald.[8]

(b) Equivocation concerning category

One expression may denote more than one category of thought, but we can usually tell from the context whether " heavy water," for example, refers to a substance useful in nuclear reactors or to a load I might carry in buckets. We would surely not think highly of an author who fails to indicate which of the two he has in mind. But when writing about totalitarianism, writers are more often equivocal concerning category than in any other way.

Perhaps the most interesting instances come from two of the three articles on Nazi Germany. Larry Thompson, writing about a " eugenics " policy of the Nazis (see also below under **(d)**), mentions " Aryan ancestry " [9] and " racial examinations." [10] Both " Aryan " and " race " have certain meanings in the context of Western scholarship, entirely different meanings in the context of Nazi doctrines. Thompson is not at all clear which set of meanings he wishes to convey. The same

[3] Murray Feshbach, " Observations on the Soviet Census," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XIX, No.3 (May–June 1970), pp. 58–64.
[4] Pfeffer, op. cit. p. 18.
[5] Li, op. cit. pp. 74, 110.
[6] R. P. Suttmeier, " Party Views of Science: The Record from the First Decade," *China Quarterly*, No. 44 (Oct.–Dec. 1970), p. 149.
[7] Paul Craig Roberts, " ' War Communism ': A Re-examination," *Slavic Review* Vol. 29, No. 2 (June 1970), pp. 245, 251.
[8] Stephen Fitzgerald, " China and the Overseas Chinese: Perceptions and Policies," *China Quarterly*, No. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1970), pp. 1-37.
[9] Larry V. Thompson, " *Lebensborn* and the Eugenics Policy of the *Reichsfuehrer-SS*," *Central European History*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (March 1971), p. 54.
[10] Ibid. p. 61.

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kind of difficulty occurs in Levine's article.[11] Similarly, in an article generally hostile in tone toward the Soviet regime, Alec Nove seems to accept—or does he?—the notion of " election " as applicable, without explanation, to the management of Soviet agricultural settlements.[12]

Since almost half of all the articles dealing with communist China contain some equivocation concerning category, it would be tedious to quote from more than one example.

Victor H. Li devotes a good deal of space to explaining that " the masses " are involved in Chinese criminal procedures. " The Party uses the masses to act as a check on official actions . . .," etc.[13] But " masses," given his context, can mean at least two things: (a) the majority of the people, without regard to political opinion; and (b) those who approve of the communist government. Mao Tse-tung himself helps us in appreciating the more specialized meaning:

> *The term " the people " has different meanings in different countries,* and in different historical periods in each country. . . . At this stage of building socialism, all classes, strata, and social groups which approve, support, and work for the cause of socialist construction belong to the category of the people (*renmin*), while those social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution and are hostile to and try to wreck socialist construction, are enemies of the people.[14]

Nowhere in his article does Li make it clear how he wishes his reader to interpret " masses " (or certain other similar terms). As a result, we never know whether the picture he paints is of a variant of democratic process or of political repression.

The remaining instances of this sort of equivocation, all concerning China, are found in Bardham,[15] Fitzgerald,[16] Suttmeier,[17] Wu,[18] Domes,[19] and Chang.[20]

[11] Herbert S. Levine, " Local Authority and the SS State: The Conflict over Population Policy in Danzig-West Prussia, 1939–45," *Central European History,* Vol. II, No. 4, (Dec. 1969), pp. 331–55.

[12] Alec Nove, " Soviet Agriculture under Brezhnev," *Slavic Review,* Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 390.

[13] Li, op. cit. p. 74.

[14] Quoted in Michael Waller, *The Language of Communism* (The Bodley Head, London, 1972), p. 130.

[15] Pranab K. Bardham, " Chinese and Indian Agriculture: A Broad Comparison of Recent Policy and Performance," *Journal of Asian Studies,* Vol. XXIX, No. 3 (May 1970), pp. 532, 536.

[16] Fitzgerald, op. cit. p. 28.

[17] Suttmeier, op. cit. pp. 152, 163, 166.

[18] Tien-Wei Wu, " The Kiangsi Soviet Period. A Bibliographical Review on the Ch'en Ch'eng Collection," *Journal of Asian Studies,* Vol. XXIX, No. 2 (Feb. 1970), pp. 397, 402, 403, 405, et passim.

[19] Juergen Domes, " The Role of the Military in the Formation of Revolutionary Committees 1967-68," *China Quarterly,* No. 44 (Oct.–Dec. 1970) pp. 112, 124, 126, 132, et passim.

[20] Paris H. Chang, " The Second Decade of Maoist Rule," *Problems of Communism,* Vol. XVIII, No. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1969), pp. 6, 7.

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(c) Equivocation concerning evidence

This type of equivocation is not common in the high-prestige scholarship which makes up our sample. We find it in two of the articles on China.

The first example comes from Li, whose work contains instances of each of our types of equivocation. He writes that "the work of the people's lawyers, and to a lesser extent the notarial offices, received great publicity and praise. Civil litigation, while still not very popular, was gaining acceptance." [21] There are two lengthy footnotes which refer to these two sentences and which are intended to supply the evidence for these statements. But a careful reading of both main text and footnotes leaves the reader wondering whether the evidence for the alleged public acceptance comes from the reportage of communist officialdom or from an independent study by independent scholars.

The other example, from Chang, is more complex because it combines two kinds of equivocation. He writes of developments which have "resulted in easier and wider access from below to political influence." [22] This statement is, again, appended by a lengthy footnote in which the greater role of "mass organizations" is given in evidence for the claim of "access from below." We cannot be sure whether this evidence comes merely from official sources or whether it has been independently checked. Furthermore, there is equivocation of category, since we are not told the sense in which "mass" is used.

(d) Equivocation concerning evaluation

The three kinds of equivocation described so far all imply some ambiguity in value judgment; in the present type, confusion over such evaluation is the determining characteristic. Six of the articles in this group deal with China, two with Germany, and none with the Soviet Union.

Pfeffer complains that "Americans . . . may be peculiarly unable to appreciate Mao as a radical in power and as a great man." [23] The context of the article leaves the reader in doubt whether the judgment of "great man" is that of the author or is attributed to others. Chang, similarly, speaks of an "ideological rectification campaign." [24] The context does not allow us to judge whether "rectification" here has the common-language meaning of effecting improvement, or whether, on the contrary, it is to be understood in the context of Chinese communist ideology. The very frequent references to "Liberation" and "liberated areas" which I have already cited also constitute equivocation of this type.

In addition to those by Chang and Pfeffer, the following articles on

21 Li, op. cit. p. 79.
22 Chang, op. cit. p. 10.
23 Pfeffer, op. cit. p. 21, fn. 43.
24 Chang, op. cit. p. 7.

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China contain equivocation concerning evaluation: Wu,[25] Bardham,[26] Fitzgerald,[27] and Li.[28]

The examples from two articles on Nazi Germany are both embedded in work with a clearly hostile tone toward the Nazi regime, and the equivocation concerning evaluation would seem to be unwitting. But it is nonetheless genuine.

Levine speaks of "the racial purity of the Greater German Reich . . ." [29] in such a way that one wonders whether or not he accepts, in this instance, a certain validity of Nazi values. (He equivocates concerning both evaluation and category in this one sentence.) He also repeatedly cites a German "struggle against Polish domination," [30] and one cannot be sure whether he merely means to voice Nazi sentiments or whether he is furnishing his own evaluation.

Thompson [31] is similarly confusing. His article deals with the Nazi "eugenics" policy, and the reader is left to wonder whether he holds that "eugenics" here involves an effort toward some sort of objective improvement. There is also doubt about his frequent use of the phrase "racially valuable," [32] and, in a somewhat different way, in regard to "certain moral and economic criteria." [33] He does not specify whether the "moral" refers to some generally accepted standard or only to the requirements of specifically Nazi morality.

ONE could no doubt find equivocation—perhaps as prominently as we have found it here—in fields other than the study of totalitarian regimes.[34] There are always certain terminological difficulties, for example, in the study of non-Western cultures by Western scholars.[35] But there is probably no other field in which confusion has been cultivated with such apparent deliberation; nor in which the resulting disorientation—both intellectual and moral—has been quite as devastating.

The language and the categories of totalitarian propaganda not only differ from those used by liberal Western scholars. They differ in ways that are subtle and seem to have been designed for confusion. It is not merely a question of "democracy," say, meaning one thing in the West

[25] Wu, op. cit. pp. 406, 408.
[26] Bardham, op. cit. p. 517.
[27] Fitzgerald, op. cit. p. 30.
[28] Li, op. cit. pp. 75, 76, 79, 88, et passim.
[29] Levine, op. cit. p. 333.
[30] Ibid. pp. 341, 342.
[31] Thompson, op. cit.
[32] Ibid. pp. 54, 58, 65, et passim.
[33] Ibid. p. 67.

[34] The problem of equivocation in regard to observer's versus actor's point of view has been very cogently discussed by the linguist Kenneth L. Pike, who introduced the distinction between "etic" and "emic" standpoints. Other writers have followed up on his suggestions. See Kenneth L. Pike, *Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior,* (Mouton & Co., The Hague, 1966), Chap. 2. Marvin Harris has recently supplied a review of the literature: "History and Significance of the Emic/Etic Distinction," *Annual Review of Anthropology,* Vol. 5, 1976, pp. 329–50.

[35] There has been, for instance, a common tendency to interpret certain non-Western practices as "religion" in the Western sense. Cf. Werner Cohn, "On the Problem of Religion in Non-Western Cultures," *International Yearbook for the Sociology of Religion,* Vol. 5, 1969, pp. 7-19.

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and another in the communist world. The communist propagandist will insist that his is the " true " democracy; that institutions in the West are not at all " democratic." The problem here is not primarily one of misunderstanding but one of dissimulation. One who speaks of Soviet-style " elections " as " democratic " is not just using words differently from the way we would use them; he is disingenuously putting forth a particular point of view. Annie Kriegel has justly observed that " *la duplicité qu'on reproche aux communistes n'est pas que dans les mots, elle est au niveau de la conception.*" [36] It is for reasons of this kind, both intellectual and moral because involving the question of scholarly integrity, that a neutral attitude toward totalitarianism is probably not possible.

Much of the difference between those who do and those who do not accept a given totalitarian regime relates to elementary interpretation of reality. Totalitarian countries do not, as a rule, admit to the existence of evil within their domain, unless such evil has first been officially certified in the controlled media. It has been said, for example, that prostitution does not exist in the People's Republic of China. Those who say it does, unless and until the Party press says so, are enemies of the regime. The same holds for traffic accidents, natural calamities, etc. Here is another reason for true neutrality concerning a totalitarian regime to be so difficult to imagine: if one accepts the official interpretation of reality over the evidence of one's senses, one is a supporter of the regime; if one does not, one is its enemy.

It is, in fact, rarely difficult in this group of 38 articles to gauge the author's attitude toward the regime he describes.

The clues of a hostile attitude are numerous and usually unmistakable. There may be use of more-or-less pejorative language, as, for example, when a Soviet publication is described as a " badly truncated pastiche." [37] Whenever the apparatus of repression is discussed in any detail or with any insistence, as is done, for instance, in Maurice Friedberg's article on Soviet Jewry,[38] the author's hostility is obvious. Failure to discuss repression, on the other hand, may be a sign of an author's sympathies for totalitarian rule.[39]

But such sympathies, very common indeed among sinologists, are perhaps most typically evidenced by the equivocation we have discussed; provided, that is, that this equivocation is in some way intentional or at least conscious. (It goes without saying that any intentional equivocation, being a species of dishonesty, should be beyond the pale of scholarly discourse.)

[36] Annie Kriegel, *Les Communistes Français* (Seuil, Paris, 1968), p. 215.
[37] Dan N. Jacobs, " Recent Russian Material on Soviet Advisers in China: 1923-1927," *China Quarterly*, No. 41, (Jan.–Mar. 1970), p. 104.
[38] Maurice Friedberg, " The Plight of Soviet Jews," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XIX, No. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1970), pp. 18, 19, 25, 26.
[39] Werner Cohn, " Perspectives on Communist Totalitarianism," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXIX, No. 5 (Sept.–Oct. 1980), pp. 68–73.

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In the case of two of the articles on Nazi Germany, the authors show by numerous comments and by the general tone of their work that they harbour no conscious sympathies for the regime. Their equivocation with respect to category and evaluation is probably for the most part inadvertent, although their style leads us to believe that, in some particulars and without full realization, they have come to accept some of the Nazi assumptions. Similar remarks could be made about certain of the writers on the Soviet Union. All this apparent inadvertence is not only a sign of carelessness on the part of these writers; it is also a tribute—cautionary and admonitory for the rest of us—to the seductive powers of totalitarian propaganda.

Finally, we must point to the much greater frequency of equivocation in sinology when compared to sovietology. This seems to be as true now as it was 10 years ago.[40] And the materials at hand indicate that academic work on China is not only more often muddled, but also much more often favourable to the communist regime. The two seem to go together.

Appendix A: The Sample

This study began as an effort to study the English-language scholarly literature on totalitarianism during the post-second world war period. The present sample deals with 1970; a period not so recent as to be embroiled in current controversy, nor so dated as to be irrelevant for the present. The results should be compared with the author's much less systematic review of some recent literature.[39]

The following journals were searched for relevant articles:

Slavic Review (Columbus, Ohio), Vol. 29, 1970, all issues.

Journal of Asian Studies (Ann Arbor, Mich.), Vol. XXIX, Nos. 2, 3, and 4; and Vol. XXX, No. 1. These constitute all issues with a 1970 date.

China Quarterly (London, England), No. 41 (Jan.–Mar. 1970) and No. 44 (Oct.–Dec. 1970). There were two other issues published during 1970, viz. Nos. 42 and 43, but since an examination of all these issues would have greatly expanded the necessary research effort, the first and the last issue were taken as representative of the whole year for this journal.

Central European History (Atlanta, Georgia), for articles on Nazi Germany. In this case, only one article on the relevant subject was found for 1970 (Vol. III), so the volumes published in 1969 (Vol. II) and 1971 (Vol. IV) were examined as well.

Problems of Communism (published under US government auspices in Washington, DC). This journal had six issues in Vol. XIX, 1970, all of which were examined. In addition, Vol. XVIII, No. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1969), a special issue devoted to communist China, was also examined in order to increase the number of articles dealing with China from this source.

[40] Ibid.

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These journals were selected in order to obtain a representative sample of the most prestigious scholarly writing in the periodical English-language literature on the three totalitarian regimes. The titles of the journals reflect their coverage, except that one article in the *China Quarterly* (that by Jacobs, issue No. 41) turned out to deal with the Soviet rather than the Chinese regime, and was counted as such. *Problems of Communism*, dealing with communism world wide, was particularly helpful because it allowed for comparisons between sovietology and sinology while holding editorial auspices constant.

Each article in the examined issues of these journals which dealt with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, or the Nazi period in Germany was carefully read and instances of equivocation were marked. However, this was done by me alone, and it is possible that another reader may have found additional instances; conceivably too, but less likely, some instances found may not have been judged as equivocal by another reader. I followed the rule of resolving doubts by not counting a given instance as equivocal. For that reason, the number of items marked equivocal should be regarded as minimal, and judgments of presence of equivocation should be more reliable than judgments of absence.

All instances of equivocation found in these articles have been mentioned in the text of the present study and have been cited in the footnotes. A complete listing of all examined articles by authors' names is given below. Items marked with an asterisk have been judged to contain some equivocation.

Slavic Review, Vol. 29, No. 1: Mills.
Slavic Review, Vol. 29, No. 2: Roberts;* Holter.
Slavic Review, Vol. 29, No. 3: Nove.*
Slavic Review, Vol. 29, No. 4: Bachman; Horvath; Brown.
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXIX, No. 2: Wu.*
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXIX, No. 3: Bardham;* Tay.
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXX, No. 1: Stahnke.
China Quarterly, No. 41: Bridgham; Cheng; Swamy and Burki; Chi; Jacobs.
China Quarterly, No. 44: Fitzgerald;* Li;* Domes;* Suttmeier.*
Central European History, Vol. II, No. 4: Levine.*
Central European History, Vol. III, No. 4: Layton.
Central European History, Vol. IV, No. 1: Thompson.*
Problems of Communism, Vol. XVIII, No. 6: Chang;* Pfeffer;* Sims; Lisann.
Problems of Communism, Vol. XIX, No. 1: Kamenka and Tay.
Problems of Communism, Vol. XIX, No. 2: McLean; Pohribny.
Problems of Communism, Vol. XIX, No. 3: Ploss; Feshbach.*
Problems of Communism, Vol. XIX, No. 5: Wolfe; Schroeder; Unger.
Problems of Communism, Vol. XIX, No. 6: Feuer; Friedberg.

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Appendix B: A Summary of Findings

Subject-Matter	Number of Articles which Contain Equivocation Concerning *			
	Motive	Category	Evidence	Evaluation
China	4	7	2	6
USSR	2	1	—	—
Germany ***	—	2	—	2

Subject-Matter	Percentage of Articles with **	
	Some Equivocation	No
China	47	53
USSR	17	83
Germany ***	67	33

Subject-Matter	Total Number of Articles
China	17
USSR	18
Germany ***	3
	38

* many articles figure in more than one column
** each article figures in only one column
*** very inadequate sample of literature

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Letters to the Editor

Sir,

I find myself in the unusual position of having contributed a manuscript which was included in a collection of interesting articles on "Negotiating with the USSR" in the Spring 1980 issue of *Survey*, without knowing of the existence or content of the other contributions. As it is, I find myself in varying degrees of disagreement with the authors of all five of the other articles. Needless to say, I remain pleased that the editor included my paper, which deals with one limited aspect of the question, but I do wish as a reader (and as a writer cited in some of the other articles) to request a brief rebuttal to several statements and arguments in two of the other articles. They are provocative discussions, and I believe the comments they provoke me to make should be of interest to them and to your readers.

Mr Floyd in his discussion (on "US Negotiations with the USSR") notes my "important part in the [SALT] negotiations," and quotes a statement I had written about US-Soviet agreement on parity, mutual deterrence and stability. He asks, fairly enough as the answer is not self-evident, whether the Soviets really had accepted those aims. He also quotes some summary statements by Dr Whelan (author of a compendium he was discussing, who had used and cited several articles I had published). In my article cited by Whelan, I had stated that the two sides had "agreed implicitly that strategic parity should be accepted and maintained," and had agreed *explicitly* on the objectives of maintaining stable strategic deterrence. I readily concede that the expression "agreed implicitly" is vague, but I was reporting as a participant under circumstances where the texts of the exchanges concerned are not in the public domain, and precise text could not be quoted. Mr Floyd might, however, have noted for the reader that I had specifically identified as the source confidential exchanges between the two governments in 1968, before the formal SALT negotiation was convened; that would provide a better basis for the reader to judge what I was reporting than his rhetorical "Did it mean anything more than that the Americans *assumed* that the Russians were aiming at strategic parity and stability?" Yes, it did and does—although, to be sure, the value of any statement must be assessed. I do not regard as an adequate assessment Mr Floyd's easy conclusion that "we can say with reasonable certainty" that Soviet weapons programmes demonstrate that Soviet objectives were and are different.

Mr Floyd also states as facts sweeping assertions which the actual negotiating record does not sustain: "The Russians were *always* very reluctant to agree to *any* precise definition of a key concept or actual object." Often, yes, but not always, and they often *did* agree when pressed. He cites the case of their refusal to define what constituted a "heavy" ICBM, permitting later installation of the SS-19 (much larger than the SS-11 it replaced). "Why did the Americans give in?" he asks. Fair question. In fact, we learned from that negotiation that the Soviets were almost certainly far advanced in development of a missile of approximately the SS-19 size, and that was why the

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Soviets refused to give up their prospective MIRV carrier and accept yet some years more of clear inferiority. We in turn settled for a clearly ineffective unilateral statement of what we contended the definition of a heavy ICBM should be (i.e. no larger than an SS-11) in the hope it might restrain them, but not with any real expectation that it would. We settled for the assurance that the Soviets would not increase the number of SS-9/18 class missiles, despite failure to obtain Soviet agreement to limit their SS-17/19 classes to SS-11 size, because we concluded that that preferred objective was not either negotiable or essential. In other words, the SALT I agreements, even with something on the order of SS-17/19 missiles in clear prospect, were judged more advantageous than no agreement would have been. The Soviets neither deceived us nor did they "put over" on us vague language they could exploit. They simply made clear they would *not* relinquish their already well advanced MIRV carriers, and we decided to accept an overall deal that we considered in our interest, despite that (and some other clear and known disadvantages). Whether that decision was wise or not, and whether a different negotiating strategy would have yielded better results, are two other questions, on which we may differ.

Mr Floyd states that it is "difficult to see how serious negotiations could take place without each party to the talks revealing to the other some basic facts about its armoury." It is more difficult, but such disclosure is far from always being a necessary condition. He is certainly correct that the Soviets have been very reluctant to disclose specific information on their weapons and forces. He is, however, wrong in confidently asserting that "in the course of the SALT talks the Russians refused to disclose any information about the number and types of their own nuclear weapons . . ." (*neither* side disclosed anything about its nuclear warheads, but I assume that by "nuclear weapons" he means ICBM, SLBM, and bomber systems, which we discussed and limited). Indeed, it is a fact of some significance that during SALT, and as a result of the SALT process, the Soviets disclosed more and more such information. The public record makes this quite clear: the agreed official published documentation on the SALT II treaty includes over Soviet signature lists identifying by Soviet designators various missile and bomber types (e.g. the Backfire is the Tu-22M; the SS-18 is the RS-20), and numbers (e.g. on 8 June 1979, the Soviets had 156 heavy bombers; on 1 November 1978, the USSR had 576 launchers for MIRVed ICBMs, and on 18 June 1979, that number had risen to 608). One should familiarize oneself with the record before publishing statements purporting to be factual about it. The author also states that: "The Soviet Chief of Staff Nikolai Ogarkov even protested strongly when the Americans released to Soviet civilian delegates information gathered by American intelligence but regarded as classified in the Soviet Union!" (Ogarkov, by the way, is now Chief of the General Staff; he was not when he participated in SALT.) His statement is flat wrong in a number of important respects. The incident in question did *not* involve release of information gathered by American intelligence; it did not even involve any American estimate or statement about Soviet weaponry

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or forces. Ogarkov did *not* "protest strongly" (nor officially); he did *not* complain about release of anything to Soviet civilian delegates. What Ogarkov *did* do was to argue (protest, if you will) about discussion of a military operational concept, which the American delegation was discussing and pressing for a Soviet comment on. He argued it was not necessary or appropriate to SALT, and told his American military interlocutor that he "as a military man" must understand the matter that had been raised. Full stop. If Mr Floyd had cited his source (which was either Mr John Newhouse in *Cold Dawn*, or someone writing based on Newhouse's account), he would have been better able to avoid responsibility for about half his misstatements, because Newhouse's account is in error. But Newhouse did not say anything about a "protest," strong or otherwise; he did not say that the subject of the discussion was "information gathered by American intelligence." He did, erroneously, refer to the subject as "Soviet military hardware" and say that Ogarkov had said "such matters need not concern his civilian colleagues." At least, until the record is cleared up, let us avoid compounding errors.

Mr Floyd apparently is attracted to a style of writing exemplified in the words that "the Americans meekly accepted what the Russians later claimed as a major victory for themselves in SALT I," but it would be more helpful to thoughtful discussion to present evidence as well as colourful conclusions. In this case, a paragraph later, fortunately he does: he cites a Soviet professor who later argued that the SALT I Interim Agreement and Vladivostok accord "marked the defeat of the American strategic arms race policy." Floyd continues: "No talk here about the achievement of 'common objectives' or of agreement about strategic parity." Literally hundreds of Soviet discussions of SALT by Brezhnev, other Politburo members, Soviet marshals and generals, and others *have* referred to SALT as supporting strategic parity. They also have argued that it is mutually advantageous and that neither side has gained an advantage. Both sides at the highest level have also signed statements proclaiming these as common objectives. That some Soviet writers propagandistically pose the latter as defeating an American "policy of an arms race"—a policy we also reject, and deny as being our policy—does not contradict the authoritative Soviet and American (pre-1981) statements avowing mutual advantage. One may, of course, always debate whether in fact the agreements are mutually advantageous and balanced, but in so far as reference is made to a side's "claims," a serious argument should not cite one case of propaganda trumpeting while ignoring the main line of authoritative Soviet commentary in statements to their Party Congress on down.

Turning now to the article by Mr and Mrs Hoeber ("The Soviet View of Deterrence: Who Whom?"), the authors find fault with my explanation of Soviet views on mutual deterrence (in *International Security*, Summer 1978). According to the authors, my argument is "laboured" and "convoluted"—I leave judgment of that to the reader interested enough to read the article. But they also state that "Garthoff added [sic] the word 'mutual,' which is not used by the Soviets." First of all, use of the word "added" implies some adultera-

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tion of a text, although the sentence quoted was my own! But beyond that, the Soviets do, apart from frequently endorsing the concept in other words, and despite the claim of the Hoebers, also use the term "mutual deterrence," and not only in ascribing or describing Western views. For example, G. Trofimenko in an article in *SShA* (No. 12, Dec. 1980, p. 54) states approvingly that "the chief function of strategic forces in a situation of mutual deterrence based on strategic parity is the avoidance or prevention of war by means of the theoretical punishment of the attacking side by a devastating retaliatory strike." To cite but one other, the Armed Forces journal *Red Star* (on 13 February 1981, in an article by S. Tarov) specifically endorses "strategic parity as a factor for mutual deterrence." The authors apparently misunderstood when they claim that I attempt to "explain why they [the Soviets] do not refer directly to 'mutual assured destruction'." It should be clear to any reader that in the very passage cited by the Hoebers I state that the American "mutual assured destruction" concept is, in my words, "much more limited than the Soviet concept of mutual deterrence"—not identical to it. In the broader sense, the Soviets do frequently refer to mutual destruction as a consequence of world nuclear war.

The Hoebers attempt to distinguish the Soviet approach by arguing that "nowhere do they say that they wish to be deterred." Nor do we! I challenge the authors to cite any authoritative American statement that we wish to be deterred. It is another matter to accept, as we do and as they do, a situation of mutual rather than unilateral deterrence, although the *need* and *wish* (and no doubt *preference*) on both sides would be simply to deter the other side. The US did accept an inevitable shift from unilateral to mutual deterrence under President Nixon with more equanimity than the Hoebers would have preferred, but that is another matter.

The Hoebers suggest a preference over my analysis for "the simple argument that the Soviets mean what they say." Without agreeing that we should abdicate responsibility for considering what the Soviets mean and why they say what they do, I generally agree. The Hoebers then argue "the Soviets *have* over two decades both said that they wanted and in actuality pursued the goal of strategic superiority. . . ." They then cite a vacuous statement from a Soviet military article ". . . the advantage in principle accrues to that side which significantly surpasses the other in strength in the aggregate or in individual and the more essential components of combat might." They then move from that to refer to "the relentless pursuit of superiority" by the Soviets. The article they cite (from Colonel Tyushkevich in *Military Thought*, June 1969) is a competent and interesting military theoretical discussion. But it proves nothing about Soviet military policy. In the original article, not quoted by the Hoebers, the passage they cite is specifically identified as *one* among "an entire series of propositions" which it is explicitly said must all be calculated for a solution of the theoretical "methodological" problem. The very next paragraph begins "A superiority in forces must not be oversimplified. Even a significant superiority is merely a favourable opportunity. Its conversion into actuality is a complex

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and contradictory process. . . . It is possible, for example, to create a superiority over the enemy in operational scales on individual sectors of the front without having a superiority in the composition of strategic forces. . . . " And a little later " In nuclear warfare everything will be different "! So much for the relevance of the colonel's discourse to evidence on a *Soviet* pursuit of strategic superiority, " relentless " or otherwise. But if the Soviets have said " they wanted . . . the goal of strategic superiority " for over two decades, we should be able to cite more convincing sources. In fact, they have not. Especially for the past five years, the leading Soviet political and military leaders have repeatedly stated flatly that " the Soviet Union does not and will not seek military superiority " (to cite one of many such statements by Brezhnev; in *Pravda,* 3 Nov. 1977). On the contrary, they assert that strategic parity and equilibrium exist, *and* that such strategic parity and balance should *not* be upset. One may accept such statements at face value or not, but they constitute the authoritative record of what the Soviets state that they want.

Now as to what the Soviets have done. The Hoebers note that the Soviets started testing MIRVs in 1973 and deploying them in 1974–75, " proving that they were under advance development during the 1969–72 negotiations—the first clear case of Soviet deception in SALT." *What* deception? We knew the Soviets were working hard to develop MIRV—indeed, we overestimated when they would succeed. And they did not conceal this aim; they insisted they too would deploy MIRVs. The 1972 Interim Agreement freezing existing ICBM-SLBM levels was entered into with the US Administration knowing full well that the Soviets were developing MIRVs and would deploy them in the mid-1970s, as noted in open testimony to the Senate in 1972.

A few pages later the authors again refer to unidentified Soviet " deception in SALT," to encourage the US to " self-disarm." Obviously they are not referring to President Nixon's open statement, widely reported at the time, that Brezhnev assured him at the Summit in 1972 that the Soviets would press ahead with military programmes not limited by the agreements. In fact, *all* the cases they cite—B-1, end of Minuteman II production, delays in the cruise missile, MX, and Trident programmes—were *not* owing to SALT considerations, much less caused by Soviet " encouragement "; they reflected budgetary and other considerations as to our judgment of our requirements. Indeed, one criticism at the time of Carter's B-1 decision, for example, was that he did *not* relate it to SALT!

The authors also state that the Soviets " bargained for and won concessions in numbers of SLBMs in part on the basis that they had to offset the US advantage of forward bases " for Polaris SSBNS, and then a year later tested a 4300 n. miles SLBM. It is true that the Soviets did raise that argument, among others, in bargaining for more favourable SLBM numbers; they did not however, *win* the concession on the basis of any credence in that claim. It was purely a matter of bargaining at the summit in which Nixon and Kissinger compromised on the numbers. The record on this point is not yet fully disclosed; see Gerard Smith's informative new volume *Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I* for a useful detailed account.

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One additional point of error in fact should be noted. The authors state that "the United States discontinued an ASAT R & D programme in 1963 [sic] because 'it had no military mission'." This statement is entirely misleading. A particular Air Force ASAT R & D *project*, SAINT, was discontinued (in 1962), but precisely in 1963 the President *approved* an interagency recommendation to deploy an ASAT capability urgently, and it was deployed in 1961. The first version was deactivated in 1967, but with no time gap and a follow-on operational deployment, which was deactivated only in 1975. (This writer knows the story well, because I drafted the recommendation for the President; see my article, and a companion one, in *International Security*, Winter 1980–81.)

For reasons of space, I will not enter the lists here to differ on many points of interpretation and on conclusions in these articles. But I believe these corrections of the record should be useful.

Yours faithfully,

Raymond L. Garthoff

Washington D.C.

Sir,

I am sorry if Raymond Garthoff feels I have done him an injustice, or a series of injustices, in my review of *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior*, and I am grateful for his explanations. He "corrects" me on five points:

1. He agrees that his statement that the Russians "agreed implicitly" that strategic parity should be accepted and maintained was vague and he claims that it "did and does" mean more than a mere American assumption that the Russians aimed at no more than parity. He does not, however, go on to say just what the expression "agreed explicitly" means. Unlike Dr Garthoff, I was not involved in the negotiations. But I would have thought that my statement that:

> In the light of what we now know about Soviet strategic armoury and nuclear weapons programmes, we can say with reasonable certainty that, if the Soviet negotiators led the Americans to believe they had "common objectives" with them, their real objectives were very different.

But that is only a layman's view.

2. Dr Garthoff says that, on the question of the Russians' introduction of the SS-19 missile, "the Russians neither deceived us nor did they 'put over' on us vague language they could exploit." But in August 1979 Dr Kissinger said:

> What we did not understand at that time and on which we had no evidence whatever at the time, because it didn't exist, was that the Soviet Union would construct a missile [the SS-19] which was sort of half-way between the SS-11 and the SS-9; that is, technically did not violate the limitations of a 15 per cent increase but which, using all the fine points of the print, was technically within the agreement. It was simply our lack of knowledge that such a missile existed or could be built . . . I would call it sharp practice.

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3 & 4. Dr Garthoff says the Russians *did* reveal some information about their own weapons and forces. Well, he must know. But I remain convinced of the Russians' general reluctance to release information. Dr Whelan recounts:

> A most revealing example of the deeply ingrained Soviet habit of secrecy was their refusal to submit figures on their arsenal of strategic weapons for negotiating purposes but rather depended on the American intelligence estimates. General Ogarkov . . . was outraged by the American disclosure of these estimates to Soviet civilian negotiators. His reaction was apparently mild compared to that of Smirnov [Soviet deputy Prime Minister] when he met Kissinger for the first time . . . during a critical moment in the SALT negotiations at the Moscow summit.
>
> To the assembled negotiators meeting at 2.30 a.m. Kissinger proceeded coolly to describe the characteristics of Soviet weapons. He recalled afterwards that it " was like telling J. Edgar Hoover about his most sensitive procedures—Smirnov practically had an apoplectic fit." In brief, Smirnov lost his temper. . . . " He didn't contest anything I said," Kissinger later remarked, " only my right to say it." . . .
>
> Ambassador Beam called the Soviet refusal to supply their figures " almost unbelievable, but nevertheless true." " We believe these estimates to be fairly accurate," Beam noted, referring to American estimates, " but as a general rule the Soviets refuse to confirm the information we have obtained through our own devices."

So, whatever the truth about the Ogarkov incident, Kissinger and Beam would seem to be reliable sources for the statement that the Russians are obsessed with secrecy and reluctant, to say the least, to release information about their own weapons.

5. On the question of whether the Russians regard what they achieved in SALT I as a victory for themselves or not I think Dr Garthoff has turned things upside down. I suspect that Tumkovsky's boast in an academic journal is nearer the truth and less " propagandistic " than the more widely publicized statements by Brezhnev and other leaders.

After all, it *was* a Soviet victory, wasn't it?

Yours faithfully,

David Floyd

London

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Erratum: In the article by Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Struggle for Afghanistan," *Survey* Vol. 25 no. 2 (111), on page 213, line 21, "Iran" should have read "Iraq."

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